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ABSTRACT

Southern Methodist University was the first Methodist institution in the South to open its
doors to African Americans in the early 1950s. There were several factors that contributed to
SMU pushing for desegregation when it did. When SMU started the process of desegregation in
the fall of 1950, two schools in the Southwest Conference had already admitted at least one black
graduate student. University officials, namely then President Umphrey Lee, realized that
because other schools had desegregated, it would not be long before SMU would have to do the
same. Lee started the path towards desegregation in 1950, and it continued through the
presidency of Willis Tate until 1970 when SMU was no longer lily-white.
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1
Introduction
And SMU/PST was two steps ahead of its city and region. The position
of being one step ahead was occupied by the Methodist Church, whose
members could be found among both the laggards and the leaders.
Methodist women in their “Society for Christian Service” had been
studying better “race relations” for quite some time, and the Church
as a whole had developed a pretty good case of guilty conscience about
the “Negroes,” mixed in with a longtime reluctance to change.
Many
faculty and students at SMU and nearly all at Perkins were ready (and
this time, it is the correct word). On balance, just maybe, the right
time and place.
There was a pretty good chance that desegregation
could succeed. 1

Merrimon Cuninggim served as the dean of the Perkins School of
Theology in the early 1950s when Southern Methodist University decided
to open its doors to African American students.

The above quotation

is credited to Cuninggim in a pamphlet he wrote in 1994 that recalled
his effort, as well as that of others at the university, to bring
about desegregation fully two years before the Brown decision was
handed down in the federal court.

One might ask why a private church-

affiliated school such as SMU would worry admitting of blacks at a
time when it was not necessary for them to do so.

It is because of

men like Cunninggim and Umphrey Lee (then the president of the school)
that made this happen when it did.

Lee was able to go to the SMU

Board of Trustees as early as 1950 and argued to change the school’s
admissions policy bylaws that restricted African-Americans from
attending the university. 2

The board conceded without much of a fight

and it is important because SMU was the only school in the South of
its kind to do so that early.
1

The exact opposite happened at the

Merrimon Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way: The Story of Desegregation
at Southern Methodist University (Dallas: Perkins School of Theology,
1994), 7.
2
Cunninggim, 8.

2

Methodist Church’s other two major institutions of higher learning in
the South, Duke University and Emory University.

Neither of these

schools’ presidents was able to convince their board of trustees to
even consider the idea of admitting black students until the early
1960s.

Duke admitted its first black student in the fall of 1961 and

Emory the fall of 1962.

The main reason why for this is that at both

Duke and Emory the board of trustees was adamant against the idea of
changing the status quo, and for them the status quo was an all white
institution. 3

SMU, by contrast started the process of desegregation

fully a decade before.
There have been numerous works on the desegregation of the
South’s public institutions of higher learning. While this is not an
exhaustive list several of the important studies include E. Culpepper
Clark’s 1993 piece The Schoolhouse Door that followed the path of
Autherine Lucy and her efforts to attend school at the University of
Alabama despite the wishes of the school and the state government. A
few years before Culpepper’s book came out sociology professor Gordon
Morgan produced The Edge of Campus which provided a first-hand account
of the process of desegregation at the University of Arkansas. Robert
Pratt contributed to the literature in 2002 with his book We Shall Not
be Moved that traced the paths taken by three African American
students attempting to break the color line at the University of
Georgia. In 2006 Dwonna Goldstone published her book Integrating the
Forty Acres and focused her attention on the efforts of the University
3

Melissa Kean, Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South:
Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State
University Press, 2008), 185 and 193.

3

of Texas to overcome the color line. One of the most recent additions
to this growing literature is Charles Eagles’ 2009 book The Price of
Defiance which described in great detail how difficult it was for The
University of Mississippi to admit James Meredith in the early 1960s. 4
While there have been plenty of books about the South’s public
schools and desegregation, much less has been written about the
region’s private institutions and how they handled the matter.

There

are numerous institutional histories of the region’s private colleges
and universities but very few that are devoted just to desegregation.
One of the few of note is Melissa Kean’s 2008 book Desegregating
Private Higher Education in the South.

Kean’s work provides an in-

depth look at what she considered the South’s five elite private
schools: Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt.

While Vanderbilt

was the first of these five schools to desegregate in 1953, Kean shows
how each school was hindered in their progress to desegregate by the
reluctance of the board of trustees to break with tradition and be
leaders in admitting black students. This work also provides a model
on how to write a similar story of SMU, and is also important in that
she did not include SMU in her study because of the relative ease with

44

E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last Stand
at the University of Alabama (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993); Charles Eagles The Price of Defiance: James Meredith and the
Integration of Ole Miss (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2009); Dwonna Goldstone, Integrating the Forty Acres: The Fifty
Year Struggle for Racial Equality at the University of Texas (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2006); Gordon Morgan, The Edge of Campus:
A Journal of the Black Experience at the University of Arkansas
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1990); Robert Pratt, We
Shall Not be Moved: The desegregation of the University of Georgia
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002).

4

which the SMU Board of Trustees accepted the inevitability of
desegregation and forged ahead of the others. 5
Even less has been written about SMU’s desegregation that these
other schools despite it being the first major Methodist institution
in the South to do so.

There are several books and articles that

mention the university’s efforts in this regard, but these only
mention the role of the Perkins School of theology’s attempt to do so
in 1952.

The overall university experience of desegregation at SMU

has not been studied.

SMU never experienced any major problems, at

least publicly, with desegregation as other schools.

Even though this

is the case, it does not mean that the story should not be told.

The

intention of this study is to tell the entire story of SMU’s
desegregation from Perkins, to the overall student body, to the
athletic programs, and any other aspect of the university in this
regards.
This study will be broken into six different chapters, each that
will explore some aspect of the university’s efforts to open its
doors.

The first two chapters will focus mainly on the Methodist

Church and the city of Dallas.

Understanding the story behind both of

these entities will help show how different Southern Methodist
University actually was.

Chapter One will offer an in-depth look at

the policies of the Methodist Church to keep the church structure
segregated at a time when the civil rights movement called for an end
to such segregated structures.
5

The church brought together several

Melissa Kean, Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South:
Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 2008).

5

branches to bring an end to a separate church for whites and blacks,
but within that united church the church created the Central
Jurisdiction to keep African Americans from having a real say in
religious matters within the church. It would not be until 1968 that
the United Methodist Church was created formally ending the Central
Jurisdiction and a segregated church structure.

By 1968, SMU had

desegregated virtually every aspect of the university so this first
chapter will be important in showing how the school was breaking from
the tradition of the church.
Chapter Two will discuss the city of Dallas and its continued
efforts to remain a segregated Jim Crow city well into the twentieth
century.

Dallas was a classic southern city in its racial policies

during this period. African Americans were given menial jobs, little
access to good schools, and even less access to the political order in
Dallas.

Well into the twentieth century (at least until the 1950s)

African Americans in Dallas feared the threat of physical violence
against them or their families.

This is just as important to show as

the story of the Methodist church because it shows once again how
different SMU was when it started to desegregate in this hostile
setting.
Chapters Three and Four focus on the earliest attempts by
Southern Methodist University to open its doors to African Americans
in the early 1950s.

The Perkins School of Theology tried to

desegregate under the deanship of Eugene Hawk in 1951.

However, Hawk,

was not very enthusiastic about the prospect of black students
entering the school that year.

He was not the only one, as there were

6

other administrators and several influential boosters that felt the
same way. Chapter Three describes the haphazard efforts by Hawk to
bring black students to Perkins in 1951.

By the end of the fall of

1951, the two black students enrolled had both failed.

It is not

until Cuninggim was brought in as dean in the summer of 1952 that true
desegregation of Perkins would take place.

One of the first things

Cuninggim did as dean was enroll five black men into Perkins during
the fall of 1952. All five graduated on time without much incident,
due in no small part to Cuninggim’s leadership.

Chapter Four will

look at Cuninggim and his role in achieving desegregation in the
school of theology as well as the five men he brought in to achieve
this goal.
Chapter Five will trace the continued effort of desegregation
effort at SMU post 1952.

By the time the initial five blacks

graduated from Perkins in 1955, other areas of the university began to
bring in their own black students.
in 1955.

The law school started the process

Paula Elaine Jones became the first black undergraduate at

SMU in 1962.

Jerry LeVias was not only the first black football

player to receive a scholarship at SMU, but in the entire Southwest
Conference.

When LeVias left SMU in 1969, most departments at the

university had at least begun the process of removing racial barriers,
and those that had not would do so by the end of the 1970s.
While desegregation went relatively smoothly at SMU, this does
not mean that African-American students on the campus did not see room
for improvement.

Chapter Six explores this topic with the creation of

BLAACS, the Black League of Afro-American and African College Students

7

in 1967.

This group staged a protest in 1969, briefly taking over the

president’s office, in an effort to demand better conditions for black
students, faculty, and staff on the campus.

While the protest was

very short, and nonviolent the organization did get the university’s
administration to look at the problem further and make some changes.
This chapter is important because it shows that while SMU did not have
very many problems with desegregation, there was some dissension among
the black students at the progress being made by the school and its
administration to fully make them a true part of the university.
As a private, church backed institution it did not have to
voluntarily open its doors to African American students in 1952 but it
did.

There were people on campus like Merrimon Cuninggim, Umphrey

Lee, and others who felt compelled to get out ahead of the situation
and bring blacks to SMU.

The school did so at a time when the

Methodist Church as well as the city of Dallas was struggling with
their racial pasts.

Neither the church nor the city was ready to do

what SMU did in 1952, and this is what makes the story so intriguing.
It is a story that has been largely forgotten, save the story of the
Perkins School of Theology in 1952.

Hopefully this study will help

tell the entire story of what took place at an important southern,
Methodist institution.

8

Chapter One
From Central Jurisdiction to Unity

It was the Church which created the Central Jurisdiction. It was the
Church which accepted the principle of segregation. It is therefore,
the Church which should be given the opportunity to speak against
segregation and to express its opinion upon segregation, against
segregation and in favor of abolishing the Central Jurisdiction and
placing the Conferences now within the Central Jurisdiction in the
remaining Jurisdictions under the Plan of Union. 1

Chester A. Smith, a member of the Methodist General Conference
from New York, made the statement above during the 1956 General
Conference of the Methodist Church.

It is clear that as late as 1956,

and in fact well before and beyond, the Methodist Church was
struggling with how to deal with segregation within the church’s
overall structure. In 1939, northern and southern branches of the
Church united creating the Methodist Church.

Within this structure,

the Central Jurisdiction was created which allowed for legal
separation of whites and blacks within the overall church
organization.

Black Methodists were only allowed to participate in

the Central Jurisdiction.

When the Methodist Church was created as

such in 1939, there were approximately 308,000 African American
members in the church.

This was the largest number of African

Americans in any protestant church that had a white majority in the
United States.

Despite this, they were still segregated into the

Central Jurisdiction.

1

The Central Jurisdiction was created to keep

Journal of the 1956 General Conference of the Methodist Church Held
at Minneapolis, Minnesota April 25-May 7, 1956 edited by Lud H. Estes,
Secretary General Conference (Nashville: Methodist Publishing House),
467-468.
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white and black Methodists separate and this was important for whites
in the church, particularly those that lived in the Southeast. 2
Despite the efforts of men and women like Chester A. Smith the
church maintained segregated conferences for blacks and whites for
nearly thirty years. It would not be until 1968 that the Central
Jurisdiction, and the segregation that it established, would formally
come to an end. 3

In the meantime, the Church struggled with how to

deal with the problem.

As the Civil Rights Movement emerged and began

to blossom by the late 1950s and 1960s, white Methodists, especially
those in the South, had to decide whether to hold on to the segregated
structure or to further the goals of the overall church.

While many

held to the ideal of segregation as long as they could, the writing
was on the wall that the Methodist Church would eventually have to
change its ways or lose members, particularly those of color outside
the borders of the United States.

Methodists prided themselves on

their missionary work outside the country and for this to work the
Central Jurisdiction would have to go.

Little did men like Chester A.

Smith know that it would take so long for this to happen.
From the time the Methodist Church created the Central
Jurisdiction in 1939 there were people within the church that made it
their mission to get rid of the segregated structure. Each General

2

Peter C. Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 1930-1975
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 3.
3
Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 195. Murray notes that
the last meeting of the Central Jurisdiction took place in 1967 in
Nashville. The following year the General Conference of the Methodist
Church convened as the United Methodist Church which included the
members of the Central Jurisdiction.
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Conference, which met every four years, from 1944 until the late 1960s
debated the issue in some form.

Even though the world was focused on

war, the members of the 1944 conference still took the time to expound
on the inequities of racism within the church.

The General Conference

of 1944 stated in its opening address, “We look to the ultimate
elimination of racial discrimination within the Methodist Church.
Accordingly, we ask the Council of Bishops to create forthwith a
Commission to consider afresh the relations of all races included in
the membership of the Methodist Church and to report to the General
Conference of 1948”.

While this seemed to be a step in the right

direction, the idea of creating a committee to study the issue would
be a means of dodging the issue rather than actually finding ways to
end segregation within the church.

Peter Murray noted in Methodists

and the Crucible of Race this when he stated, “During the early 1940s,
the Methodist Church did relatively little regarding civil rights.
After the struggle for unification, a movement to make sweeping
changes in the jurisdictional system, especially regarding its racial
structure, had little prospect for success”.

While there were people

within the 1944 General Conference that wanted to end segregation in
the church, there were other more pressing problems, like keeping the
newly unified church together.

Pushing the racial issue at that time

would not have helped do that. 4

4

Journal of the 1944 General
Kansas City, Missouri, April
Secretary General Conference
729. Murray, Methodists and

Conference of the Methodist Church held at
26-May 6, 1944 edited by Lud H. Estes,
(Nashville: Methodist Publishing House),
the Crucible of Race, 56.
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It is not much of a surprise that the Methodist Church did not
make racial policies more of a priority during the mid-1940s.

The

world at large was at war, and this undoubtedly was on the minds of
most in the United States including the church. It is important to
note that despite this the church did take a step towards at least
acknowledging there was a problem that needed to be fixed by
subsequent general conferences.
The fact that the 1944 General Conference looked at race at all
is indicative of the already changing landscape in the United States
in regards to the issue.

By 1944, A. Philip Randolph’s threatened

march on Washington had already compelled President Roosevelt to sign
executive order 8802 calling for the creation of the Fair Employment
Practices Committee. He also agreed to give a certain percentage of
defense plant jobs throughout the country to African Americans, thus
giving them an economic opportunity many had not had to that point.
By 1944, the idea of the “Double V Campaign” was also well entrenched.
This started in 1942 when an editorial was sent by African Americans
to the Pittsburgh Courier, one of the most respected black newspapers
in the country at the time. The basic notion of this campaign was
victory abroad and victory at home.

The victory abroad referred to

winning the war against totalitarianism and Nazism.
was to end racism here in the United States.

Victory at home

Black men were serving

in great numbers in the war and felt that in return for this they
should be given more respect and equality at home.

Members of the

12

Methodist Church would have been aware of both of these events by
1944. 5
Not much had changed by 1948. Still, there was more talk about
the idea than action in 1948.

Murray writes, “The 1948 Methodist

General Conference spoke more candidly about racial problems, but it
took little action within its own house”. The Methodist Women’s
Society of Christian Service admitted, “Our accomplishments in interracial cooperation between Negro and white groups during the past
quadrennium have been slight indeed”.

Women, like those in this

society, continually tried to get the male dominated church structure
to look at the inequities of the church in regards to race.

They

would ultimately play an important role as a counter to the men who
wanted to keep segregation going strong in the church. 6
The racial backdrop of the United States had changed by 1948.
Two major color barriers had been broken by 1948.

The first was major

league baseball which opened its doors to blacks in 1947. Jackie
Robinson became the first African American to play in the majors when
he suited up for the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947.
barrier broken by 1948 was the military.

The second major color

President Harry Truman

signed executive order 9981 in July of 1948 officially desegregating
the US military.

Before this African Americans that served in the

military did so in segregated units with white officers.

The writing

was starting to appear on the wall by 1948 that the Jim Crow era was
nearing its end, yet the Methodist Church did nothing to set an
5
6

Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 53-54.
Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 59-60.
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example and lead this movement.

1948 was one of a number of times the

church could have stepped up and taken this leadership role and it
failed to do so. 7
Reverend Edgar A. Love of the Washington Annual Conference of the
Central Jurisdiction tried to turn the words into action at the 1952
General Conference. He offered up an amendment in a report titled “The
Methodist Church and Race” where he wanted “Methodist institutions
including local churches, colleges, universities, theological schools,
hospitals and homes, take steps immediately to open their doors to all
people alike, without distinction as to race, creed, or color”. 8

This

was the first time that someone within the General Conference had
actually called for concrete change.

Even so, the Love initiative as

it was called was very controversial and caused much debate during the
1952 General Conference meeting.

There were those that came out in

favor of adopting the initiative and there were those that were
strongly in favor of getting rid of it.

One of the strongest voices

of opposition came from Charles Parlin of Newark, New Jersey, who was
the Chairman of the General Standing Committee on the State of the
Church.

When he was given the floor to speak to the General

Conference he opined, “Should this amendment carry it would require
reharmonizing the whole Discipline. We would be completely out of
order in my opinion, if this amendment went through.
the whole thing into utter confusion”.

7
8

Ibid.
Ibid, 67.

It would throw

In the end, Parlin won out and

14

the amendment was defeated.

For many this was simply going too far

for the Methodist Church in 1952. 9
Love and Parlin represented the major arguments within the church
for and against segregation in 1952.

Love was an African American who

was a part of the Central Jurisdiction and therefore knew how
segregation created inequality, in society and within the church as a
whole.

The way to end that was to get rid of segregation, and Love

was trying to push the Methodist Church to take a role in leading the
way with his initiative in 1952.

He wanted the church to take an

active role in ending racial injustice, yet the church stood idly by
and let other organizations take the lead.

Parlin on the other hand

was not as convinced that the church should follow this path in 1952.
This was not necessarily due to a lack of understanding of the issue,
but concern for how it would affect the church at large.

Parlin was a

yes man to the Methodist Church and he simply did not feel that church
should take the risk at that time because it would cause a lot of
problems in reorganizing the church structure.

This in essence is the

argument the church was struggling with at the time; integrate at the
request of men like Love who had intimate knowledge of the Central
Jurisdiction, or stay the course for the sake of church structure.10
One part of Love’s initiative that did get a second look in 1952
was that of desegregating Methodist seminaries.

9

Towards the end of

Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 68. Journal of the 1952
General Conference of the Methodist Church held at San Francisco,
California, April 23-May 6, 1952, edited by Lud H. Estes, Secretary
General Conference (Nashville: Methodist Publishing House), 650.
10
Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 67-68.
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the conference, there were several memorials put forth from theology
students at Duke and Emory that asked the General Conference to
“urgently recommend that all Methodist Schools of Theology admit
qualified students without regard to race or color.

The Committee

voted concurrence except in those instances where State laws would
force an undue hardship upon the institution involved”.

Despite Edgar

Love trying to remove the last part of this statement from the vote,
it allowed for a loophole in North Carolina and Georgia that made it
where neither Duke nor Emory took action to remove their racial
barriers.

The church knew that Duke and Emory would not do so because

of laws in both states and according to Peter Murray, “The church, in
effect, declined to put any pressure on these two divinity schools to
open their doors to African American applicants”.

One bright spot for

the Methodist affiliated seminaries was SMU which adhered to this
memorial and admitted its first African American students in the fall
of 1952. This was not a problem for SMU because of the actions taken
by university president Umphrey Lee in late 1950. In November of 1950,
Lee convinced the Board of Trustees at SMU to change the school’s
bylaws to ensure there would not be a problem with desegregation when
the matter arose.

Little did he know it would happen so quickly

thereafter. 11
Southern Methodist University was not the first southern
institution to integrate by 1952.
11

It was simply the first Methodist

Journal of the 1952 General Conference of the Methodist Church,
1212. Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 68. Merrimon
Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way: The Story of Desegregation at Southern
Methodist University (Dallas: Perkins School of Theology, 1994), 8.

16

affiliated school in the South to do so.

It was also one of the first

to do so without the threat of litigation. Several court cases had
come out by 1952 that forced universities in the South to open their
doors to blacks including Sipuel v. Board of Regents in 1948, Sweatt
v. Painter in 1950, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma in 1950.

The Sipuel case

came out of the University of Oklahoma and while it did not end
segregation it put the onus on the state to provide a truly equal
education for African Americans that wanted to attend law school in
the state. The McLaurin case was also from Oklahoma and officially
opened the doors of the University of Oklahoma to African American
students.

The Sweatt ruling was a similar decision out of Texas that

called for ending segregation at the state’s major institution, the
University of Texas in Austin. The difference put forth by the Love
memorial at the 1952 Methodist General Conference is that the
University of Oklahoma and the University of Texas were public
institutions being forced to desegregate by the courts.

SMU was

simply adhering to the Love amendment of its own accord. 12
When the Brown decision came out in 1954 the Methodist Church had
a difficult time dealing with the ruling.

The Church did have legal

segregation written into its constitution with the Central
Jurisdiction and many were not sure what to do.

While there was no

General Conference in 1954, the Council of Bishops did meet in
November to decide how to approach the issue and whether or not the
church would make a formal statement in regards to the case.

12

Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 60-61.
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Congregants within the Central Jurisdiction praised the ruling, while
southern members of the church were not as optimistic.

In December of

1954 nearly three hundred Methodist ministers and laymen met in
Birmingham, Alabama, to create the Association of Methodist Members
and Laymen.

Their intended goal was to defend segregation within the

church, as well as convince as many Methodists as they could to not
push for change in the jurisdictional system at the 1956 General
Conference.

However, for many Methodists the problems with race

within the church went well beyond the Central Jurisdiction and this
was discussed thoroughly at the next General Conference in 1956.

When

the conference opened in Minneapolis in April of 1956, race relations
and the Central Jurisdiction was one of the most important agenda, and
this would be the most important decision the conference had faced
since unification in 1939. 13
By 1956, the civil rights movement was truly beginning to take
shape so it is not a shock that the Methodists were at least nominally
taking this into account in the General Conference of that same year.
The Montgomery Bus Boycott had taken place in late 1955 and continued
through much of 1956. This was one of the galvanizing moments in the
early movement and proved that African Americans were now ready en
masse to fight the system.

At the same time, 1956 was the start of

the massive resistance movement among many southern whites in which
they tried to keep Jim Crow alive.

One way they did this was to

create the Southern Manifesto, a document designed to create a way to

13
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legally resist Brown.

This dichotomy would play itself out in the

Methodist General Conference in 1956. 14
Debate raged almost from the beginning of the General Conference,
due in large part to the introduction of Amendment IX, a
constitutional amendment that allowed for gradual desegregation to
take place within the Methodist Church. The General Conference wrote
and submitted the amendment to all conferences for ratification. The
amendment had three major parts all which called for some form of
desegregation with the onus being placed on local churches.

According

to Peter Murray, “The first part permitted local churches within the
Central Jurisdiction to transfer into annual conferences of regional
jurisdictions. The second part streamlined desegregation by permitting
entire annual conferences of the Central Jurisdiction to transfer into
the regional district.”

The third part of the amendment said that

when a quarter of the Central Jurisdiction’s membership had
transferred into regional jurisdictions then a bishop within the
Central Jurisdiction would transfer to the regional jurisdiction with
the most members from the Central Jurisdiction.

While this would not

end segregation, it was a start, and Amendment IX was looked on in a
quite favorable way by the General Conference because it called for
limited action and did not threaten any one jurisdiction
specifically. 15

14
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W Sproule Boyd, a minister of the Northeastern Jurisdiction from
Pittsburgh, was one of those that fought to get the amendment passed.
Boyd was the pastor of the Franklin Street Methodist Church in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania and was active in the NAACP in the state. In
1956 he received the Civil Rights Award of Pennsylvania from the state
director of the NAACP.

With this in mind, it is not a surprise that

he would be interested in helping get Amendment IX passed.

When Boyd

addressed the General Conference he referenced the fact that the
Methodist Church had six jurisdictions only one of which was based on
race.

This was clearly the definition of segregation and the church

should at the minimum acknowledge this fact. The adoption of Amendment
IX according to Boyd, would allow that to happen if nothing else. 16
For Boyd, the only way the Church would be able to move forward
in race relations was to pass Amendment IX.

Others felt the same way

and the amendment passed the 1956 General Conference with well over
the two thirds vote needed to send the amendment out for other annual
conferences to ratify.

Many Methodists stressed that Amendment IX

would be implemented on a voluntary basis and this would lead to a
lasting idea in the church-voluntarism.

Local churches could

desegregate if they wanted based on Amendment IX, but it was not
mandatory and this put a number of people at ease over the passing of
the amendment.

16
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interesting conundrum for many African Americans within the church.
While the plan called for voluntary desegregation within the church’s
jurisdictions African Americans had not volunteered for the Central
Jurisdiction.

At the same time, those in favor of the amendment felt

that it would give the opportunity for at least limited integration
without the possibility of losing church members, particularly those
in the South. 17
Despite the overwhelming support for Amendment IX there were some
within the general conference opposed to the initiative.

Oddly enough

this opposition came from people within the Central Jurisdiction as
well as from a few liberal whites in the church.

The argument they

gave was that simply getting rid of the Central Jurisdiction was not
going nearly far enough.

For those opposed to Amendment IX, like

Reverend C. Anderson Davis of Tennessee, ending the Central
Jurisdiction was only part of the problem and this amendment did not
address other issues of segregation within the church, therefore it
should not be passed.

This is evidence that at least some African

Americans within the Central Jurisdiction did not want tokenism.
Rather, they wanted true equality within the church but in 1956 they
would not get this. 18
After Amendment IX was passed the General Conference moved to
create a commission to study how to make the process of desegregation
more of a reality.

The Standing Legislative Committee on Conferences

addressed the issue by endorsing the creation of a commission to study
17
18
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and recommend action in regards to the current system of jurisdictions
within the church.

The main goal of the commission was to study the

strengths and weaknesses of the jurisdictional system and to report on
ways to make it better (or less segregated). The committee of 70
members was called the Commission of Seventy. The 70 members included
46 people from the various jurisdictions, 12 Bishops of the Church,
and 12 laymen.

This was done to provide a cross section of the church

in the hopes of finding answers to the race problem within the
Methodist structure. 19
Racial practices in the Methodist Publishing House were also
addressed at the 1956 General Conference.

The Methodist Publishing

House was the largest religious publisher in the United States and one
of the largest employers in all of Nashville, Tennessee.

Prior to

1956, accusations of discrimination and segregation were brought
fourth against the publishing house.

The General Conference of 1956

tried to rectify the issue by encouraging the Methodist Publishing
House to further end segregation in its employment practices and
provide equal opportunity to people of all races in all levels of its
organization.

For the Methodist Church this was one more step, albeit

a small one, toward better race relations in the overall structure of
the church. 20
The findings of the Commission of Seventy were the first racial
issues discussed at the 1960 Methodist General Conference.
19
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address titled, The Jurisdictional System and Racial Brotherhood, the
1960, conference stated, “Without prejudging your actions on its
proposals, we wish to commend the general method and spirit of the
report and to say that, in our considered judgment, your dealing with
it is the most urgent specific obligation of this Conference.”

Many

Methodists at the 1960 General Conference saw the writing on the wall.
The Church realized that by 1960 the reports of the Commission of
Seventy presented at the conference “may have a more immediate and
far-reaching effect upon the unity and the vitality of The Methodist
Church in America and beyond, in our mission and our impact on the
world, in the immediate present and the longer future, than any other
you will take in this Conference”.

The time for action had come and

many at the Conference were now more willing to take a stand. 21
Chester A. Smith of New York was one of these men that wanted to
take a stand at the 1960 General Conference and in the process created
a firestorm.

He wanted to amend a statement by the Commission of

Seventy to get Methodist institutions of higher learning to further
look at their racial policies.

Smith specifically wanted the church

to quit giving money to Duke University’s seminary as well as any
other Methodist seminary that did not admit African American students.
Raymond E. Balcomb, a minister on the Commission of Seventy, took
Smith’s idea even further by saying that each Methodist institution
that received World Service funds should be required to report
21
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annually on their racial policies and practices.

Smith proposed to

the general conference that as long as Duke continued to remain
segregated the university should get no money from the Methodist
Church or any of its affiliate organizations.

Smith explained the

necessity of his proposal by stating, “We have this great institution
refusing to admit into its School of Theology men who want to study
for the ministry, but who are refused admission into the School of
Theology because they are Negroes”.

After noting how fine an

institution Duke was he went on to assert, “I say that in order to put
the stamp of approval upon such a position as the trustees of that
institution uphold and maintain, we should express our grave
disapproval of what they are doing by refusing to give them one dollar
of our money from our Church or from our World Service receipts”.
After Smith spoke to his resolution, there was much debate about
the issue at hand.

Some in the crowd were in agreement with Smith

while others did not believe that this was the proper approach to this
specific situation.

Thurman L. Dodson of the Washington Conference

was in favor of adopting the amendment, telling to the General
Conference about the amendment he declared, “It seems high time for he
General Conference if it believes what it says to take a stand for
Christ, because I am certain that all the money that goes into this
Church, certainly we ought not to use it to uphold segregation
practices”.

Edwin L. Jones of the Western North Carolina, SE

Jurisdiction, opposed the amendment, questioning the right of the
church to act as a police power on this matter.

The church should not

24

be compelled to coerce Duke, or any other Methodist affiliated
institution for that matter, when it came to ending segregation in its
institutions.

Another person against the amendment was Norman L.

Trott of the Baltimore, NE Jurisdiction.
issue in a different light.

Trott begged to look at the

He felt it was not right to deny funds to

future ministers of the Church simply because they went to an
institution that practiced segregation. When he spoke to the general
conference he tried to show that if you starting taking away funds
from Duke then you would be depriving the theology students already at
the school of financial support.

This would be bad for the Methodist

Church because it would dispossess the church of much needed
leadership in the form of ministers trained at Duke.

In the end, men

like Trott and Edwin Jones prevailed, and the amendment proposed by
Smith was not adopted.

But it did not come without much debate and

clearly the General Conference of 1960 was willing to work toward a
solution to the segregation problem in a way the General Conferences
of the past had not. 22
It must be noted that the amendment to pull funding from Duke’s
theology school was introduced by Chester A. Smith of New York.

In

the general conference’s debate on whether to pass the amendment or
not virtually to a man those in favor of the amendment were from the
North and the West, as well as other countries like Argentina.
opposed were from the South.

There are a few exceptions to this, but

overall the trend holds along regional lines.
22
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that supported the amendment were doing so out of blind faith that any
end to segregation was a good thing.

This was not always the case as

those from the South that were opposed to the amendment tried to show
with disapproval of the amendment. 23
In addition to finances tied to racism, the 1960 General
Conference continued to debate the existence of the Central
Jurisdiction.

Even with sustained debate, nothing was resolved in

1960 in regards to ending the Central Jurisdiction immediately.

The

General Conference adopted Recommendation No. 10 as Amended on May 5,
1960.

This recommendation stipulated that the Church had originally

agreed to create the Central Jurisdiction and for the time being would
have to live with that fact.

If the church did not, many African

American Methodists would be left out of Annual Conferences and the
Church did not want to see this happen.

The goal was to have a

completely inclusive church and this could not be achieved in 1960 by
ending the Central Jurisdiction. 24
Ending the Central Jurisdiction was not enough for a number of
members of the 1960 General Conference.

Racism in the Methodist

Church went far beyond the lifetime of the Central Jurisdiction
according to men like James P. Brawley, president of Clark Atlanta

23
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College in Atlanta.

Brotherhood should be the main focus and until

that was achieved the end of racism within the Methodist Church would
not be complete.

Brawley asserted that simply ending the Central

Jurisdiction was not the answer.

He called on the 1964 General

Conference to declare “in unequivocal terms that the entire Church and
all of its institutions…shall be desegregated and no one shall be
denied admission because of color or racial identity”.

This would

only be achieved if all Methodist churches, from the local level to
the national level, practiced racial inclusiveness.

Brawley

recommended, “creation of racially inclusive churches, cross-racial
appointment of ministers, and desegregation of women’s ministerial,
and youth groups”.

The stage was now set by 1964 to not just end

segregation with the Central Jurisdiction but end all racist practices
within the entire Methodist Church power structure. 25
It is not a shock that the 1960 General Conference was a little
more concerned about ending racial structures within the church than
earlier ones.

Segregated structures, including those in public

schools and lunch counters to name a few, were starting to fall across
the country and the church did not want to be left behind in this
matter.

While it was too late for Methodists to lead the way in

opening doors, they could at least follow.

The church did not want a

public spectacle like what had happened in 1957 in Little Rock.

Even

so there were ministers willing to speak out on the subject of school
desegregation.

25
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supported the idea of public school desegregation openly.

It was this

line of thinking that made it possible by 1960 for Methodists at the
General Conference to take on the issue with a little more urgency. 26
Bishop Gerald Kennedy continued Brawley’s line of thinking when
he opened the 1964 General Conference in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania with
the Episcopal Address.

Kennedy was a well-known Bishop throughout the

Church, due in no small part to the fact that he had been on the cover
of Time Magazine, and he wanted the Church to end segregation and for
people within the Church to quit trying to justify it through
Scripture.

He noted in the Episcopal Address, “It is, therefore, most

disturbing to see Methodists trying to justify segregation on the
basis of weird interpretations of the Scriptures”.

He went on to say

that, “We believe that this General Conference should insist upon the
removal from its structure of any mark of racial segregation and we
should do it without wasting time”.

Finally, in his closing remarks

on segregation Bishop Kennedy stated emphatically that, “We believe
that this General Conference should be able to say when it adjourns
the people called Methodists, by the grace of God, have moved forward
toward removing segregation”.

Finally, it seemed that the Methodist

Church was on the verge of moving forward in the process of ending
segregation throughout the Church in a meaningful way. 27
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One new development at the 1964 General Conference was the
presence of more than 1,000 Methodist youth, both African-American and
white, who came to the conference on May 2, 1964 to protest the
continuation of the Central Jurisdiction.

Several of the bishops at

the Conference met with the youth, while several others brushed it off
as a publicity stunt.

Nonetheless, the demonstration shows that the

youth of the Church were ready to get involved in a way they never had
before.

It proved that the concern over racial segregation within the

Methodist Church was not just being discussed by the members of the
General Conference, and that the youth were ready to respond in a way
that would actually produce change.

The civil rights movement was in

full swing by 1964, and by that time protests were a normal part of
the movement.

Methodist Youth were now ready to follow that same path

in an effort to affect change. 28
Inside the conference James Brawley recognized that what the
Methodist youth were doing was part of an ever changing landscape in
America.

African-Americans would no longer sit idly by and those

within the church were no different according to Brawley.

The time

had come for the Methodist Church to finally move forward from its
racist, segregated past.

Brawley noted in an address to the General

Conference
In the beginning, there was a reluctance, hesitation, inhibitions and
frustrations, but now these psychological frustrations have grown to
impatience which gives tremendous urgency to what we do at this
General Conference and in the immediate weeks and months ahead. There
is a revolution carried on by a New American Negro in every section of
this country, South, North, East and West.
28

Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 156.

29

This is a revolution born of conditions too long ignored by both
church and state. This revolution gives all Negroes everywhere a new
sense of kinship and unity, and links them with a growing group of
kindred spirits in a universal struggle for freedom, dignity, and
equality. This is a new spiritual encounter for the church.
The Methodist Youth demonstrating outside the Conference were a part
of this revolution and a part of this growing group of kindred
spirits.

This provided the perfect opportunity for those within the

conference to realize what Brawley, and the youth, were trying to tell
them and make a real move to end the Central Jurisdiction as well as
all other racial barriers within the Methodist Church. 29
The question still remained how the General Conference would do
that.

The first step was to remove financial impediments caused by

segregation.

Two separate funds were created in order to take care of

minister salaries and pensions once the segregated annual conferences
began to merge.

This was a step the church had never before taken.

The amendment to create these two funds was proposed by Charles S.
Scott of the Central West Jurisdiction and amended by Edwin E. Reeves
of the Southern California Jurisdiction.

Neither was from the South,

and provides yet another example of people from outside the region
pushing for change within the church. After numerous debates on the
issue Reeves’ amendment was passed and both funds were established by
the General Conference of 1964.

29
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taken by the General Conference to end segregation and the next step
was to fully abolish the Central Jurisdiction. 30
The abolition of the Central Jurisdiction became imperative by
1964 and beyond because the Methodist Church was planning a merger
with the Evangelical United Brethren Church. The EUB Church was a
750,000 member Midwestern denomination with a German background. It
was similar in doctrine and polity to the Methodist Church so in this
regard the merger made sense.

Methodists viewed it as a way to boost

membership without having to radically change the doctrines of the
church. The merger was to take place during a special session of the
General Conference in 1966, and people within the Methodist church
feared the merger would not happen if the Central Jurisdiction was
allowed to continue.

The thought was that, “The EUB Church might

reject union if its leaders perceived that the Methodist Church was
not making sufficient progress on racial practices”.

Sufficient

progress on racial practices at this point meant completely ending the
Central Jurisdiction and not allowing it to be a part of the merger.
Since it was a church of German origin, there were almost no African
Americans among its membership.

Despite this, the EUB was a church

that had opposed racial discrimination over the years and would not
compromise that for the sake of the merger. The Methodist Church
needed the new members the EUB Church would provide so the 1964

30
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General Conference needed to act in a manner that would finally end
the Central Jurisdiction. 31
With the merger in mind the 1964 General Conference laid out a
plan to formally end the Central Jurisdiction, thereby, leaving it out
of the merger. William Astor Kirk of the West Texas Jurisdiction spoke
before the General Conference with the idea of leaving the Central
Jurisdiction out of the merger with the EUB Church.

He noted in his

address, “That the Methodist Church record its judgment that the
Central Jurisdiction structure of the Methodist Church not be made a
part of the plan of merger with the Evangelical United Brethren
Church”.

It did not make sense to Astor to bring the Central

Jurisdiction into a new church.

The merger would allow for a clean

slate of sorts, to start anew without the segregated structure of the
previous church.

Astor felt that the church was contradicting itself

by bringing this structure into the merger while at the same time
asking men like himself, those within the Central Jurisdiction with
leadership responsibility, to end the race based jurisdiction.

32

In the end the motion to merge was adopted by a vote of 464 to
362. While this is a margin of 102 votes, it does not exactly provide
a mandate for the merger. It seems evident that a good number of
people did not want the merger to take place because it would end the
Central Jurisdiction.

However, the merger with the Evangelical United

Brethren Church would take place as planned and the Central

31
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Jurisdiction was on its way to being completely abolished when this
new united Church was formed. 33
As the 1964 General Conference was winding down those in
attendance created a statement of principles that would guide the
church in years to come. This included that the aim of the church was
to be an inclusive church in an inclusive society.
racial inclusiveness.

This included

Pastors in the church were called upon to make

sure their local worship services were open to all races and that
anyone, regardless of color, would have equal opportunity on the local
level in the Methodist Church. The statement of principles asked the
church as a whole to practice fair employment policies and render
services to the public without discrimination. Even though the church
had a past full of racial indignation, it did not mean that the
present day church should continue down that path. Methodists should
work to end segregation within the church but in society at large as
well.

This included all public and Methodist schools that still clung

to the idea of separate but equal. Clearly the ending of the Central
Jurisdiction was now not enough for the Methodist Church. Since that
was in the process of being achieved, Methodists at the 1964 General
Conference wanted to completely end segregation within the entire
church and this statement of principles was the first step towards
that goal. 34
In 1966, the Methodist Church held a special session of the
General Conference to finalize the merger of the church with the
33
34

Ibid.
Journal of the 1964 General Conference, 1269-1272.

33

Evangelical United Brethren Church.

In order for this to occur, the

church would have to end the Central Jurisdiction once and for all.

A

progress report from the 1964 General Conference was read during the
Episcopal Address of this special session in regard to that matter.
The progress report was meant to ease the minds of those in the EUB
Church about the upcoming merger with the Methodist Church.

It noted

the headway the church had made between 1964 and 1966 to end
segregation as well as to continue to do so after the merger in 1968.
The merger was predicated on the fact that the progress report was put
into effect.

It is highly likely that members of the EUB Church would

have backed out of the deal if they did not feel the Methodist Church
was acting in a manner that would soon see the end of the Central
Jurisdiction. 35
1968 was the target date for ending the Central Jurisdiction.
The landscape of the United States, and the Civil Rights Movement, was
vastly different by 1968. Many racial barriers had been taken down and
others were on their way to the ground by this date.

The civil rights

movement had become much more militant by this point with groups like
the Black Panthers creating the Black Power Movement.

No longer did

African Americans sit idly by, or protest like Dr. King.

Those in the

Methodist Church knew the Central Jurisdiction had to be ended because
of the merger with the EUB Church.

With this in mind, it only makes

sense that 1968 would be the date to do so.
35
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Central Alabama Jurisdiction made this very clear when he stated,
“When we began these discussions, members of the Central Jurisdiction
Advisory Councils insisted that 1968 should be the terminal date for
segregated structures in the Methodist Church”. He went on to say, “It
was our feeling that both the spirit and letter of action taken in the
1964 General Conference would be served by the elimination of
segregated Conferences by ’68”. 36
There were still those within the church that did not agree with
setting a hard date.

Men like George Atkinson from California

believed that the Central Jurisdiction would be ended by 1968 but “we
don’t think you can do it by forcing it”.

He compared the Central

Jurisdiction to a marriage and said a forced marriage has very little
chance of success.

Atkinson and others felt that Lowery was trying to

force the issue to end the Central Jurisdiction by 1968, but also said
that if given time it would be ended by that date. 37
By the end of the special conference in 1966, the Methodist
Church had adopted a new statement of purpose in regard to ending
racism in the church.

The report was titled Resolution for the

Elimination of Racial Structure and the Development of Greater
Understanding and Brotherhood in the Methodist Church. By adopting the
resolution every level of the church structure agreed to eliminate all
forms of racism within the church as quickly as possible.

36
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contradicted previous statements made by the church as it had taken
nearly thirty years to get to this point. The resolution sought to
make it where no new annual conferences of the church would have a
jurisdiction based solely on those from the Central Jurisdiction. All
levels of the church organization would resolve to fully end racism
within its structure by 1972 at the latest if not before.

This goes

well beyond the Central Jurisdiction which would stick to the 1968
target date.

As had been mentioned before just ending the Central

Jurisdiction was not enough as the racism in the church was at all
levels, not just geography of the annual conferences.

Once the

resolution was put forth the Methodist church finally had a formal
plan in place to end racial discrimination within its structure at
every level. 38
The Central Jurisdiction met for the last time in Nashville,
Tennessee in August of 1967.

The church was finally moving in the

right direction in regards to racism within its organization.

African

Americans at this last meeting were cautiously optimistic for the
future.

One obstacle to creating an all-inclusive church had been

removed, but this did not mean that the church was free of racial
strife.

African-American Methodists, “wanted inclusiveness to create

a brotherhood that truly transcended all racial barriers”. 39
The ending of the Central Jurisdiction was just the first step in
creating this inclusiveness and the General Conference of the newly

38
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united church in 1968, as well as those to follow, continued to
struggle with how to make the church truly united.

Murray noted when

he wrote, “This building of an inclusive church would not be easy, and
it would require the church to be more aggressive in fighting racism
in American society.

Without true inclusiveness, the United Methodist

Church would be a church without racial structures but with little
genuine fellowship”. This genuine fellowship and racial brotherhood
would truly be an accomplishment for the Methodist Church as no other
large American church had achieved the type of racial brotherhood the
Methodist Church now sought. 40
The General Conference of 1968 would be the first conference of
the newly created United Methodist Church.

While the Central

Jurisdiction had been formally ended, the United Methodist Church
still had many problems to fix when it came to the issue of race, and
the 1968 General Conference would begin to address those problems.
The first was the remaining racial structures in the church,
especially the segregated annual conferences in the Southeastern and
South Central Jurisdictions. The second would be the idea that the
newly created church needed to further promote interracial harmony and
fellowship among all Methodists.

African American Methodists feared

that they would be ignored by their white brethren within the church
and that tokenism would replace exclusion.

Once the aforementioned

had been achieved, the church would then try to make itself an agent
for racial change within society.

40
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difficult as many Methodists did not see themselves as harbingers of
change within overall society. Nonetheless, a number of Methodists
felt that pushing for that change in society was the most important of
all of the racial problems confronting the new church and worked
tirelessly to this end. 41
The notion of the United Methodist Church becoming an
organization for social change was brought forth during the Episcopal
Address of the 1968 General Conference.

The bishops asserted that the

Methodists should take a trip to the impoverished areas of the cities
and decide whether or not they have done enough as Christians to right
these wrongs.

The Episcopal Address read as follows

Having the miracle of Christ-like sight and hearing performed, may we
suggest that members of the fellowship walk humbly through the
depressed sections of any great city of the world.
Visit the
schoolhouse, the local market, the apartment house, the neighborhood
where our brothers dwell.
Then, decide, whether we, members of the
fellowship, have done justice, whether we have shown loving kindness,
whether the expectations which our proclamation of the Good News has
lifted could possibly be realized in these neighborhoods.
Ask
yourself, “Is this the realization of Christ’s dream? Is this the City
of God?” An honest answer would reveal whether his spirit, his mind
possesses us; whether we have been his obedient servants.
The idea is that if Methodists truly considered doing this they would
realize that they had not done enough to help social change within the
country and hopefully seeing the impoverished areas would help them
get more involved. 42
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Ending all the segregated annual conferences left over by the
abolition of the Central Jurisdiction was crucial in order for the
church to truly achieve the inclusiveness and brotherhood it sought.
The general conference of 1968 made this clear stating, “In the United
Methodist Church no conference or other organizational unit of the
church shall be structured so as to exclude any member or any
constituent body of the church because of race, color, national
origin, or economic condition”.

Organizational units were defined by

the General Conference as, “the structures into with the Church was
constitutionally organized as set for in Division Two, namely
Conferences (General, Jurisdictional, Central, Annual, District, and
Charge), the Episcopacy, and the Judiciary”. 43
In addition to ending the racial structures, the General
Conference of 1968 also wanted to raise the pensions and salaries of
those previously in the Central Jurisdiction.

This was a major

concern for the last of the segregated conferences and a hurdle the
General Conference needed to address.

According to Peter Murray, “The

national church had to accept more of the financial burden for mergers
to take place in the Deep South because it had ignored very low
pensions and inadequate minimum salary scales in the Central
Jurisdiction for years”.

Once the conference was over, the new church

began to end the last of the segregated conferences within the church.
This would rely heavily on the local populations of the churches, and
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while this would be difficult at times the segregated local
conferences would eventually all be ended within the new church. 44
1968 was a pivotal year for the Methodist Church.

This was the

year the Methodist Church merged with the Evangelical United Brethren
Church, but it was also the year the Central Jurisdiction was ended
for good.

The Central Jurisdiction had been created in 1939 and every

General Conference from that point until 1968 tried to find a way to
end it.

This finally occurred with the merger in 1968.

While the new

church still had its racial problems, by 1968 it was well on its way
to completely eradicating racism within the structures of the church.
It had been a long road with many bumps along the way, but the United
Methodist Church was closer than it had ever been by 1968 to being
truly united in racial attitudes and brotherhood.
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Chapter Two
Desegregating the Dallas Way
Dallas is a good city and we want to keep it that way. We need all of
our citizens to accept their civic and their personal responsibilities
and stand up and be counted for law and order. We need your help. As
your mayor and speaking for your city council, we pledge our
assistance in this program and earnestly hope to have yours. Together
we will show America the Dallas Way. 1
The idea of the “Dallas Way” is as old as the city itself. It
came about in the 1840s as a way to promote the city as one of
cooperation, hard work, and civic conduct.

The concept continued to

grow along with the city into an idea that “people should obey the law
in a spirit of enthusiasm, cooperation, faith, courage, vision,
perseverance, hospitality, and brotherly love.” While this model would
be used in all facets of life in Dallas, it especially rings true of
the civil rights movement in the city.

It provided Dallas a way for

peaceful, albeit slow at times, desegregation in all aspects of public
life in the metroplex.

For the most part, Dallas adhered to this

model when beginning the process of desegregation.

The city did not

experience the riots and upheaval of many areas of the South during
the civil rights movement.

Desegregation, according to William

Brophy, “was a result of hard work and excellent communication between
the city’s black and white communities.”

This was the essence of the

“Dallas Way” and numerous other communities throughout the region took
notice and had their own versions of this model. Greensboro had
“Civility”, Atlanta was the “City too busy to hate”, and Tampa had the
“Tampa Technique”.
1

All of these cities were using some version of the

Mayor Earle Cabell, Dallas at the Crossroads, Film Commissioned by
the Dallas Citizens Council in 1961 and produced by Sam Bloom. Found
on Youtube.
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“Dallas Way” to promote peaceful race relations and for the most part
it worked.

The “Dallas Way” made for peaceful civil rights

transitions through the 1950s and 1960s. 2
In order to keep the city under control and follow the “Dallas
Way”, Dallas businessmen formed the Dallas Citizens Council. 3

The

council was created in 1937 by R.L. “Bob” Thornton and would control
politics and business in the city for decades.
1880 and grew up poor in rural central Texas.

Thornton was born in
As a child he did

everything from pick cotton to clearing brush so he was instilled with
a drive and hard work ethic from his earliest days.

By the early

1900s this determination helped him become a banker in Dallas and
eventually the president of Mercantile National Bank.

He was made

president of the Texas Bankers Association in 1924 and eventually the
president of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce in 1933. It was from this
position that the idea of the Dallas Citizens Council began to take
shape.

With Thornton at the helm, the DCC included real estate

magnates, department store owners, bankers, manufacturers, insurance
company executives, and owners of utility and media outlets.

The

group came up with a strategy that would serve the entire city saying
2
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that what was good for the business community in Dallas was good for
all of Dallas.

This included the black community. In other words, it

was to the advantage of Dallas’ black citizens to keep the business
community happy and the way to do this was to not cause a stir with
racial issues.

If the black community would bring its concerns to the

DCC, in a nonviolent way, the business leaders in turn would help
desegregate the city.

While this would take time, often decades, and

only provide nominal racial change in the city, many of the black
elite bought into the plan and began negotiating with the DCC on a
regular basis to help bring what change they could to Dallas. They
felt this was the only way that they would achieve any change, and at
the time even small differences in the city’s thinking on racial
issues were welcomed. 4
One way the Dallas Citizens Council started the negotiation
process was to create a biracial committee to look at the city’s
racial problems and figure out ways to solve them peacefully.

The

Committee of 14 as it was called was created in 1960 when then Mayor
Bob Thornton (founder of the DCC) had a meeting with several key
members of Dallas’ black community to talk strategy. Thornton told
those in attendance that if they wanted to push for change they needed
to get the DCC on board because “these guys have power”.

The

committee consisted of seven leaders from both the white and black
4
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communities, and these 14 men would significantly bolster the chances
of peaceful desegregation in Dallas.

The black members of the

Committee of 14 included George Allen, president of Great Liberty Life
Insurance Company; W.J. Durham, one of the most prominent black
attorneys in Dallas; Reverend E.C. Estell, president of the
Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance; C.J. Clark, undertaker and
spokesman for various fraternal organizations; Reverend B.E. Joshua,
president of the Baptist Ministerial alliance; E.L.V. Reed, a tire
dealer; and A. Maceo Smith, a leading black businessman and one of the
most prominent Negro leaders in Texas.

The white members of the

committee were James Aston, president of the Republic National Bank;
Carr P. Collins, Sr., president of Fidelity Life Insurance Company;
Karl Hoblitzelle, chairman of the board of the Republic National Bank;
W.W. Overton, board chairman of the Texas Bank and Trust Company; John
Mitchell, cotton machinery manufacturer; Julian Scheppes, wholesale
liquor dealer and a leading Jewish layman; and C.A. Tatum, president
of the Dallas Power and Light Company.

It should be noted that the

black members of the group were chosen by the black community.
According to A. Maceo Smith, who was perhaps the most important black
member of the Committee of 14, “What made the committee a useful tool
is that we were talking with the people who were able to do
something”.

This also gave the committee an air of respect in the

black community.

When Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP,

met with the Committee of 14, he came away impressed asserting, “If
this sort of thing had been done throughout the country—people willing

44
to sit down together and talk about the problem—we would have a
different picture now”. 5
The first thing the Committee of 14 did in its initial meeting
was come up with a list of goals to accomplish in Dallas. Smith led
the way in challenging the organization with six objectives to help
desegregate the city of Dallas.
food services to the city.
public accommodations.

The first was to provide integrated

The second was to provide integrated

Neither of these was new, as black leaders

like Smith and others had been trying to accomplish these goals for
years.

The third goal was to provide equal employment opportunities

for Negroes at City Hall.

The fourth called for the removal of racial

designation signs from all public places.

The fifth goal was to

provide integrated seating accommodations at sporting events and other
public places and the sixth goal was to open accommodations in hotels
and motels. This would indeed be a challenge to the Committee of 14 to
accomplish all six of these goals, but they began working on each one
as quickly as possible after the first meeting. 6
While A. Maceo Smith’s work with the committee was important to
furthering black rights in Dallas, this effort started well before the
group was formed in 1960.

Originally from Texarkana, he graduated

from Fisk University in 1924 and obtained a masters’ degree from New
York University in 1928.

5

Smith came to Dallas in 1933 and immediately
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helped to resuscitate the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce as well as
the local chapter of the NAACP. He said the DNCC was needed “because
at that time there was little or no involvement of blacks with the
ongoing of the city, you had your little thing on this side of town,
while white folks were on the other side of town and the twain didn’t
meet”.

This sounds very similar to his position in later years with

the Committee of 14. Smith was already setting up the idea of more
black involvement with the workings of the city by bringing back the
Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce. 7
Politics, more specifically black political participation,
quickly became a concern for Smith after he came to Dallas. In 1933,
right after coming to Dallas, Smith helped create the Progressive
Citizens League.

This organization provided African Americans the

opportunity to register to vote in Dallas by paying their poll taxes
if they could not afford to do so.

He also assisted in organizing the

Progressive Voters League in the city in 1936 to get blacks more
involved in voting and the political process. It was organized right
after Ammon Wells, an African American man, ran for the state House of
Representatives and came in 6th out of 60 candidates.

Wells garnered

1,001 votes while the winner polled 1,844 votes and Smith, as well as
Maynard Jackson (leader of the PVL), felt that if there had been more
black voters registered Wells probably would have won the race. By
joining the Progressive Voters League, black Dallasites were adhering

7
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to the “Dallas Way” because they were fulfilling their civic duty and
acting responsibly as put forth by the Dallas Citizens Council. 8
Once the PVL was formed, Smith and Jackson came up with a five
point program to help blacks in the city. The program indicated that
Smith and Jackson were actively pushing for change in Dallas. The
first of the five points was to get African Americans hired as
policemen.

Second they wanted an adequate public housing program put

in place to allow blacks access to affordable housing.

The next part

of the program focused on getting a recreational center for blacks
that was run by blacks and fourth they wanted a new high school built
for African American students.

Finally, they wanted to increase

African American employment in the city government of Dallas.

These

issues were brought to the forefront during the 1937 Dallas city
council elections.

By this point the PVL had gained enough influence

that it was crucial in deciding five out of the nine seats.

This was

important to Smith because it took away some power of the Citizens
Charter Association which had been winning or at least controlling
elections for decades. Smith noted the 1937 election was unique
because it was the first time the white CCA had not completely
dominated an election.

The group had never gotten a complete majority

but came close most years, and controlled the seats that they did not
win. With more blacks voting in 1937 even this came to an end, and the
power of the CCA was somewhat broken.

Not long after, the ideas

coming from the five point program were put into place in various

8
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ways.

Lincoln High School, a new black high school, was a product of

the PVL’s influence in this election.

Also, blacks gained access to

Wahoo Lake recreational center and employment in city government
increased by 300 to 400 per cent. 9
The late 1930s was also the time that A. Maceo Smith, Maynard
Jackson, and an African American woman named Juanita Craft helped
revive the NAACP chapter in Dallas. 10

The chapter had been defunct

since the 1920s, but Smith and company held the group’s first meeting
in years in 1936.

Smith quickly rose through the ranks to become the

state secretary of the Texas State Conference of Branches of the
NAACP.

Because of his position statewide as well as his prominence in

the Dallas chapter, Dallas would become the epicenter to help end the
white primary, not just in Dallas but throughout Texas.

Dallas at the

time was typically southern in that it was dominated by one-party
Democrat politics.

In a one-party state, essentially the only vote

that matters is the primary vote, and blacks were disfranchised from
this vote.

Smith and others in the Dallas chapter of the NAACP wanted

to change this by getting rid of the white primary.

They had been

trying to do this since 1937 when they put a case through the courts
that eventually made it to the Supreme Court and failed (which Smith
recalls only briefly in an interview years later).

Despite the

setback Smith continued to use this as the means of ending the white

9
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primary. In 1940, the Dallas NAACP got a dentist from Houston named
Lonnie Smith to be the plaintiff in a new case designed to get rid of
the white primary.

The dentist was chosen because he had been denied

a ballot in Harris County’s Democrat party primary in 1940, and the
NAACP took action against this.

Thurgood Marshall and local attorney

W.J. Durham (a member of the Committee of 14) were the lead
prosecutors in the case which made it all the way to the United States
Supreme Court.

While this was early in Marshall’s career he would go

on to be a champion of the civil rights movement first as chief legal
counsel for the NAACP and then as the first black man to be Supreme
Court Justice.

Marshall was the main litigator that helped win the

Brown case so it is fitting that he would be helping to fight the
white primary in Dallas at this early stage. It took four years but
the white primary system was finally defeated in the case.

While A.

Maceo Smith was not involved directly in the legal proceedings, he
worked diligently to see this case won.

His dealings helped open the

door for ending the white primary throughout the South, and he made
note of this when he recalled the decision years later Smith
remembered that “In 1944 on April 4 we had a sweeping decision against
the white primary.

It opened up the primary throughout the South.

This started right in my living room.

We prepared the strategy there,

and we financed the case here in Texas”. 11
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The next thing Smith and the local chapter of the NAACP did was
fight to equalize teacher pay in Dallas. This was actually done
through the efforts of an umbrella organization created in 1942 called
the Dallas Council of Negro Organizations.

The DCNO consisted of all

the major African American organizations in the city including the
NAACP, the PVL, the Negro Chamber of Commerce, as well as 20 other
major black organizations in the city.

Even so the NAACP took the

lead with this organization and found a young teacher named Thelma
Page to be the plaintiff in the case.

Smith personally told her that

if she got fired from her job that the NAACP would pay her salary for
a year.

The case was filed in November of 1942 as Page v. Board of

Education, City of Dallas, once again with W.J. Durham as lead
counsel. The case did not last long as a ruling was handed down in
February of 1943 to grant pay raises over the next two years until
salaries were equalized.

City leaders did not want a long drawn out

trial because it could hurt the city’s image.
“The case never went to trial.

According to Smith,

When the evidence we had built up was

presented to Judge William Atwell we got a consent decree equalizing
salaries”. 12
Smith and the Dallas NAACP also got involved in the case to
desegregate the University of Texas beginning in the late 1940s.
Smith recalled years later that a group of men that included Thurgood
Marshall, Carter Wesley publisher of the Houston Informer newspaper,
Charley Thompson of Howard University, and a few others (not named)
12
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were sitting on his front porch in Dallas drinking whiskey when they
came up with a plan to put a case through the courts to test
segregation in higher education in Texas.

Originally Wesley wanted

the group to file suit to make Prairie View equal to Texas A&M, but
Marshall’s ambitions were bigger than that because he opined, “No we
ain’t fooling with that, we’re going to file this against the
University of Texas”.

Thus was born the case of Sweatt v. Painter in

which Smith and the Dallas NAACP chapter filed suit against the
University of Texas to open its doors to black students. Before the
case was heard the state tried to be proactive and build a law school
for Heman Sweatt in the basement of the capitol building in Austin. He
refused to attend so then the state of Texas built a separate law
school in Houston and again he refused. Eventually the case that was
started on Smith’s porch over a glass of whiskey made it to the U.S.
Supreme Court.

It is clear Smith was proud of his involvement when he

remembered years later, “We filed and carried the case of Sweatt vs.
Painter to the United States Supreme Court, and the court in 1950
declared segregated public education illegal, and that was the
forerunner of the Brown case”. 13
While the Sweatt case did not directly involve progress for
blacks in Dallas, it is clear men like Smith and the Dallas chapter of
the NAACP were heavily involved the matter.

The group was also

working towards gains in the city itself during this time as well.
African Americans served on juries in Dallas in 1941 for the first

13
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time in 50 years.

In 1946, African Americans won their first precinct

chairs in the Democratic Party and participated in the Dallas County
Democrats county convention for the first time. That same year 14
black police officers were appointed to patrol the city’s black
neighborhoods.

There were other small gains in the 1940s such as the

employment of black postal workers, work in the defense plants, and
access to Wahoo City Park. 14
Despite these gains, blacks in Dallas still lacked equal
treatment.

There was still inadequate housing for blacks, segregated

schools, and segregated public facilities all of which would take
years to bring down.

Smith and the NAACP began to look into these

local issues. One of the first hurdles they tried to change involved
housing.

This would be a difficult task because there was very little

in the way of adequate housing, and what was there, proved to be
shoddy at best.

According to Smith, “At the time of the beginning

that I am telling you about, the only housing blacks could get was
hand-me-downs or boxes that they nailed together themselves”.

The

Federal Housing Authority was not financing any black housing.

Banks

were making ten year loans with incredibly high interest rates that
could not be paid.

New houses were out of the question because the

banks would not finance those in the slum areas.

Couple this with the

fact that in the 1940s, there were a number of bombings that were
designed to discourage blacks from settling in white areas.

Smith

used his influence to gain an audience with what he called the “top-
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level leadership of Dallas”.

A committee was created within the

Dallas Chamber of Commerce to investigate the bombings.

Then chamber

president, Bob Thornton, called together a blue-ribbon grand jury, but
no one was ever brought to justice.

Although the responsibility for

the bombings was never solved, city leaders dealt to some degree with
the issue of housing.

Projects were built to give blacks more access

to housing, though they remained segregated for years to come. 15
Public school desegregation became a hotbed issue in Dallas after
the Brown case was handed down in 1954.

The NAACP, as well as the

Committee of 14 began looking into desegregating Dallas’ schools as
early as 1955.

Twenty-eight black students attempted to integrate

all-white schools that year, but school authorities denied them
entrance.

The NAACP filed suit against the school board, but the case

was continued repeatedly in order to delay desegregation of the school
system.

This failed attempt to integrate the schools in Dallas led to

a backlash among the white community.

Numerous whites formed the

Texas Citizens Council of Dallas which vowed “to fight to the end to
maintain segregation in Texas schools”.

This is the start of the

massive resistance movement in Dallas that was sweeping the South
after the Brown decision.

The idea behind the citizens’ councils was

to use any lawful means they could to block Brown from being
implemented throughout the South.

The Texas Citizens Council of

Dallas was led by Texas Attorney General John Ben Sheppard who not
only wanted to keep segregation in Dallas schools but also completely
15
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remove the NAACP from the city.

He actually achieved his goal, albeit

for a brief time, when the NAACP in Dallas ceased operation from
September of 1956 through May of 1957.

The main reason for this was

retaliation against the organization for the desegregation law suits.
The records of the Dallas chapter were confiscated and this in essence
crippled the organization.

Smith was forced to resign as state

executive secretary of the NAACP, and the local chapter had to break
ties with the national entity.

The NAACP in Dallas did not really

regain its former strength that had been built by Smith and others
until 1959 when a lady named Minnie Flanagan was named president.

She

was able to bring the group back from the brink of extinction by
linking it to the sit-in movement in Dallas. 16
The goal of lessening the influence of the NAACP in the city was
furthered in 1957 by the Texas State House of Representatives.

It

passed a bill saying no state or local agency could hire NAACP members
and this included teachers, which was a tactic used in other states
throughout the South as well.

Ten other segregation bills were passed

most of which were designed to delay integration further unless a
local option vote was taken where a majority of people voted to open
the schools.

None of the bills were viable in the long run, but they

showed the willingness of the state legislature to do whatever it
could to block integration. Texas had a state law in place that
required locals to vote on school desegregation, and schools could
lose funding if they attempted to violate this rule and open the doors
16
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to black students without going through the proper channels.

Dallas

schools could lose $1.5 million in state aid as well as lose
accreditation if they tried to desegregate without a majority vote.
The school superintendent and board members also could be fined up to
$1,000 for the same offense. 17
The issue of desegregating the schools would continue into the
1960s in Dallas.

The citizens of the city adhered to the “Dallas Way”

by acting on their civic duty and upholding the letter the law. In
order to move forward with desegregation a referendum vote needed to
be held and this occurred in August of 1960.
to 7,416) against integration.

The vote was 4-1 (30,234

Even though the Brown decision had

been handed down six years earlier, it is apparent that the white
citizens of Dallas were not ready to have their children attend
integrated schools. 18
The NAACP forced the school board to develop a desegregation
plan in 1961 by winning a case in the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.

The ruling compelled the school district to

implement a plan that called for gradual integration starting in the
first grade and moving each year after 1961 to a new grade until all
grades were desegregated in the Dallas schools.

In August of 1961, 18

African Americans enrolled in previously all-white elementary schools
throughout the city and played a major role in ensuring a peaceful
desegregation process in the schools.
17
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journalist who covered desegregation of the schools for the Dallas
Morning News, “Early in 1960 the DCC saw ultimate desegregation as
inevitable. It vowed that for the well-being of Dallas the strife of a
Little Rock or New Orleans must be avoided, absolutely”.

Hoover

pointed out that the DCC repeatedly made note that if the new “stair
step” program of desegregation was to work in Dallas, it was because
the citizens of the city obeyed the law and abided by the “Dallas
Way”. Hoover noted that the good people of Dallas “agree with the
DCC’s central tenet. This is: whether you favor desegregation or not,
good citizens obey the law”. 19
This idea of being law abiding citizens in regard to
desegregating the schools was driven home further by a film released
by the DCC in 1961 titled, Dallas at the Crossroads.

The film, along

with a pamphlet of the same name, was distributed all across the city
to thousands of organizations to help get the word out that good
citizens should accept the law that the schools would be desegregated
and do so without causing a ruckus in the city. The 22 minute film was
produced by Sam Bloom and narrated by Walter Cronkite and included a
number of Dallas’ prominent citizens (presumably most if not all were
members of the DCC) advocating that Dallas obey the law or face the
consequences.

According to Cronkite, “Other cities have faced, and

faced recently, the same problems of change which Dallas now faces.
They have met these problems with violence.

The face of violence is

the face of hate, unreason, cruelty, personal, and civic

19
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irresponsibility”.

This reasoning permeates the film, and it almost

seems like the business community was trying to shame miscreants in
the city into abiding by the law and allowing desegregation to occur
without violence.

In order for the city to move on with

desegregation, it must do so by adhering to Dallas Way, and this could
only be achieved by following the letter of the law. 20
At the same time school desegregation was taking place in Dallas,
the DCC and the Committee of 14 began planning for the desegregation
of lunch counters and other public facilities in the city.

Once again

it was in the best interest of the DCC for things to go smoothly, so
they began negotiating with black leaders in the Committee of 14, as
well as others throughout the city, to achieve this as quickly and
quietly as possible.

The DCC made note of this in a pamphlet put out

in the early 1960s that stated, “Restaurants, theaters, increased use
of department store facilities, hotels, churches—all are likely
targets.

Here, as with the schools, the problem may ultimately have

to be resolved by law”.

Starting in 1960 the Committee of 14, as well

as the DCC, began to negotiate with several downtown Dallas stores to
look at the possibility of opening the lunch counters.

Several stores

in Dallas, including Woolworth’s and Walgreen’s, desegregated their
lunch counters without incident in 1960. In April 1960, two Southern
Methodist University theology students were served at HL Green
Department store without incident as well.
because it was a national chain.
20
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warning that it had been chosen for an integration attempt.

Even so

there was not a problem at the Green store as Reverend Richard
Stewart, then one of the theology students, recalled years later. This
was mainly because the university backed the students as did the town
of Dallas. Allen Madison, a boy of 14 at the time, that was also
involved in bringing integration to the Green store recalled that,
“Not many people in town even know that happened.

This is undoubtedly

due to efforts of the DCC and the Committee of 14 working behind the
scenes to assure that there would be no violence involved in this
encounter.

The businessmen of the DCC wanted it this way—no

attention, no violence, and thus no possibility of loss of business
due to exposure. According to Joe Goulden, then a reporter for the
Dallas Morning News, “Dallasites knew the sit-ins had damaged the
images of other cities.
fate.

They were determined not to suffer the same

The DCC decided they were not gonna have racial strife in the

city of Dallas”. 21
Despite the fact that several stores had desegregated their lunch
counters by 1960, there were a good number that had not.

Because of

this the Dallas Community Committee, an offshoot of the Committee of
14 run by Reverend E.C. Estell, called for a boycott and picket of
downtown stores in order to get them to open their lunch counters to
African Americans.

21
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included a cross-section of the African American community in Dallas.
It continued each day of the week with a different group every time.
One day it was the lawyers who picketed.
businessmen and professionals.

The next it was black

Then it was the ministers, and yet

another day it was the beauticians as well as people in similar
occupations.

The Dallas Express, the city’s main African American

newspaper, took out a full page ad in May of 1961 where more than 300
women of color signed a pledge to not shop in downtown stores that
were not desegregated. The ad, combined with the picketing, worked.
On July 26, 1961 business establishments in downtown Dallas were to
remove their discriminating signs, symbols, practices, and extend
service to all customers regardless of race.

To dramatize this event,

the Committee of 14 arranged for 159 African Americans to walk into 49
downtown lunch counters and restaurants to be served without incident.
This in turn prompted the Dallas Community Committee to call off its
boycott. The boycott only lasted two months but it created tension in
the black community as to the direction the civil rights movement
should take in Dallas.

The boycott ultimately provided limited

success that was seen merely as tokenism.

Several lunch counters

still refused to serve African Americans.

Bus stations, Parkland

Hospital, and the Texas State Fair still continued their policies of
racial discrimination well into the 1960s.

Because of this, the

Committee of 14 decided to abandon the idea of direct action and go
back to the negotiating table with the white businessmen of the Dallas

59
Citizens Council. In doing so they would continue on with the notion
of desegregating through use of the Dallas Way. 22
The idea of direct action in Dallas did not actually begin with
the downtown boycott and picket.

Rather, it had started in the 1950s

with a theater and the state fair. The concept was started by Juanita
Craft, a key member of the NAACP chapter in the city. She was in
charge of the Dallas Youth Council of the NAACP and got teenagers to
picket a theater as early as 1955 for its discriminatory practices.
The theater picket did not work but laid the groundwork for other
direct action protests to occur because Craft provided an
infrastructure with the NAACP Youth Council that would be the basis
for other protests to come.

The most notable one was waged against

the Texas state fair which also occurred in 1955 at the request of
Craft and the Dallas youth Council.

The fair was held annually in

Dallas but blacks could only attend on Negro Achievement Day which was
just one day out of the sixteen at the fair. The youth of the NAACP
began picketing in 1955 at six of the eleven gates open to the public.
The young protestors held signs that voiced their discontent with
sayings like “This is Negro Achievement Day at the Fair-Keep Out”,
“Racial Segregation is Un-Clean, Un-American, and Un-Moral—Stay Out”,
and “Don’t Sell Your Pride for a Segregated Ride—Stay Out”.

They also

passed out handbills that claimed visiting the fair on any other day

22
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other than Negro Achievement Day would bring blacks, “humiliation and
disgrace”. 23
The picketing was brought about by a condemnation of the fair by
the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce which said that there were
several midway rides blacks were banned from, as well as eating places
at the fair, even on Negro Achievement Day.

This was met with

compromise by then Mayor R.L. Thornton, who was also president of the
fair.

The midway rides would be opened immediately to people of all

races, but “moral and legal commitments” would prevent any policy
change in the Fair Park restaurants.

James H. Stewart, executive vice

president and general manager of the fair, was miffed by the fact that
blacks were picketing the fair at all.

He noted that, “It is

particularly ironic and difficult to understand (the picketing) in
view of the fact that the State Fair of Texas has been a pioneer in
making available to Negroes, through its 16-day run, facilities that
are not open to them anywhere else in the state”.

Thornton tried to

accommodate black demands at the fair, which should not be surprising
since he was a founding member of the Dallas Citizens Council.
However, his acquiescence could only go so far as he was bound by
state law which would not allow any further integration in a public
facility. While the protest did not end segregation at the fair
completely it did bring whites to the negotiating table which is yet
another example of abiding by the Dallas Way.

After the picketing at

the fair, Thornton arranged several meetings with black leaders
23
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including Juanita Craft and George Allen, a prominent African American
businessman, to discuss integrating public facilities.

These meetings

resulted in a plan to send black patrons to downtown stores to test
segregation, and though it failed it did open the door for what would
come in the 1960s as previously stated. 24
While Craft did not get what she wanted fully accomplished in the
1950s, the idea of desegregation would become more of a reality by the
early 1960s in downtown Dallas.

By the end of 1963 blacks were being

hired as retail salesmen, cashiers, checkers, and customer contact
employees in a broad spectrum of stores in the city.

This included

major stores as well as those as small as shop size and it occurred
city-wide, not just in black communities. Some 150 businesses
including department stores, food chains, and apparel stores
cooperated with the hiring of black employees.

Once again this

happened without incident, and according to Morning News reporter
Dennis Hoover, “It is the most conspicuous facet of a deliberate and
persistent effort by Dallas business and civic leaders to open new
employment vistas for Negroes throughout industry generally”.

This

was yet another item on a long agenda of the desegregation plan for
Dallas put forth by the DCC.

A spokesman for the DCC noted, “All

along it has been recognized that the process of school, restaurant
and other desegregation was leading up to a question of pure
economics—helping Negroes to gain the financial means to utilize their
new freedoms.

24
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inevitable”.

Of course, expanded economic opportunity for Negroes in

Dallas also meant expanded economic opportunity for the business
owners in the city.

The idea of business profit, or lack thereof,

always fueled the process of desegregation in Dallas. If the city
looked good by hiring black employees, then the business leaders
looked good and would continue to attract new investors.

This was the

goal all along and the DCC spokesman noted this when he stated, “The
effort has been intricately planned and skillfully executed, as have
all of Dallas’ major desegregation moves”.

This is what made Dallas

the envy of other cities throughout the South. While some had
picketing and rioting, Dallas moved forward peacefully and quietly for
the most part.

The DCC spokesman made this point clear when he said,

“If and as problems arise they are nipped in the bud.

This, too, is

part of Dallas’ envied pattern in race relations”. 25
By the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, Dallas had
nearly completed the task of breaking down racial barriers in the
city.

By this point, “the city unobtrusively has integrated parks,

pools, hotels, food services, theaters, etc., with few exceptions”.
The city was not completely integrated in public accommodations but it
was pretty close.

Many in Dallas felt that the passage of the Civil

Rights Act would not really have much of an impact on the city.

This

was the definitely the case with city councilman George M. Underwood
Jr. who told the Morning News in June of 1964, “I think the civil
rights law passage will go practically unnoticed here, we are so

25
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completely integrated now.
difference in our lives.

I doubt there will be any awareness of any

Changes are being made smoothly right now”.

Councilman R.B. Carpenter Jr. had much the same assessment, but also
reinforced the idea of the Dallas Way when he was quoted as saying, “I
believe the only thing we can do is go by the letter of the law.

Some

more places will have to integrate. But most have already done so.
What’s left?”.

Negro leaders were praised in these effort just as

much as white leaders. Robert Cullum, president of the Dallas Chamber
of Commerce, stated to the Morning News, “We must give high credit to
the good citizenship of our Negro community.

They have responded in a

fully responsible way to remarkably cohesive and unselfish
leadership”.

He continued by giving credit to the idea of the Dallas

Way as well.

According to Cullum, a businessman by trade, Dallas “has

a promising situation—we are ahead of the law writers, will attend to
life within the full spirit of what the law wants to do”.
statement was the embodiment of the Dallas Way.

Cullum’s

The city would abide

by the law, as it had with all others with few exceptions, for years.
Just because a new civil rights bill was being passed, it did not mean
Dallas would have to change. The city was well ahead of the curve, and
Dallas would continue on as usual. 26
SNCC, as well as other more radical protest groups, came to
Dallas in the 1960s intent on accelerating the sometimes slow-moving
change brought forth by A. Maceo Smith and other black leaders in the
Committee of 14.

26
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as the influence of the DCC and the Committee of 14, the direction of
the movement never really changed in Dallas.

According to Kevin

Merida of the Morning News, “Black militants in Dallas found it
difficult to press aggressively for change”.

There was an incident in

Dallas in 1968 that brought the city as close as it would come to
chaos during the civil rights movement. Ernest McMillan and Matthew
Johnson, local leaders of SNCC in Dallas, were sentenced to ten years
in prison for leading a food-smashing raid on a white owned South
Dallas grocery store. They led the raid because the store did not have
any black employees and their prices were higher than other stores
while the quality of their products was lower.

The penalty was stiff

for damages that only amounted to a little over $200, but after this
SNCC would have a hard time gaining traction in Dallas.

McMillan and

Johnson, “represented the new, unwelcomed black power movement”.
Dallas was used to peaceful negotiations in regards to racial changes
in the city, and the incident of 1968 was an anomaly that proved that
this is how things would continue. The grocery store incident had
occurred during the summer of 1968 when tensions were still high after
the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and it would be one of
the few incidents of this nature in Dallas. The Committee of 14 and
the DCC had done too much to see this change.

James Smith, President

of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce in the early 1960s told Merida
that “C.A. Tatum (president of the Citizens Council) and the 14-man
committee had detoothed the tiger, so to speak”. While the changes may
not have always come as quickly as some wanted, the DCC and the
Committee of 14 had been the voice of reason for years and this would
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not change because of one episode of violence at a time when tensions
were high. 27
When looking at the rights movement in Dallas it is easy to make
comparisons to other cities, notably Houston and Atlanta.

The reason

for this is that the businessmen in all three cities did what they
could to make it seem like there were no racial problems in these
areas.

Business leaders in Dallas, Houston, and Atlanta knew that if

there was racial strife in the city, entrepreneurs were less likely to
invest in the city.

Like Houston, Dallas tried to dilute its

“southernness” and become more of western city.

This was done in

order to prove that there were no racial problems in Dallas.

This

idea can be taken all the way back to Reconstruction in Dallas because
the business moguls knew that if they did not steer the city away from
racial violence then there would be no one willing to invest in the
city.

Dallas desperately wanted to become a financial hub and this

could not be achieved in a city with internal racial turmoil.

Dallas

mirrors Atlanta in that both cities were built by the railroads, and
also like Houston, Atlanta tried to make big business the order of the
city, not racial violence. 28
One parallel that can be drawn between Dallas and Atlanta was
that Atlanta also had a biracial organization similar to Dallas’
Committee of 14.

27
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maintained an air of civility in dealing with the civil rights
movement.

The goal was the same in both cities-economic growth-and

this could only be achieved in Atlanta (and Dallas) through the work
of negotiation on behalf of the white and black communities in regards
to civil rights.

Businessmen in Atlanta promoted the idea of racial

harmony by appealing to civic pride just like in Dallas.

Peace was

kept in racial matters and thus the city prospered economically.
Black leaders in Atlanta went along with this despite the fact that
they knew more racial change needed to occur in the city.

The same

can be said for Dallas’ black community beyond the Committee of 14. 29
The Progressive Voters League of Dallas is similar to the Atlanta
Negro Voters League which was made up of black preachers, professors,
lawyers, and businessmen in the city.

A.T. Walden, Atlanta’s version

of A. Maceo Smith, was the leader of the organization and was seen as
the New South’s first black political boss.

He used the influence of

the Negro Voters League to gain favor with the white leadership of
Atlanta’s city council much the same way Smith did with the PVL in
Dallas.

Walden bargained with white politicians offering black votes

in exchange for favorable race relations in Atlanta.

Atlanta’s

business community liked this because it kept race tensions down and
profits up as a result and the city developed a reputation as an
“oasis of tolerance” in regards to southern race relations. 30
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School desegregation provides another example where a similarity
to Atlanta is noteworthy.

Like Dallas, Atlanta also decided to put

forth a plan to open the schools to black students in 1961.

Also like

Dallas the city expressed a willingness to do so peacefully.

The

Atlanta Constitution voiced the opinion in January of 1961 that the
year was critical for the city, and expressed the hope “that the
schools can be preserved and the children spared such experiences as
we’ve witnessed in New Orleans”.

This provides a direct link to

Dallas as the video aforementioned wanted to do just this.

Atlanta’s

mayor, William B. Hartsfield, espoused the same sentiment as Dallas
mayor Earl Cabell when he called for “cool-headedness and common sense
to solve our problems and to preserve the city’s reputation…Mobs,
lawlessness, and terror won’t change the courts”.

Clearly Atlanta was

thinking very much along the same lines as Dallas as the city did not
want to hurt its business reputation.

A violent struggle for

desegregation in the schools would result in loss of business and the
power structure in neither city wanted that, thus the call for law and
order. In January of 1961 Atlanta businessmen issued a statement
saying that, “disruption of our public school system would have a
calamitous effect on the economic climate of Georgia”. Meanwhile, the
fight to desegregate the University of Georgia was also taking place.
Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes entered the campus in Athens in
the fall of 1961 through the help of a federal court order.

According

to Alton Hornsby, this actually “saved” the public schools from having
to desegregate quicker.

Legislators in the state were willing to keep

segregation intact in the public schools until court order and this
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did not come until the UGA ruling in 1961.

However, once the ruling

was handed down the university began desegregating and thus so did the
public schools in Atlanta.

On August 30, 1961 nine black students who

had survived the rigorous testing and other procedures to qualify for
transfers entered schools in each of Atlanta’s four quadrants without
incident.

Desegregation in Atlanta’s schools had become a token

reality, peacefully, just like in Dallas. 31
While there are numerous similarities in the civil rights
experience in Dallas and Atlanta as aforementioned, this ends by the
mid to late 1960s.

By this time various southern cities appeared to

be coming apart at the seams, and Atlanta was one of those on the
brink of chaos.

The Civil Rights Movement had become more militant

with the emergence of more vocal, violent protest groups and cities
like Los Angeles were literally and figuratively on fire because of
incidents like the 1965 Watts Riots.

The quiet, nonviolent protests

of King and the early leaders of the movement were becoming less
frequent.

The sit-ins were replaced by riots.

Atlanta where schools and churches were bombed.
revolt in a black neighborhood in 1966.

This happened in
The city experienced

People in Dallas feared the

same would happen to their city because of the close ties to Atlanta.
31
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However, this would not be the case in Dallas because the business
leadership had worked for decades to ensure that would not occur.
They men involved with the DCC continued to lead the way in Dallas and
did not let the violence engulf Dallas.

There was one near riot but

it remained localized and never reached the point where things would
get out of hand.

Atlanta could not say the same and the city became

more militant at a time that Dallas remained calm. 32
The Civil Rights Movement in Dallas never reached the fever pitch
that it did in many southern cities.

It was, for the most part, a

peaceful and quiet period that was made possible through negotiation.
Business leaders in Dallas did not want to see their city engulfed in
racial conflict, so they sought out negotiation with the black
community. They came up with the idea of the Dallas Way and this
became the norm even for the Civil Rights Movement.

This meant

following the letter of the law, and doing what was right for the city
as a whole. If this meant opening the doors of the city to African
Americans so be it.

It was beneficial to the city to desegregate

quietly and peacefully because it was beneficial to the businessmen.
The Dallas Citizens Council led the way in regards to adhering to the
Dallas Way.

They formed a biracial group, the Committee of 14, to

help lead the city through a negotiated desegregation plan.

They

acquiesced when necessary and brought racial change to the city,
albeit slowly at times.

32
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remained the same.

Desegregate, through negotiation, to avoid the

trials and tribulations of other cities and live by the Dallas Way.
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Chapter Three
Before its Time: The Desegregation of Perkins School of Theology
I don’t like this proposal.
It goes against what I’ve always
believed. But I can tell which way the wind is blowing and I’m going
to vote for it. 1

An unnamed, but influential Board of Trustees member at Southern
Methodist University made the above comment before voting in November
1950 to change the school’s bylaws.

This was an important vote

because it would remove restrictions on admitting people of color and
would open the door for African American students to attend SMU as
regular students.

This was a big step for a private, church

affiliated school in 1950.

The mere idea of actually changing the

bylaws, let alone allowing blacks to enter SMU, was something that the
other major private schools in the South were not even contemplating
at the time.

The others, namely Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and

Vanderbilt held out as long as they could in regards to starting the
process of desegregation. So, in this respect Southern Methodist
University was before its time. While the university did not open the
doors in all of the various schools in 1950 to African Americans, the
door was cracked open with the board’s decision of that year. There
were many people that were instrumental in this monumental decision
and the subsequent admission of blacks in the coming years at SMU,
including university president Umphrey Lee, Board of Trustees chairman
A. Frank Smith, and Bishops William Martin and Paul Martin (no
relation) among countless others.

1

Perhaps the most important, though,
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was Merrimon Cuninggim.

Cuninggim became the dean of Perkins School

of Theology at SMU in 1951, and it was his leadership from then until
the early 1960s that truly helped bring about the desegregation of the
School of Theology at the university.

Despite the fact that

desegregation at Perkins was smooth and quiet for the most part, there
were problems with, and detractors of, the experiment.

When

opposition did rise, it was Cuninggim that stuck to his convictions
and kept the process going without it completely coming apart at the
seams.

Black students had attended classes at Perkins sporadically

prior to 1950. As early as 1946 Dean Eugene Hawk, spurred on by
faculty prodding, arranged noncredit afternoon classes for black
ministers who wanted more training as provided by the School of
Theology at SMU.

Dr. Hawk was quick to point out that “these Negroes

are not enrolled in SMU, they pay no fees, they get no college
credits.

Our instructors handle these classes outside their regular

schedules”.

Two years later, in 1948, school administrators allowed

African Americans to sit in on regular classes with white students.
Neither instance raised any controversy. 2
While there was no opposition to these incidents in 1948 at
Perkins, there was definitely confusion.

In April, the Conference on

Christian Action for Human Rights made a mistake when it stated that
SMU allowed admittance to black students in the School of Theology.
This was not true, and Dean Hawk made sure everyone knew it by issuing
an immediate denial. Despite this, Hawk began receiving letters
2
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commending SMU for its imagined racial progress.

Methodist pastors in

Texas led the way in praising SMU. Reverend J. Troy Hickman of San
Marcos wrote to Hawk and was “glad your institution is already doing
something definite for Negro leaders in the church.

Many Perkins ex-

students who are now in the ministry are delighted with the progress
made there since our time”. Reverend Seaborn Kiker echoed this
sentiment from his pastorate in Falfurrias, Texas when he wrote, “It
was gratifying to me to learn of the good service our School of
Theology has been rendering the Negro brethren…Any door that can be
opened to them…is a great service to the church”. However, SMU was not
quite as racially progressive as these ministers thought.

It would

still be a few years before blacks were admitted as regular students
at Perkins. 3
Not all of the commentary Dean Hawk received in 1948 was
positive.

His worst fear, and indeed that of the Board, was that a

school like SMU was not ready to cross the racial divide that existed
in the South.

Doing so would break the bonds of white supremacy that

were still very much alive even in Dallas in the late 1940s.

Race

mixing was not something people in the church at large and the
community wanted to see at SMU in 1948.

A letter from Allen Green to

Hawk illustrated this point quite clearly.

Green wrote in his letter,

“I’m in favor of helping the negroes all we can but let’s keep them
segregated.

It is no good for races to mix.

continue to enforce segregation.
mixture of races”.
3

Ibid.

I hope that you will

Not one true southerner wants a

The fear was that if you allow the races to mix,
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even if it is just in school, then you are moving in the direction of
social equality. One segregationist leader warned about the “serious
problems that are sure to arise if we abandon our segregated school
system—such as integrated social events, integrated restroom
facilities and showers, drama classes and more…”.

Another put it more

bluntly stating “when we come right down to it, that’s what this is
all about: a nigger a-marrying your sister or your daughter”.
Numerous whites in the South, including those in Texas, felt the time
had not yet come for this to happen. 4
Despite the white supremacy argument presented to Dean Hawk,
Southern Methodist University continued to move forward, not backward,
between 1948 and 1950 in race relations on campus. Once again, the
faculty began clamoring for more change.

The post-World War II era

was a time when social mores were altered, and faculty members at SMU
wanted to help facilitate that at Perkins.

The Church and the public

responded well to what had already taken place so it was now time to
move forward again.

Prior to the Board meeting in November of 1950,

the faculty of Perkins asked Dean Hawk to present a plan to the Board
of Trustees to allow blacks to enter the School of Theology as regular
students.

Enter Umphrey Lee.

He went to the Board of Trustees in

November of 1950 with the idea that they should change the charter of
SMU to allow for the entrance of blacks.

Lee knew the possibility was

coming in the near future, and “wouldn’t it be wise, he reasoned to
get rid of the restrictive wording in the By-Laws?

Then, when and if

desegregation comes, we won’t have to suffer through the argument in
4
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the Board”.

Merrimon Cuninggim provided a first-hand account of how

things went in Dallas and said of Lee’s decision in 1950, “Part of
Lee’s facing the desegregation question so early was genuine
statesmanship. He knew it was coming, and he knew that, when it came,
it would create grave discord; so he wanted to settle the matter in
advance, if possible”. By this point Silas Hunt had already been
admitted to the University of Arkansas in 1948, Ada Sipuel was
enrolled at the University of Oklahoma that same year, and Heman
Sweatt won in the courts to allow him to attend the University of
Texas in 1950.

The precedent had been set by these actions.

While

these cases dealt specifically with public institutions, it appears to
be an impetus for why Lee went to the Board in November of 1950 and
his proposal was passed without much fanfare.

The way was now open to

bring in African Americans as regular students at Perkins. 5
Just the idea of changing the school’s charter to eventually
allow black student to enter SMU was more than what the other major
private schools in the South were willing to do in 1950.

Melissa

Kean, author of Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South,
noted in her book that, “Before the schools bowed to the inevitable,
though, each one endured nearly two decades of internal argument about
how best to respond to these demands for change”.

The trustees at

Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt fought throughout the 1950s
and early 1960s to keep the lily white status quo at their
universities.
5
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The debate about allowing blacks to enter had already been settled by
the Board’s decision in November of 1950.

This is not to say that

there would not be opposition at SMU, but it would be about other
matters in regard to black students at the school, not the actual
admission of these students. 6
Lee’s decision to change SMU’s bylaws to allow for blacks as
regular students coincided with his effort to make the theology school
more nationally known.

He wanted to upgrade the facilities, the

faculty, and even the dean of the school. In Lee’s opinion all of
these changes would enhance the image of Perkins.

One of the first

things Lee did was search for a new dean for the Perkins School of
Theology.

Hawk was not the person Lee envisioned to lead Perkins to

national prominence.

Bishop Lee probably shared the opinion expressed

by John W. Hardt about Hawk when he declared, “There was a feeling, I
believe that Hawk wasn’t an academic, and he had done about what he
could do…it was time for him to move on”.

Hawk had been an able

administrator, but he was not the visionary figure Lee needed in his
quest to make Perkins great.

Instead, Lee chose Merrimon Cuninggim.

Lee and Cuninggim began talking in December of 1950 about the
possibility of Cuninggim becoming the dean.

Cuninggim had the

academic credentials as well as the preaching background that Lee felt
was necessary to move Perkins forward.

Cuninggim’s list of academic

achievements was very impressive. In 1931, he received a Bachelor’s of
Arts from Vanderbilt University.
6
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Master’s of Arts in English from Duke University.

His next two

degrees came from Oxford where he received a B.A. in 1935 and a
diploma in theology in 1936. These degrees came while studying at
Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar for three years. His final two degrees came
from Yale in 1939 and 1941 respectively and included another
Bachelor’s Degree as well as a Ph.D. in religion and education.

In

addition to the degrees, Cuninggim was an ordained priest of the
Methodist Church. 7
Cuninggim’s professional record was as impressive as his list of
degrees.

Prior to coming to SMU he had been director of religious

activities at Duke from 1936 to 1938.

He taught religion at Emory and

Henry from 1941 to 1942 and at Dennison College from 1942 to 1944. In
addition, Cuninggim served as a chaplain in the Navy while aboard the
battleship Tennessee from 1944 to 1946.

From 1946 to 1951 he taught

at Pomona College in Claremont California.

It was during this time

that he also served as chaplain for the Associated Colleges of
Claremont from 1948 to 1950. 8
While Cuninggim’s time as an ordained priest and a chaplain was
important, it was his academic pedigree that caught Lee’s eye.

Lee

was looking for someone who was an educator first that also had a
religious background and Cuninggim fit this description very well.
The previous deans at Perkins had been clergymen first and educators a
distant second, but Cuninggim was the opposite and, thus, was the
perfect person to change SMU’s School of Theology into a nationally
7

Simon, “Breaking the Color Bar at SMU”, 37. Grimes, A History of
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8
Grimes, A History of the Perkins School of Theology, 92.
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known entity.

The school had new buildings and a new endowment, and

Cuninggim could provide the leadership that would take Perkins to new
heights.

Cuninggim was hired in January of 1951, and started that

summer. 9
When Lee decided to hire Cuninggim as the dean of the Perkins
School of Theology, Cuninggim was adamant that he would not take the
position unless Lee allowed him to desegregate.

In Cuninggim’s own

account of the meeting that he had with Lee prior to his hiring he
recalls, “Among the many things I asked Lee, whom I had long known and
admired, was this:

How soon would the way be open for admitting

Negroes into the regular student body?”
open now.

Lee responded, “The way is

You can start working on it the day you come”. This gave

Cuninggim the assurance he wanted. Cuninggim took the position as dean
of the Perkins School of Theology in the summer of 1951 and
immediately began laying the groundwork for opening the school’s doors
to African American students. 10
In order to fully understand the ramifications of Cuninggim’s
position on the issue of race, it would be appropriate to look at his
upbringing.

He was born in Dallas in 1911 and grew up in academia.

Early in Merrimon’s life his father, Jessie Lee Cuninggim, was a
professor at what was then called SMU’s School of Theology.

In 1921

Jessie Lee became President of Scarritt College, a small Methodist

9
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college in Nashville, Tennessee. It is here that the young Cuninggim
was introduced to the idea that blacks deserved an equal chance at
education.

While president of the College, Jessie Lee Cuninggim

worked with Fisk University in order to provide an opportunity for
blacks to be trained at Scarritt.

Merrimon Cuninggim recalls what

his father had done at Scarritt, and it definitely helped shape his
ideas for the future.

It would be his modus operandi his entire

academic career to help blacks get this equal chance as much as
possible, and he carried this over with him as dean of Perkins.
Cuninggim explained that “as a son of my father who had worked for
better race relations all through his career at Scarritt and elsewhere
I wanted no part of the job at Perkins unless the way was open for
Negroes to be admitted to the school as regular students. 11
African Americans started attending SMU as regular students in
January of 1951.

Since Cuninggim agreed not to take over the deanship

until the summer of 1951, this occurred while Hawk was still dean. Two
black men, ministerial students who graduated from Samuel Huston
College in Austin and Jarvis Christian College in Hawkins, entered the
theology school in early 1951.

When this occurred, Perkins became the

second voluntary postgraduate seminary desegregation in Texas.

The

first was Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, a small school

11
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with only 100 students, so breaking the color line at Perkins, “was
more influential because of the size and prestige of SMU”. 12
Dean Eugene Hawk implemented a strict, straightforward
interpretation of the board’s November ruling in regards to what these
few students could and could not do while studying at Perkins.

Hawk

felt that the students should be allowed to take classes at Perkins
and nothing else.

The black students were from Dallas, so they had no

need to live in the dorm.

That made the situation easier because Hawk

would not have allowed it anyway.

He wrote in a letter that, “They

[the black students] do not eat in the dining hall nor occupy the
dorms.

The understanding with the Board of Trustees is that they will

not share the living or eating facilities”.

When Lee was asked about

his take on blacks being regular students, he spoke in vague terms.
Lee was asked specifically about meals and rooms and he often replied,
“that when and if Negro students were to be admitted, proper
restrictions would be placed on their activities”.

When Lee discussed

the matter with Cuninggim, his answer was different.

Lee told

Cuninggim on numerous occasions that he would support Cuninggim’s
promise to allow black students as regular students with no
restrictions.

Numerous Board members agreed with Hawk on the

interpretation of the change in the bylaws.

They left the board

meeting in November believing, “the sole intention was to let the
Negroes come and sit in the back of classrooms”.

The Board minutes

from the meeting were entered on November 10, 1950 and included the
12
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statement that the administration would be “given power to act if, as
and when it seemed timely and proper”. 13
The student reaction to the new members of the 1951 Perkins
family was decidedly better than Hawk’s.

Marion McMillan was one of

the first black students in 1951 and was described by his peers as “a
kind of happy-go-lucky guy and easy to get along with”.

He had an

outgoing personality and numerous white students enjoyed eating with
him and spending time with his family at his home in Dallas.
McMillan’s demeanor, his academics were not up to par.

Despite

His career,

along with that of the other two black students at Perkins, did not
last past the first semester.

This brought an end to the first

experiment of black regular students at SMU. 14
With the failed attempt at desegregation under Hawk, it would be
up to Cuninggim to bring success to the endeavor.

He was charged with

creating a national name for the school and this included bringing in
highly acclaimed faculty.

Cuninggim started working on this goal as

soon as he took over the dean’s chair in the summer of 1951.

When he

brought on new faculty members Cuninggim made sure that they held
similar views to his on the race question.

This is seen in the hiring

of Cuninggim’s good friend Albert Outler, who was at the time a
professor of theology at Yale.

One of Cuninggim’s selling points to

Outler was that he could help him bring black students to Perkins.

He

told Outler, “As Southerners we’ll have a great chance to work on
desegregation; Lee says we can admit Negroes as regular students right

13
14
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away”.

This was incentive enough to get Outler to leave Yale for SMU

and the national reputation of Perkins was already taking shape. 15
It is important to point out part of Cuninggim’s statement to
Outler as crucial to his understanding of desegregation at SMU.
Cuninggim told Outler that Lee said they could admit blacks as regular
students to the university.

This took on a very different meaning for

Cuninggim than it had for Hawk.

Regular students could live where

they wanted and take part in any activity that they pleased.

This was

what Cuninggim envisioned for the black students at Perkins.

However,

the Board as well as members of the Methodist Church did not
necessarily see eye to eye with this interpretation.

Leaders of the

University, notably Hawk and benefactor J.J. Perkins, were not
comfortable with giving black students full access to the school, and
Cuninggim freely admitted had he known that was the case he would not
have come to SMU and for that matter neither would Outler. 16
Despite the setback of a failed experiment, Cuninggim was
determined to make this happen by the fall of 1952.

He made it his

personal mission to do well in this undertaking and worked tirelessly
to accomplish this goal.

He wrote letters to Negro educators to

inquire about their students’ interest in SMU.

He also visited a

number of the “stronger” black colleges across the South to personally
drum up support for Perkins in this regard. This effort worked as
Cuninggim was able to attract five black students from three different
denominations to SMU in the fall of 1952. They were each from
15
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different states: Arkansas, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and
Texas.

He was proud of this accomplishment because it was not seen as

tokenism.

When most southern schools went through desegregation they

found one suitable candidate to begin the process.

But Cuninggim

purposefully chose five young men with varying backgrounds to
desegregate the Perkins School of Theology.

They were John W. Elliot,

James A. Hawkins, James V. Lyles, Negail R. Riley, and Cecil Williams.
These five men would pave the way for a new beginning at Southern
Methodist University. 17
When the five black students started class at Perkins in the fall
of 1952, Cuninggim made the decision to keep it quiet from the media.
He insisted that there be no public announcement of the new students,
and the university adhered to this idea.

SMU wanted the process to go

smoothly and quietly and this is exactly what happened in the public
eye.

Cuninggim claims that neither side wanted to get the story out.

He referenced this in his pamphlet, Perkins Led the Way, when he
wrote, “Those that would have stood in the doorway didn’t want their
fellows to know they had failed.

And those of us who helped to open

the door didn’t want to shout, for self-protection, or timidity, or
distaste for boasting.
been self-defeating”.

To have played Little Jack Horner would have
Desegregation at Perkins was allowed to go on

without much outside interference because of the very quiet way in
which it was implemented. 18

17
18
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SMU was poised to start anew with the promise made in 1950 to
bring in blacks as regular students in the fall of 1952.

Just like

when the board made the decision in November of 1950, SMU was years
ahead of the other major private schools in the South in this regard
in 1952.

Nothing had changed since 1950 at Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane,

and Vanderbilt.

The board members, as well as the presidents of each

of these schools, stuck to their convictions that their schools would
remain all white in the early 1950s and indeed into the foreseeable
future.

Even in the event that one, or more, of the presidents of

these institutions wanted to push for change, they were not willing to
do so as early as SMU. There were factors at each of these other
private, southern schools that made desegregation too difficult of a
policy to implement.
When Harvie Branscomb arrived at Vanderbilt in 1946 he was told,
“no black man had ever been on the Vanderbilt campus except in a
menial way”.

Branscomb was chancellor at the university from 1946 to

1963, and the attitude towards race relations did not change much in
his time at Vanderbilt.

Despite the fact that Branscomb did not

personally like segregation, in Nashville, or on campus, there was not
anything he could do about it because “changes in the practice of
segregation could happen only slowly and only at the level of the
exceptional Negro”.

Branscomb treaded with caution in his early years

at Vanderbilt and he had a hard time reconciling what he wanted to do
and what he could do at the school. He wanted to alter the racial
policy at Vanderbilt, but it was going to be hard for him to get the
Board of Trustees to accept that change.

In the end the board won
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out, and Vanderbilt kept the status quo throughout the early 1950s and
remained an all-white segregated campus. 19
Goodrich White at Emory University took a different path than
Branscomb at Vanderbilt.

White was President of Emory from 1942 until

1957, and Chancellor from 1957 until 1979, and he did not urge the
board to take any measures towards the desegregation of the university
until the early 1960s.

More than anything, White feared the volatile

nature of Georgia’s racial politics and was concerned about a white
backlash in the state if he tried to convince the Emory board to
change its stance on segregation.

Instead, White worked to expand

opportunities for blacks within the confines of segregation.
According to Melissa Kean, “Rather than attempt to break down the
color line at Emory, White turned his attention to the improvement of
Georgia’s segregated institutions”.

While there were black workers,

entertainers, and occasional speakers at Emory, the academic side of
the school remained lily white and segregation thorough throughout the
early 1950s as well. 20
Duke University was similar to Emory and Vanderbilt in barring
black students. One difference, however, was that Duke did make it
possible for black researchers to work on campus.

There were also

some black staff members, all of whom were relegated to using
19
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segregated facilities.
sections as well.

The auditorium and football stadium had black

Duke Divinity students tried in 1948 to get the

board of trustees to consider allowing blacks as day students to that
specific division of the university.

By the time Hollis Edens became

president of Duke in 1949, the divinity students had circulated a
petition to attract the attention of the board on this matter.

In a

brief letter to faculty members of the Divinity School, Edens wrote
that, “I do not think that the interests of either the negro race or
of Duke University will be served at this time by raising for
discussion the question of admitting negroes to the Divinity School”.
The petition was never presented to the board in 1949, and it would be
many years before the matter was brought up again.

Duke, like Emory

and Vanderbilt, would remain segregated for the time being, and the
issue would not even be discussed with their prospective boards until
much later. 21
Rufus Harris, president of Tulane from 1937 until 1959, took much
the same approach to the race question as Harvie Branscomb did at
Vanderbilt.

While Harris was personally offended by the treatment of

blacks in a segregated society and saw the writing on the wall, he
also felt that change had to be “realistic”—by which Harris meant slow
and methodical.

Harris even stated that “temperate and realistic

leaders would remain in control of the progress down a slow path of
improvement”.

21
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of change, and they were not willing to modify their policy on black
students throughout the decade of the 1950s.

The Tulane board

comprised “a group of powerful, local men who prided themselves on not
bending tradition for anyone”. 22
Arguably Rice University was the most recalcitrant of the
southern private schools in regards to race relations.

William

Houston was the president of Rice from 1946 to 1961, and there was
very little said, let alone done, about segregation during his reign.
There is nothing from the Board meeting minutes or any other records
at Rice that even mention racial matters before the late 1950s.

In

addition, the school’s charter stated clearly that the Rice was for
white students only. President Houston made this well known in 1948
when the Thresher, the school’s student newspaper, began
editorializing about the need to end segregation and base admissions
on merit.

In February of 1949 Houston sent a letter to the editor of

the newspaper that stated very plainly, “I have concluded that some of
THE THRESHER staff, as well as most of your correspondents, must be
unaware of the provisions of the Rice Institute charter. The Rice
Institute was founded and chartered specifically for white students”.
It was evident in this statement that this would not change anytime
soon at Rice. 23
It seems that while a few of these aforementioned presidents may
have been willing to move forward, albeit slowly, with race relations

22
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at their various institutions, it was their prospective Boards of
Trustees that presented problems. Umphrey Lee did not have this
problem at Southern Methodist University.

The Board had already

changed the bylaws to admit Negroes when the time came.

There had

initially been some resistance but Lee’s proposal passed in the end.
Lee knew that desegregation was coming and got out ahead of the
problem. This by no means indicates that Lee was a visionary.

His

biographers called him a “committed gradualist” when it came to race
relations.

He did not, however, like the idea of being forced to

desegregate by court order, so he made sure that SMU did so before
this happened.

Lee was a realist and when he saw that things were

about to change he began pulling strings within the board to work
towards a peaceful solution.

This is the reason for the 1950

decision, and the subsequent admission of the five black men in the
fall of 1952. There would be successes and failures with desegregation
at Perkins between 1952 and 1955, and Merrimon Cuninggim would guide
every decision.

If there were to be more successes than failures it

would be up to Cuninggim to achieve them. 24

24
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Chapter Four
The Continued Effort at Perkins: Merrimon Cuninggim and
Desegregation

Perkins was never the same after Merrimon Cuninggim came.
He recast
the mission of the school; and it was his vision, supported by Umphrey
Lee, which brought the first African-Americans to SMU. 1

If there was a visionary in the story of the desegregation of
Perkins it was Merrimon Cuninggim. He set out in the fall of 1952 to
keep his promise to John W. Elliot, James A. Hawkins, James V. Lyles,
Negail R. Riley, and Cecil Williams that they would be regular
students of the university now that they were enrolled at Perkins.

He

called them into his office on the first day of class to discuss what
being regular students meant.

Cuninggim recollected that the students

had reservations about how the process was going to work, and he
wanted to reassure them that they would have all the privileges of
university life as regular students at SMU.

He told them that,

“regular students make their own decisions about where they go and
what they do.

So you will have that privilege too”.

Thus, Cuninggim

began a series of conversations that he would have with the five black
students during their time at Perkins, and it was the first assurance
of many he would hold true to for the next three years. 2
Later in the initial meeting with the five black students
Cuninggim told them he would help them deal with any problems that
would arise.

1

He told the students that anytime something came up he
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would tell them about it and sit down with them to discuss how to
handle it. Cuninggim would give them his own personal advice on how to
deal with each problem, but would respect their wishes when they made
a decision.

The final solution to issues on campus would be theirs

and theirs alone.

They talked with Cuninggim at length in this first

meeting about what complications could arise and how they would deal
with each situation when it did. 3
The idea of letting the black students decide their own path at
SMU was something that a lot of schools would not have been willing to
do.

Cuninggim was giving them a say in what went on in their lives.

SMU was not bringing about desegregation by fiat or administrative
rule.

The Board did not step in and tell the five blacks what they

could and maybe more importantly, what they couldn’t do.

Cuninggim

truly wanted to help, and in the process in fact did treat the five
men as regular students.

It was a controversial move that would cause

problems—as well as heartaches—for Cuninggim in the coming years.
However, it was his conviction to do so and Cuninggim stuck to this as
much as he possibly could while the five men were at Perkins.

There

were some tense moments where Elliot and the other four had to make
difficult decisions that went against their personal beliefs.

But

Cuninggim was doing his part to keep his promise that they would be
regular students of Southern Methodist University. 4

3
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One of the first situations that Cuninggim discussed with the
pioneers was what to do about eating on campus.

He reassured them

that there would not be any problem in the cafeteria at Perkins.
However, this may not always be the case in other eating facilities on
campus.

He pointed out to them that if they were to go to the student

union and try to eat that there was a possibility they would not be
served.

As a result, the black students agreed, at least for the time

being, that the only place they would dine would be in the cafeteria
at the school of theology.
Perkins cafeteria.

Cuninggim did not foresee problems in the

The five black men disagreed did.

The kitchen

staff was all black and did not take too kindly to “these uppity
young-uns comin’ in here and pretendin’ to be regular students”.
Cuninggim personally went to talk to the kitchen staff and told them
that they were in fact regular students and were the first in a long
line to come. 5
Another potential concern that came up in Cuninggim’s first
meeting with the five black students was the issue of their attending
SMU’s home football games at Cotton Bowl Stadium.

Cuninggim

approached the people at the stadium and raised the question.

The

Cotton Bowl representatives responded that the stadium had a Jim Crow
law, but it would not be a big deal for the black SMU students to sit
in the Negro section.

Cuninggim then asked that since the blacks were

regular students what would happen if they sat in the student section.
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The Cotton Bowl representatives responded that they would not do
anything because “you can bet we don’t want to raise the problem”.
The answer was sufficient for Cuninggim because he was certain that
the problem would not be made public by either side.

An important

component to the success of the mutual discussion experiment was
discretion, which became Cuninggim’s mantra with the Perkins students.
He was successful in getting things done for the new students, because
he negotiated behind closed doors.

After the Cotton Bowl reps gave

the nod of approval, the SMU Athletic Department was contacted and
responded very well to the situation.

The athletic department set

aside five tickets in the middle of the student section for the
Perkins students, and did so without them having to enter a drawing
for the seats like most students.

The athletic department then set

aside an additional twelve to fifteen seats around the black students
so they could be surrounded by people sympathetic to their cause.

The

five students attended the first home game in the fall of 1952, and
they were treated with respect and encountered no problems in Cotton
Bowl Stadium the entire year. 6
Seating was not the only thing the athletic department had to
deal with in the fall of 1952 in regards to the new black students.
Shortly after the fall term began, the question of whether they would
play intramural sports was brought to the attention of intramural
representatives of the athletic department.

Originally, the black

students were not the ones who brought up the issue. Rather, it was
the white student responsible for putting together Perkins’ intramural
6
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teams.

This student (unnamed) took it upon himself to go to the SMU

Athletic Department and demand that the black students be allowed to
play intramurals immediately.

An athletic department representative

said they would have no problem with the black students playing, but
advised the student to check with the faculty senate just to be
certain.

No one in the senate had a problem with allowing the blacks

to participate in intramural sports, but they tabled the motion in
order to discuss it with administration first.

Word got back to

Cuninggim, and he called the Intramural Director, Matty Bell, a close
personal friend.

Cuninggim told Bell that since the blacks were

regular students they would be participating in intramurals. Cuninggim
wanted to warn Bell so he could notify his umpires and referees in
advance that black students would be participating in intramurals.
Bell, who was also the athletic director, told Cuninggim that he was
glad that “you’re treating it normally; no point in making a big scene
is there?”.

The matter was settled, and the black students

participated in intramurals from the time they entered Perkins.
Elliot and company decided not to take part in intramural football
because of the physical contact associated with the sport.

The five

black men did play baseball, and there was one “incident” associated
with the Perkins baseball team that could have caused a problem.

One

of the black students decided to play catcher, and in one game in the
spring of 1953 there was a play at the plate.

The black catcher

blocked the plate, tagged the white runner, and he was called out.
Nothing happened as a result, and Cuninggim wrote in a letter to
Charles Braden that “as a result (of the play) there developed a
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magnificent, interracial, healthy rhubarb”.

This proved that blacks

and whites could get along, even when minimal physical contact
occurred, without a racial dilemma occurring in the aftermath. 7
Not all the decisions came as easily in that first meeting, or
subsequent meetings, with Cuninggim.

While the new theology students

would have liked to do everything, just like other regular students,
there were a few things they avoided in order to keep their problems
to a minimum.

One thing the black students avoided was swimming in

the university pool.

Negail Riley described the situation to

Cuninggim in a letter he wrote in October of 1955, which was right
after he had graduated from Perkins.

Riley’s assessment was that

swimming in the pool would be a step back in the desegregation
process.

Family Swim Night at SMU was open to the public, and Riley

et al. knew that this might cause a problem.

Riley opined to

Cuninggim that, “We saw very frankly into the nature of much of the
prejudices of the whole area.
question.

To swim or not to swim was the

The decision to swim would have been retrogressive,

especially since Family Night was the program of the larger community
that did not have a unanimous benignant attitude”.

Sacrifices, like

not swimming in the university pool, were made so that desegregation
as a whole could work.

7
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Papers, Bridwell Library, Perkins School of Theology, Southern
Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
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others into this decision he let them decide, and they chose to do
something for the betterment of the entire process. 8
When decisions had to be made between Cuninggim and the black
students, all six men discussed the issue, and generally came to an
agreement about how to deal with the potential problem.

There was one

episode where the blacks and Cuninggim deviated from the consensus
model.

In March of 1955, the last semester for the five at Perkins,

James Lyles and Cecil Williams decided to take part in an NAACP Youth
Council protest against the segregated Melba Theatre in downtown
Dallas.

Cuninggim advised them not to get involved in the protest,

because it would bring unwanted attention to what was happening at
Perkins.

Lyles and Williams did not listen, and participated despite

Cuninggim’s warning.

Lyles recalled in an interview with William R.

Simon years later that, “That was the closest we came to open conflict
with Cuninggim.

That was the only time we really stood our ground.

We said we reserved the right to participate because we felt it would
be a violation of our conscience not to do so”.

Even though Cuninggim

did not like Lyles’ and Williams’ decision, he did not forbid them
from participating.

If the black students were truly allowed to make

their own decisions, Cuninggim had to allow them to get involved in
the protest if they wanted. 9

8

Letter from Negail R. Riley to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 14, 1955,
found in Black Seminarians at Perkins: Then and Now.
9
Simon, “Breaking Down the Color Bar at SMU”, 42.Merrimon Cuninggim,
“Integration in Professional Education: The Story of Perkins, Southern
Methodist University”, 113, reprinted from The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, March, 1956,
found in Merrimon Cuninggim Papers, Bridwell Library, Perkins School
of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
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The mutual decision making process between Cuninggim and the five
black students usually worked very well with little outside
interference.

There were a few instances when other university

officials tried to step in and take over the process.

The list

included Umphrey Lee, Eugene Hawk (who had been made vice president
after Cuninggim took over as dean of Perkins), and benefactors like
Joe Perkins to name a few.

Lee understood the process that Cuninggim

had set up better than most, and gave his support to that technique as
much as possible.

However, Lee tried to “assist” Cuninggim in the

decision making process in November of 1952.

As aforementioned, the

black students had agreed to only eat at the Perkins cafeteria.

The

only time one of the students strayed from eating at Perkins was on a
Sunday when he was on campus (which was actually pretty rare as they
had obligations with local churches in Dallas that usually kept them
busy all day).

The Perkins cafeteria was not open on Sundays, and one

of the black students (which one was not mentioned), was invited by a
white student to accompany him to a University dining hall.

While in

the dining hall, the two Perkins students sat down with a white
undergraduate female that they were both acquainted with from a
Methodist youth conference.

The white girl had never ever eaten with

a black person before, and she wrote home to her mother where she
expressed her delight about the experience.

She penned, “I had lunch

today with a black student from Perkins, and it was a wonderful
experience…”.The mother was appalled at her daughter’s “wonderful
experience”, and she contacted President Lee to discuss the matter.
Lee sent word to Cuninggim that he had to tell the black students they
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could not dine anywhere but the Perkins cafeteria.

Cuninggim replied

to Lee that he could not do so in good conscience because of his
promise to the blacks that they were to be treated as regular
students.

The cafeteria incident caused tension between Lee and

Cuninggim, and could very easily have led to Cuninggim’s termination.
Even so, Cuninggim did not back down. 10
The tension led to a meeting between the President and the Dean.
Lee was concerned because he had received some serious objections from
the mothers involved.

The mothers’ objections threatened to put an

end to the Perkins experiment, and Lee wanted Cuninggim to understand
the ramifications. Cuninggim went into the meeting with the mindset
that he would respect Lee’s decision. If Lee decided to tell the black
students they would not be able to eat anywhere but the Perkins
cafeteria, then that would be the decision. Cuninggim simply said he
would not do it because of his pact with the students.

Both men asked

the other questions about how things would go with the cafeteria
situation. Lee wanted to know what the young men would decide, and
Cuninggim wanted to know if Lee would uphold the black students’
decision no matter what they chose.

Both Lee and Cuninggim were

satisfied with the answers they got in the meeting, but Cuninggim was
particularly pleased with “knowing that Lee both approved of the
method in principle and was willing to allow it to be used even in a
most awkward circumstance”.

Lee was happy knowing that Cuninggim had

assured him that more than likely the Perkins students would agree to
eat only at the cafeteria in the theology school.
10

Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 15-16.
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presented the problem to the black students, they “realized how silly
it would be to let our experiment founder on some inconsequential
liberty”.

They agreed to eat only at the Perkins cafeteria until the

rest of the University was ready to fully accept them.

Lee and

Cuninggim both walked away from the meeting with the notion that the
desegregation experiment would not be brought down by a minor issue.11
The aforementioned dining hall problem was important because it
showed that Cuninggim and Lee were willing to talk out any potential
problems. The situation did not always go so smoothly when other
university officials got involved.
five black students was housing.

The most volatile issue for the

When they arrived in the fall of

1952, four of the five were put in the dorms, and initially this did
not cause a stir. However, by the spring several of the black students
expressed interest in rooming with whites.
housing on the black students.

No one forced integrated

Several of the black men had been

asked by white classmates at Perkins to room with them.

When word got

to the Board of Trustees about the new arrangement, the members were
not pleased.

The Board felt they had not been asked for permission to

allow the black students to be housed in the dorm.

The Board

certainly had not approved any of the five rooming with whites.

When

Lee went to the board in 1950 to get them to change the bylaws, the
question of living quarters inevitably came up.

When asked what he

was going to do about rooms and meals Lee responded, “Oh, that won’t
be a problem”.

A handful of influential board members (none of them

named) took Lee’s comment to mean that blacks would not be allowed in
11

Ibid.
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the dorms or room with whites.

When the Board found out the living

arrangements for the black students in 1953, they began to backtrack
on what they had promised the black students.

More specifically, the

Board began speaking of what they had not promised.

The members of

the Board had agreed to admission and nothing more.

They felt

betrayed, because Lee and Cuninggim had gone behind their backs to
allow the students in the dorm without permission.

The matter had to

be dealt with, and would be put to a vote in the upcoming board
meeting in May of 1953. 12
As the board meeting drew closer, the members that wanted the
students removed from the dorm purposely kept Cuninggim out of the
loop.

Since he was not privy to the back channel dealings, Cuninggim

was forced to use his own connections to resolve the matter in a way
that was beneficial to the black students.
fight, he was caught in the middle.

Because Lee did not want a

He could agree with the board and

allow them to vote on the issue, but that decision would more than
likely result in the black students’ removal from the dorm.

If Lee

sided with the board it might even lead to expulsion for the black
students.

The other possibility for Lee was to continue to let

Cuninggim proceed with the idea of mutual consultation, but that path
would alienate the board. 13
The opposition began to form behind closed doors, and included
several of the conservative businessmen on the board.

The decision to

question Cuninggim’s method was not done just by the board.

12
13

Ibid, 9, 19.
Ibid, 19.

Rather,
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the ringleader among those dissatisfied was former dean of Perkins,
Eugene Hawk.

While it had been several years since his removal as

dean, Hawk still harbored bitter resentment that he had been removed
without even being contacted.

At first, Cuninggim did not know that

Hawk was involved, but when he found out, Cuninggim surmised that Hawk
was not mad at him per se, but at Lee because it was Lee that had gone
behind Hawk’s back and hired Cuninggim in the first place.

The issue

of the black students being in the dorm was the perfect opportunity
for Hawk to embarrass Lee.

After all, Lee had given a less than

definitive answer to what the role of the new black students would be
when he had the board change the bylaws in 1950. 14
Hawk sought to use the dorm question to his advantage with the
upcoming board meeting in May of 1953.

He started to whisper to

several of the board members that their authority had been usurped by
Cuninggim and Lee.

The situation quickly became an attack on

Cuninggim, and by extension Lee.

The Board did not like the fact that

Cuninggim was making decisions for the black students without their
consultation.

Furthermore, Cuninggim could remove the students from

the dorm, and the problem would be solved.

However, the blacks wanted

to live in the dorm, and Cuninggim felt they should have that choice
whether the board approved the verdict or not. If the board made

14

Letter to Charles Braden from Merrimon Cuninggim, August 7, 1964,
found in Merrimon Cuninggim Papers.
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decisions by fiat, then there would be no point in the students
conferring with Cuninggim when problems arose. 15
Cuninggim began to worry that Hawk was going to get his way, and
the board was going to rule to remove the black students from the
dorm.

Cuninggim could not let Hawk win, so he began conferring with

his own group of friends on the board to figure out a solution.
Cuninggim’s cohorts included Bishop A. Frank Smith, chairman of the
board, Bishop Paul Martin, chairman of the Board’s Committee on the
School of Theology, and Bishop William C. Martin, Resident Bishop in
Dallas and President of the National Council of Churches.

The School

of Theology Committee decided to meet the night before the scheduled
board meeting to solve the problem. In the meeting, Smith, Martin, and
Martin tried to get Cuninggim to back down and place restrictions on
the black students.

Smith tried to at least convince Cuninggim that

he should tell the black students they could not room with whites.
When Cuninggim got home from the meeting, he told his wife that if
Smith did not change his mind he would have to start looking for a new
job.

When the meeting was over, nothing had been decided.

However,

Smith called Cuninggim the next morning to arrange a meeting in his
hotel room.

When Cuninggim got to the meeting, Smith told him that

the Committee would “handle the matter”.

Once the board met later

that morning the issue was not even brought up.

While this did not

necessarily end the fight, things went on as they always had at

15

Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 19-20. Letter to Charles Braden
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Perkins.

The black students stayed in the dorm, and continued on with

their normal everyday activities. 16
While many involved thought that the board’s lack of action on
the subject at the May board meeting was the end, it really was just
the beginning.

Hawk and others that wanted to see restrictions placed

on the black students felt that the reason they had not gotten a
response from the board was because they had failed to get the support
of Joe Perkins, the main benefactor and namesake for the school of
theology.

The university could not afford to lose the money he gave.

Hawk wrote a letter to Perkins in the summer of 1953 telling him about
the situation at hand.

Originally, no one told Cuninggim who sent the

letter, but it was Mr. Perkins himself who eventually told Cuninggim
that Hawk was behind the scheme.

Once Perkins was notified, he began

expressing his concern about the situation to the board.

He sent a

letter to William Martin on August 17, 1953 where he told Martin that
this was a matter of “extreme importance and it should not be delayed
any longer”.

Perkins also alluded to the fact that he may go

elsewhere with his money if the present conflict was not resolved
quickly.

Perkins mentioned directly in his letter that, “My interest

and zeal in SMU would suffer a very severe heart attack if this is not
straightened up in the very near future”.
letter to Cuninggim on August 27.

Perkins wrote a scathing

He made it very clear to Cuninggim

that he had become quite disturbed about the “Negro question in
connection with the University”.

16

Ibid.

Perkins also made it clear that
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Cuninggim had overstepped his bounds, and that the board had never
approved or authorized letting the black students into the dorm. 17
The situation was compounded in the summer of 1953 by the fact
that Cuninggim’s main supporters were all indisposed by illness or
travel.

According to Cuninggim’s personal account of the situation,

“In the early summer of 1953 three things happened to help their
cause, one to each person who they thought stood in their way”.

Lee

had a debilitating heart attack that eventually caused him to step
down as president. Bishop Smith’s wife was deathly ill, and he had to
stay close to her in Houston.
church business.
himself.

Bishop Paul Martin was overseas on

Cuninggim was left to fend off the wolves by

Hawk especially felt that since Lee, Smith, and Martin were

out of touch the time was ripe to strike.

It was during the period

where the aforementioned men were gone that Hawk sent his letter to
Joe Perkins.

If Perkins bought into Hawk’s line of reasoning, it

could ruin the university financially.

Cuninggim did not know what to

do, and told Charles Braden in a letter years later.

Cuninggim

quipped to Braden, “Though nobody wanted to buck Mr. Perkins, nobody
wanted to tell me to get the Negroes out of the dormitory or to issue
the order over my head.” 18
When University officials heard of Perkins’ letter, they had to
act.
17

They tried two things to keep the situation under control.

Letter to Bishop William C. Martin from J.J. Perkins, August 17,
1953. Letter to Merrimon Cuninggim from J.J. Perkins, August 27,
1953. Both letters were found in the body of the letter from
Cuninggim to Charles Braden, August 7, 1964 which was found in the
Merrimon Cuninggim Papers, Bridwell Library, Perkins School of
Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
18
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First, they wanted to keep Joe Perkins calm so he would not press for
board action before Paul Martin got back from his trip.

If the board

had acted before Martin got back, then the outcome probably would have
been radically different.

Secondly, university officials tried once

again to get Cuninggim to remove the blacks from the dorm, and
possibly even the school all together.

Frank Smith sent an urgent

letter to Mr. Perkins persuading him “to let this matter ride as is
until the return of Bishop Paul Martin which will be late fall”.
second request was not as easy to accomplish.

The

Cuninggim, who was out

of town on business, called the school and told university officials
that under no circumstances should the black students be removed from
the dorm and nothing was to be changed.

Cuninggim had some time to

think about the situation before he got back to SMU. Before he got
back to Dallas, Cuninggim wrote his “Memorandum on the Negro Problem”
where he outlined every step and precaution that had been taken since
Lee had the bylaws changed in 1950. 19
When Cuninggim got back to campus, he had meetings with several
university officials, including one with Dr. Hosford and Willis Tate,
who were jointly acting as president in Lee’s absence.

In each

meeting, Cuninggim produced his newly written memorandum and read it
to those present.

Each time he read the memo, university officials

came away convinced that Cuninggim’s methods were working.

During the

meeting with Hosford and Tate, Cuninggim recollected that both men
responded “Well, we are with you” after he read them the memo.

19

Letter to Charles Braden from Merrimon Cuninggim, August 7, 1964,
found in Merrimon Cuninggim Papers.
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Cuninggim was allowed by Bishop Smith to read his memorandum at the
Faculty Pre-school conference in mid-September, and after reading it
he gained the support of nearly all the faculty (most of which agreed
with him anyway).

Once Paul Martin got back to the United States, he

had a meeting with Joe Perkins to try and convince him that based on
Cuninggim’s memorandum, things needed to move forward not backward.
The meeting went well, and despite the fact that Perkins still was not
completely comfortable with the situation he relented.

More

importantly, Perkins agreed to continue giving money to SMU. In the
meeting Perkins asked Paul Martin directly if the matter was not
settled amicably would it hurt the university.

Martin replied that it

would, and Perkins seemed to change his tune a bit.

He told Martin,

“That is the only consideration.

The University must rise above any

hurt feelings that can develop.

The School of Theology is our first

love”.

The image of Perkins, and SMU, needed to be protected and

Perkins backed down.

Perkins’ wife, Lois, was present at the meeting

and after hearing her husband speak on the subject she stated, “I
don’t agree with my husband on this particular matter.

And if he had

shared with me the letter from Dr. Hawk last summer, we would never
have had any trouble”.
Cuninggim.
Cuninggim.

Lois Perkins was on the same page as

She was “indeed a heroine of the story” according to
Her social conscience as well as her work with various

women’s groups within the Methodist Church made her more aware of the
plight of blacks particularly those at SMU.

Mrs. Perkins stating that

there would have not been a problem had she been consulted is an
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oversimplification of the issue, but provides context on how delicate
the situation was in the summer and fall of 1953. 20
As the summer came to a close, Cuninggim had a meeting with
Negail Riley, James Hawkins, Jim Lyles, and Cecil Williams.

The

meeting lasted hours, and was focused on the black students living in
the dorm with whites.

Eventually, they decided that it would be best

for them not to room with white students for the time being.

The four

men sent a letter to Bill Berner, housing director at SMU, presumably
at the end of the summer of 1953 stating that they would not room with
white students that fall.

But they stated, “In light of the

situation, we regard our decision as a retreat; although we accept it,
we realize that it is a compromise that should not have to be taken”. 21
Once the housing hurdle had been cleared, there were no other
major incidents in regards to the five black men at Perkins.

Before

they left in 1955, a few other black men came to study at Perkins, and
the process continued without much problem.

All five graduated on

time in the spring of 1955.

Once again, the university chose not to

publicize their graduation.

There was not even a mention of the black

students graduating in the University Commencement program.

The five

men did, however, receive much applause from the crowd as their names
20

Ibid. Norman Spellman, Growing a Soul: The Story of A. Frank Smith
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were called.

By 1955 they were participating in nearly every activity

across campus, and it had been a good experience.
Cuninggim, “It was almost altogether positive.

According to

The ready acceptance

of the step by the overwhelming majority of students and faculty was
patent for all to see.

As the word got around the country, largely by

the academic grapevine, it made SMU look good nationwide”.

This is

not surprising, because it is why Umphrey Lee had taken a chance and
hired Cuninggim in the first place. 22
When the Perkins experiment came to an end, the first five black
graduates expressed their gratitude to Cuninggim for giving them the
power to decide their own futures at SMU.

Several sent him letters

while still at Perkins, while a couple sent them after they graduated.
James A. Hawkins wrote Cuninggim a letter in August of 1953, right
before the start of his second year, and summed this attitude up well.
He wrote to Cuninggim, “The means of our keeping each other informed
on problems that arose, sharing in the discussions, and eventually the
solution of them proved to be one of the important steps we took last
year”.

Hawkins was very appreciative that Cuninggim gave them a voice

in the matter.

He noted this in his letter by stating, “I must give

you praise for letting us decide in the final analysis the steps we
should follow.
this”.

22

I, along with the others, am truly grateful to you for

Riley, Lyles, Williams, and Elliot all made similar statements

Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 27.
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in letters to Cuninggim in October of 1955, the semester after they
all graduated from Perkins. 23
The desegregation of Southern Methodist University was handled
quietly and without much problem.

Desegregation started when Umphrey

Lee decided to get the board of trustees at the school to change the
bylaws to allow for blacks to come to SMU as regular students. The
admission of blacks came to fruition under the leadership of Merrimon
Cuninggim, as well as others like Lee, Bishop Frank Smith,and Bishop
Paul Martin.

SMU desegregated at a time when no other southern

private school, let alone a Methodist school, was even thinking about
the idea.

While Lee and others played a role in breaking down SMU’s

racial barriers, Cuninggim is the one that deserves the lions’ share
of the credit.

Cuninggim’s obituary in the Dallas Morning News summed

up his leadership at SMU noting, “Merrimon took over the leadership in
a very shrewd way, of the desegregation of Perkins. He fought the
battle with a real keen sense of Southern diplomacy”.

The quote sums

up Cuninggim’s importance to the school of theology, as well as the
university as a whole.

He made Perkins into a nationally known

school, and raised the level of academics at SMU.

In the process, he

opened the door for African American students at SMU as well as other
private institutions in the South.
Brown.

23

And he did so two years before

SMU was not forced by court order to desegregate, and Merrimon

Letter from James A. Hawkins to Merrimon Cuninggim, August 6, 1953;
Letter from Negail R. Riley to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 14, 1955;
Letter from James Lyles to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 20, 1955;
Letter from Cecil Williams to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 22, 1955;
Letter from John W. Elliot to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 26, 1955.
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Cuninggim can be seen as a visionary for his role in accomplishing
that goal. 24

24

Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 1.
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Chapter Five
Forging On…Gradually: Desegregation at SMU after Perkins
I explained to the trustees that I was assuming they expected me to
deal with desegregation or integration and that unless I was
instructed otherwise, I would deal with it at the pace I believed
best. And so we moved quietly. 1

When Willis Tate became president of Southern Methodist
University in 1954, desegregation was already underway at the school.
However, the Perkins School of Theology was the only department at SMU
that had black students.

One of his duties as president was to

oversee the continued effort of desegregation of SMU’s colleges and
school.

Tate’s quotation above shows how he planned on forging ahead

with the process of bringing more black students to the university.
Like Cuninggim before him, Tate felt it was best to proceed quietly
and deliberately.

He did not feel that SMU should rush into any rash

decisions and open all of its doors immediately.

Tate preferred to

follow the model of other schools in Texas, namely the University of
Texas in Austin, in regards to further desegregation measures.

By the

time Tate became president in 1954, SMU’s fervor for being a leader in
desegregation had waned.

The school was successful in breaking down

one barrier, but it did not hurry to break down others.

Full

integration at SMU did not come until later, as it did at UT.

While

Texas admitted its first black graduate student in 1950, the first
undergraduates were not admitted until 1956.

Subsequently, Texas did

not go beyond the academic programs until the 1960s.

1

SMU did the

Interview with Willis Tate by Gerald McGee, “On the Ups and Downs” in
Johnnie Marie Grimes, Willis Tate: Views and Interviews (Dallas:
Southern Methodist University Press, 1978), 167.
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same, and would also not have black students in all of its colleges
until the 1960s.
While the spring of 1955 marked the end of SMU’s first successful
foray into desegregation, the “second step toward integration” was
started then as well.

When the Board of Trustees met that term, the

members agreed to admit “qualified” Negro students to evening classes
in the law school. By 1955, several schools in the Southwest
Conference had black law students, including the University of
Arkansas and the University of Texas, and SMU made the decision to
join their ranks.

The first black student was admitted to the Dedman

School of Law in the fall of 1955.

She was Mrs. Ruby Braden Curl, a

teacher at Carver Elementary School. Curl was a 1944 graduate of
Samuel Huston College in Austin, Texas with a degree in social
science.

Prior to entering SMU, Curl had been a teacher in the Dallas

school system for nine years, with her last at Carver.

Curl wanted to

go to law school so she could use her legal training to work with
juveniles.

While Curl is in the 1956 SMU yearbook, the Rotunda, she

does not appear in any subsequent yearbook.
attended the law school for one year.
followed a similar path.

It seems that she only

Several other black students

Elmer Richard Medlock from Dallas was listed

as a first year student in the 1957 Rotunda, but not was not in
subsequent editions.

Earldean V. Robbins, also from Dallas, appeared

in the 1959 yearbook but also does not appear to have finished more
than that first year. Curtis Pearson was listed as a second year
student in the 1960 Rotunda, but has no mention the following year.
The 1960 yearbook does provide some insight into what appears to be
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the first black graduate.

Richard A. Strecker was listed in the 1960

yearbook as a first year law student.

Four years later his name

appeared in the 1964 SMU commencement booklet having earned his
bachelor’s in law.

Once he was added to the alumni directory the

bachelor’s had been changed to a J.D. of law as SMU had changed the
title of the degree to coincide with other schools doing the same.
Presumably he is the first black graduate of the Dedman School of Law
at SMU. 2
SMU now had two schools that were desegregated, the Dedman School
of Law and the Perkins School of Theology.

However, there were no

plans, at least in the immediate future, to add any other departments
to the list.

In fact, Tate stated in the same article announcing the

entrance of Mrs. Curl to the law school that he did not “know of any
further plans for integration in any other schools of the university”.
The Board was scheduled to meet in November of 1955, but Tate was not
sure if they would be discussing any future desegregation plans.
Nothing changed as late as 1958, when SMU student president David
Musslewhite told fellow delegates to the Student Conference on
National Affairs that he saw no reason for SMU to integrate the

2
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1964, Southern Methodist University Convocation and Commencement
Records, box 9 folder 3, Degolyer Library, Southern Methodist
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graduate school at the present time.

Musslewhite was adamant that

“there’s no reason to integrate just for the sake of integration”. 3
Despite Musslewhite’s statement in 1958 and the fact that SMU had
only desegregated the law school and school of theology, the
university was similar to numerous schools in Texas.

According to

Richard Morehead of the Dallas Morning News, thirty five schools in
Texas had blacks by 1958.

At least twelve additional institutions of

higher learning had desegregation policies by that point, but did not
have any black students.

Several others, including Texas Christian

University and Baylor University, were like SMU in that they had
desegregated their graduate programs.

However, none of the three

major Protestant affiliated schools, SMU included, in Texas had opened
the undergraduate doors to blacks in 1958.
Dallas had black students.

By 1959, three colleges in

In addition to SMU, Southwestern Medical

School of the University of Texas and the University of Dallas had
black students enrolled in January of 1959.
had desegregated by 1960.

Most colleges in Texas

Morehead notes that more than forty

colleges and universities had black students in the state in the
summer of 1960.

The next step was to open the doors to black

undergraduates. 4
Even though Southern Methodist University had desegregated all of
its graduate programs by the early 1960s, the undergraduate school was
3

Ibid. Richard Morehead, “College Students Favor Gradual
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4
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still lily-white.

Pressure started mounting, from inside and outside

SMU, to get the school to break down yet another barrier.

The campus

held Ministers Week in February of 1961, and delegates were greeted
with student appeals to bring in black students as undergraduates.
The students also urged the participants of Ministers Week to persuade
Methodist hospitals to provide equal treatment to black and white
patients. The “protestors” displayed placards outside the entrance to
McFarlin Auditorium (where the ministers where meeting), and
distributed a mimeographed sheets signed “The Policy Committee”. The
same group was believed to be responsible for a sit-in at University
Pharmacy prior to urging the ministers to further desegregate the
campus.

The only student to be identified specifically was Charles

Merrill from the Perkins School of Theology.

He noted that what the

students did was not a demonstration, but rather, “It is primarily an
appeal to the Methodist Church and its principles”. 5
In October of 1961, an unofficial poll of nearly one-fourth of
the student body at SMU indicated that students favored the
integration of the undergraduate level at the school.

The following

year, in May of 1962, the North Texas Methodist Conference urged the
trustees of SMU to “integrate all its facilities as rapidly as
possible”.

Delegates to the annual meeting unanimously adopted a

resolution that called for the integration of all Methodist
institutions in the area.

The conference also agreed to assist

schools financially that were encountering difficulties in moving

5

“Desegregation Appeals Greet Visitors at SMU”, Dallas Morning News,
February 9, 1961.
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towards integration.

SMU was now being asked to join the ranks of the

University of Texas, Texas Tech University, and the University of
Arkansas as the only schools in the Southwest Conference that allowed
black undergraduates in 1962. 6
SMU did join the aforementioned schools in the fall of 1962.

The

Board of Trustees took the poll into consideration during its next
meeting, but did not make any official changes to university policy
regarding desegregation.

It seems the only decision needed on the

matter was the one made by Umphrey Lee in 1950.

With this being said,

Paula Elaine Jones enrolled on Friday September 14, 1962 as a fulltime undergraduate at the school.

Miss Jones was the first black

student to attend SMU on the undergraduate level, and she helped the
university “complete the full desegregation of all educational
facilities”.

Jones registered in the SMU coliseum with the other

incoming freshmen, and she did so without incident.

The university

followed that same pattern when it brought in the first black students
at Perkins in the early 1950s, as well as at the law school and other
graduate programs.

There is another way that Jones’ entry into SMU

followed a well-established model, and that is the fact that she was a
great student.

She attended the Harwood Girls School in Albuquerque,

New Mexico where she was a “straight A” student that graduated with
honors.

All students admitted to SMU were held to a high academic

standard according to President Tate.

6

He stated to the Dallas Morning

“Desegregation Appeals Greet Visitors at SMU”, Dallas Morning News,
February 9, 1961. Jack Castleman, “SMU Urged to Integrate”, Dallas
Morning News, May 31, 1962. “SMU Enrolls Negro Girl as Freshman”,
Dallas Morning News, September 14, 1962.
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News that “Every student granted admission to SMU is a person of high
scholastic personal qualifications.
Jones”.

This is the case of Miss Paula

He went on to say, “Each student so admitted will meet

extremely high standards of scholarship and character”. 7
The standard for African American students, especially ones that
were considered the first in an area, were even higher.

Schools like

SMU were not going to risk their reputations on a less than
extraordinary black student, because the student had to be able to
withstand the pressures that came with being the first.

Jones was one

that could handle the burden, just like the first five had been able
to do at Perkins.

She came to SMU on a scholarship, and had been

offered a similar scholarship by the University of Texas.

By having a

scholarship, and planning on chemistry as her major, Jones showed that
she was ready for the academic and social rigor that would be expected
of her at Southern Methodist University.
speaking of Jones to the Morning News.

Tate made this clear when

She was president of her class

in Albuquerque and is “intellectually and personally qualified to
pursue her studies in this university”, Tate told reporters.

Jones

graduated from SMU in 1966 with a degree in speech pathology and
audiology, and she became active in several clubs during her tenure at
the university as well. 8
Even though SMU had desegregated all of its schools by 1962, the
gap between the first and the last was eleven years.

7

Southern
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Methodist University had been before its time in 1950/1951 by opening
the Perkins School of Theology to blacks.

When Paula Jones came to

SMU in 1962, the school was simply following the protocol set by other
universities in the Southwest Conference, namely the University of
Arkansas and the University of Texas.

Silas Hunt came to the

University of Arkansas in 1948, and was considered the first black
student in the law school.

In August of 1955, Arkansas Attorney

General Tom Gentry made it clear that the state’s flagship institution
would have to open its doors to black undergraduates.

Gentry’s

motivation for doing so came on the heels of the second Brown decision
in May of 1955 which called for schools to desegregate with “all
deliberate speed”.

With Gentry’s prodding, the University of Arkansas

allowed black undergraduates to matriculate at the school starting
that fall.

However, by the fall of 1956, there were only eight black

undergraduates at the University of Arkansas.

More importantly,

Arkansas had waited eight years to complete the desegregation of all
of its educational units.

The University of Texas was only slightly

quicker to adhere to Brown.

A week after Brown II was handed down,

University of Texas President Logan Wilson announced that the Board of
Regents would meet on July 8, 1955 to “define the path the University
will follow on undergraduate integration”.

During the July 8th

meeting, The University of Texas Board of Regents announced that the
school would now accept black undergraduates.
taken eight years, Texas took six.

While Arkansas had

Heman Sweatt was admitted to the

University of Texas Law School in 1950, and black undergrads were
admitted to UT in the fall of 1956.

SMU took a bit longer than
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Arkansas and Texas to bring in its first black undergraduate to
campus.

The school was no longer a leader in desegregation. Rather,

SMU was now a follower, simply doing the same thing the two power
schools of the conference had done in previous years. 9
While SMU may not have been a leader in undergraduate
desegregation as compared to the public schools of the SWC, it was
still one of the first to open its doors to black undergraduates among
the major private schools in the South. Emory University did not admit
its first black graduate student until the fall of 1962.

Tulane’s

first black graduate student was in the spring of 1963, and Rice
University’s was not until 1965.

The Board of Trustees at Duke

University decided in November of 1962 to admit black students to the
undergraduate level.

Vanderbilt University changed its policy on the

admission of black undergrads in the spring of 1962 placing it at best
on par with SMU with regards to a desegregation timeline.

None of the

major private institutions in the South had black undergraduates
before SMU.

Therefore, when compare SMU to its private counterparts,

it was still a leader on the desegregation front. 10
Now that all the educational programs were desegregated at SMU,
it was time for the school to move on to other areas in the process.
While SMU desegregated the undergraduate program in 1962, there were
9
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no black athletes, faculty members, or student organizations. SMU made
the first step in that direction in December of 1964.

President Tate

announced a new program that would bring in twenty five students from
Bishop College, an all-black undergraduate institution in Dallas,
starting in January 1965.

The black students were to take classes at

SMU that were not offered at Bishop.

Tate called the new phase a

“revolutionary pilot program between a white and a Negro institution”.
Tate felt it necessary to bring in the black Bishop students to
encourage them to stay in Dallas for graduate school rather than going
north for higher degrees.

The Bishop students were each slated to

take one 3-hour course and attend class three times a week for one
hour.

While they were not SMU undergraduate students, the university

was pushing to further integrate the campus. 11
Another racial barrier fell at SMU in 1965 when William S. Willis
Jr. became the first black faculty member.

Willis had attended Howard

University as an undergraduate, and eventually obtained his Ph.D. from
Columbia University in anthropology in 1955.

Despite having a

doctorate from a prestigious university, Willis’ job opportunities in
academia were not great.

As late as 1964 Willis had not found a

permanent teaching job, so he moved to Dallas hoping to find a
position.

Willis was given a position in the Sociology and

Anthropology Department at SMU. However, the appointment was not
solely at SMU.

Rather, two-thirds of his time would be spent there,

and the other third would be at Bishop College on the other side of

11
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December 18, 1964.
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town.

Willis would have joint teaching duties at both schools.

The

job was incredibly taxing with lots of time spent traveling,
conflicting class schedules, and meetings at both schools that kept
Willis beyond busy. 12
Willis’ joint position at SMU and Bishop College quickly became
more than he could handle, to the point that he only stayed with the
job for one year.

By the fall of 1966, Willis had given up the Bishop

position, and only taught part-time as an assistant professor at SMU.
In the fall of 1967, he became a full-time assistant professor, and
was promoted to associate professor with tenure in May of 1968.
Despite the taxing nature of his schedule, Willis felt that he and his
wife’s “efforts to integrate had been successful to a large extent”.
The feeling of acceptance did not last long though.

He became

disillusioned by the fact that he had the largest course load, and was
the lowest paid faculty member in the department.

Willis became

increasingly more militant in his belief that he was mistreated by the
Department of Anthropology, and that African Americans in general were
not given their due in anthropological circles.

Also, white faculty

members began causing Willis problems with overtly racist jokes and
comments.

By the spring of 1972, Willis had had enough and resigned

from Southern Methodist University.

He sent a letter to Tate, who by

that time was chancellor, notifying him that he was leaving his

12

Peggy Reeves Sunday, “Skeletons in the Anthropological Closet: The
Life and Work of William S. Willis Jr.”, in African American Pioneers
in Anthropology edited by Ira E. Harrison and Faye V. Harrison
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 247-248, 252.

121
position at SMU.

Willis was not happy about his decision, but felt it

was necessary for his own peace of mind. 13
One of the most controversial racial walls also came down in 1965
at SMU.

In the summer the football team signed “a wizard athlete from

Beaumont Herbert named Jerry LeVias”.

When LeVias signed with the

Mustangs, he became the first black athlete to receive a scholarship
from a school in the SWC.

The football program was the most visible

part of a university, and many were not ready for LeVias to break the
sanctity of the gridiron in the SWC.

However, he did sign with the

Mustangs despite having 92 offers coming out of high school.

Even

though there were times LeVias wanted to quit, he never reneged on his
word to SMU, and he went on to have one of the most illustrious
careers in the history of SMU football. 14
The story of LeVias coming to SMU did not actually start in 1965.
Rather, it began with the hiring of Hayden Fry as the new football
coach in 1962.

At the time, Fry was an assistant coach under Frank

Broyles at the University of Arkansas.

When SMU contacted Fry, he

made it very clear that he was not interested in taking the job in
Dallas if they would not allow him to recruit black players.

SMU

officials told Fry in his first meeting that no school in the SWC had
an integrated athletic program, and they were not going to be the
first.

Fry told SMU in that case he was going to stay at Arkansas,

and the meeting ended.

Fry was not surprised by SMU’s stance, but he

was a little disappointed.
13

A few days after the initial meeting, SMU
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called Fry a second time and asked if he was still interested in the
job.

He said if they would let him bring in black players then yes,

and SMU once again dodged the subject and told Fry they would get back
to him.

Not long after, Fry got a third call from the university and

they told him that he could recruit one or two black players “with the
understanding that they would not only be good players, but also good
students and fine citizens”.

The school told Fry that he would have

to screen potential black athletes very heavily, and that the process
could take time, even a year or two. Assistant Athletic Director
Lester Jordan spoke for the department when he said at the time of
Fry’s hiring, “We had to be very careful.

We wanted to get a man from

a cultured background with good scholastic standing”. Fry said he
understood and took the job as the head football coach of Southern
Methodist University in 1962. 15
Fry’s steadfastness on desegregating the SMU football team had
its sources early in his life.

He grew up in Odessa, Texas which was

a town with a great mixture of races, nationalities, and religious
backgrounds.

Fry had numerous black and Hispanic friends growing up,

and he was disturbed by the way they were treated.

He did not like

the fact that his friends had to sit in the balcony of the movie
theater, or that they had to ride in the back of the bus to name a

15
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few.

When Fry reached high school, he was not pleased that his black

friends had to play football at a different part of the city.

He made

a commitment that if he were ever in a position to change the racial
make-up of a football team, he would do so.
chance, albeit grudgingly.

SMU offered him that

He would now be able to test the promise

he had made to himself in his school days. 16
Once Fry took the job at SMU, he began the process of finding the
right black athlete to break the color barrier in the SWC.

He and his

staff “quietly started to survey some of the black high schools of
Texas, looking at their top players”.
long the search might take.
the right fit for SMU.

Fry was not concerned with how

Rather, he wanted to make sure they found

The more Fry searched, the more he became

enamored of Jerry LeVias.

LeVias was not big, only 5-8 and 160

pounds, but he was as Fry put it “a great athlete, an exceptional
student, mentally tough, and came from a strong family”.

LeVias’

parents and grandparents instilled in him strong moral and religious
values, so much so that he carried a Bible in his pocket.

Because of

his religious devotion, LeVias had been taught not to hate, and that
all people were children of God who had been put on earth for a
reason.

LeVias had never been in trouble on the field or, more

importantly, off the gridiron.

LeVias was perfect for Fry and SMU.

He was exactly what the school, and the coach, were looking for to
help bring black athletes into the SWC. 17
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Hayden Fry searched for two years to find a person the caliber of
Jerry LeVias, both on and off the field, to be the first black
football player at SMU.

But finding him was only part of the battle.

Now Fry had to convince LeVias to actually take on the burden of being
a trailblazer and sign with SMU.

As noted, LeVias was highly

recruited out of high school with over 90 college offers, and SMU was
the only one to express interest in LeVias that was a predominantly
white school with no black athletes.

Winning over LeVias would not be

an easy task, as there were recruiters sending him letters and making
phone calls as early as his sophomore year.

LeVias had also made

several trips to the University of California at Los Angeles, and
essentially was ready to commit when Fry and an assistant coach named
Chuck Curtis showed up in Beaumont.

When Fry visited with LeVias, he

took a very different approach than most coaches.

Fry didn’t talk

much about football with Levias, or tell him how important he would be
to the Mustang program.

Rather, Fry told LeVias that he would get a

top-rated education from SMU. He talked about the academic prowess of
the school, and LeVias came away impressed with Fry’s tactics.

LeVias

said it was the first time that a coach spent so much time talking
about education, and “Coach Fry showed an interest in me as a person”.
Not only did Fry make an impact on LeVias, he had an effect on Jerry’s
grandmother as well.

When she met Fry she told Jerry, “There’s

something Godly about that man”.

Fry left Beaumont with a commitment

from LeVias, and the process to bring in the first black football
player to the SWC was underway. 18
18
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When LeVias made his way to Dallas in the fall of 1965 as a
freshman, he entered a new world.

According to his uncle, Joe Sasser,

LeVias experienced culture shock in Dallas. His environment in
Beaumont was nearly 100% black, and now he was thrown into almost the
complete opposite.

SMU was not completely lily-white in 1965, but it

was far from being totally integrated.

In his first year at SMU,

LeVias experienced some minor trouble with whites on campus.

Abner

Haynes, the first black athlete to play college football in Texas at
North Texas State, knew LeVias would have at least some problems.

He

stated in a Fox Sports Southwest documentary that, “I can assure you
being black in Dallas at the time he was going to SMU he could not
avoid headaches”.
going to Dallas.

Early on, Jerry’s father was not too happy with him
He told Fry, “There was too much prejudice…They had

just killed the president, and I didn’t want them to kill him too”.
LeVias recalls numerous times where he had small run-ins with his
white counterparts on campus.
to him in class.

White students did not want to sit next

LeVias said that tardiness to class was cut down

significantly by his presence, because students that were late had to
sit by him, and they did not want to do so.

The professors were

better in that they supported him, but early on in his SMU academic
career the students did not want anything to do with him.

One time

when LeVias was in a Nature Of Man course, a white student raised his
hand and asked the professor point blank was it true that “coloreds’
brains are smaller than that of whites.”

The teacher proceeded to

chastise the student, and posed to him a scenario where a black child
would be given all the advantages in life over a white child.

She

126
then asked the student which one would be more educated.

Once the

white student had been dressed down, LeVias felt somewhat more
comfortable in that particular class.

One of the worst things to

happen to LeVias while he was a freshman was that he had a white
roommate whose mother protested her son living with a black person.
The white student was removed at the mother’s request, and LeVias
lived by himself.

While he liked having a larger room to himself, the

incident had an impact and was one LeVias never forgot. As LeVias’
freshman year continued, he recalled other times where white students
acted in similar fashion. 19
The problems that LeVias faced during his freshman year were not
limited to the general student population.

Some of his teammates and

a few coaches opposed his presence as well.

LeVias remembers being

spit on in practice his freshman year.

He recalls that several

assistants did not want to tape him up. The head trainer, Eddie Lane,
was the only one who would help Jerry with his injuries when he first
started with the football program.

LeVias was frequently injured his

freshman year due in no small part to his own teammates.

Lane kept

the infirmary open late because he knew Jerry would be the last one
there, and Lane would help him with his injuries.

When LeVias would

enter the shower all of his teammates would leave, and he was the last
one in the locker room. At team meals Jerry would sit down at a table,
and everyone there would get up even if they were not finished eating.

19
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None of his teammates invited him to social gatherings, or even out to
eat a hamburger after a game. LeVias did not find solace outside the
team either because there were very few blacks at SMU in 1965.

Fry

told Jerry from the start that “there were very few blacks there at
the time and that his social life might be hindered”. In other words,
SMU was a lonely environment for LeVias, even among his so called
teammates. 20
LeVias did not encounter much trouble during his freshman year,
because he was not really in the public eye except on campus.
Freshmen were not allowed to play on the varsity football team in
1965, so LeVias was not on the field for thousands to ridicule.

AS a

sophomore LeVias was a focal point of the Mustangs’ offense; therefore
he became the subject of criticism and hatred.

Having a black athlete

on the football team as a freshman was one thing.

When that black

player became a big part of the program, like LeVias did in 1966, the
racial incidents became increasingly more likely.

According to Temple

Pouncey, author of Mustang Mania: SMU Football, LeVias only took part
in 66 plays his sophomore year in 1966, but he “accomplished more than
any other player in the Southwest Conference”.

As LeVias became a

bigger part of the offense, the hate mail and threats poured in even
more.

Levias noted that “when I started making a difference in the

Southern Methodist University football program and we started winning,
that’s when people started writing hate letters, hate mail, and phone
calls”.

Harold Jeske, a member of the SMU Athletic Committee from

1966 to 1974, said that there was so much hate mail that came in
20
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during that period that the athletic department had a person whose
only job was to sort through Jerry’s mail. 21
The hate mail was only part of the ordeal for LeVias. Once he
started seeing significant playing time for the Mustangs, there were
incidents both on and off the field that were cause for concern.

He

recalls playing Texas in 1966 where the Longhorns fans and players
gave him a hard time during warm-ups. The fans were catcalling,
insulting him, and people in the stands were even holding up ropes
like nooses.

The players spit on him and talked about his parents.

Afterwards, Texas’ quarterback Bill Bradley went up to LeVias and
apologized for his teammates, and Bradley and LeVias remained friends
for years after the game.

Similar incidents occurred when SMU played

Texas A&M that same year.

The corps cadets blocked the Mustangs’ bus

on the way to the stadium, and the players had to walk half a mile to
the dressing room.

When they came out for the pre-game, someone

released a number of black cats on to the field.

During the game,

Jerry was tackled by a white player from the other team who spit in
his face and called him names.
sidelines.

LeVias was furious when he reached the

He threw his helmet, and sat down on the bench away from

his teammates.

Fry came over to console him, and told him to forget

about the game.

Not long after the Aggies had to punt, and LeVias

told Fry he was going to return the punt for a touchdown. Jerry went
out to receive the punt, and he returned it 86 yards for a touchdown.
LeVias did not lash out at the player who spit on him.

21
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struck back the best way he knew how—on the field.

The punt returned

for a touchdown helped the Mustangs win the game. 22
The most serious problem in 1966 occurred when SMU played Texas
Christian University.

Fry had LeVias work out in the locker room, and

Jerry thought it was because he was the best player and was receiving
star treatment.

Just before the game started Fry pulled LeVias aside

and told him there had been a threat on his life.

Someone had sent

word to Fry that there was a sniper in the stands who was going to
shoot LeVias.

He stayed in the middle of the huddle throughout the

game, and ran to the sidelines as fast as he could.

Anytime LeVias

came near the TCU bench, the coaches moved away out of fear.

In the

end nothing happened, but Fry and LeVias had to treat the threat as if
it were real. 23
The hate mail, threats, and physical contact took its toll on
LeVias, to the point that he thought seriously about leaving SMU
during his sophomore year.

He told his sister, Charlena, that he was

fed up with the abuse, and was going to leave because he could not
take it anymore.

Charlena told him that their father always told them

that if they make their bed hard they have to sleep in it.

In other

words, Jerry had chosen SMU and had to stick to that commitment.

Fry

also told LeVias that he is “the symbol of his race and if he quit he
will handicap the program for other people”.

22
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and went on to have one of the most illustrious careers in Mustang
history. 24
LeVias was not the only person at SMU who caught flack for his
being on the football team in the late 1960s.

Fry was constantly

criticized for his recruitment of black players. According to LeVias,
there was a gentleman’s agreement in the SWC not to recruit black
athletes.

When he was brought to SMU, the other conference coaches

were not pleased with Fry for breaking the unwritten code.

Once

LeVias left SMU the Mustangs did not win as much, and administrators
used the fact that Fry was going to recruit too many blacks as an
excuse to get rid of him.

Fry was fired in 1972, and LeVias believes

one of the main reasons was because Fry had been the first to break
the color line in SWC football.

Journalists who wrote glowing reports

about LeVias’ play on the field were the subject of scorn as well.
Dallas Morning News reporter Sam Blair said the first time he wrote
about LeVias’ dazzling play against Navy in the Cotton Bowl, he
received anonymous threatening phone calls the next day. So, LeVias’
time at SMU was not just detrimental to his own wellbeing, but to
others as well. 25
LeVias, Fry, and the journalists who praised his efforts on the
field appear to be the only ones who received any ridicule and scorn
during his playing days at SMU.

LeVias was the Southwest Conference’s

first black scholarship athlete in football. The football program was

24
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a source of pride for SMU, Dallas, and numerous people of East Texas.
People came by the thousands to cheer on the Mustangs each week, and
the shock of having to do so for a black player was something they
simply were not ready for.

SMU was like most southern universities in

that the football program was one of, if not the last, area of the
school to desegregate.

This was mainly due to the nature of the sport

and the physicality involved.

The possibility of physical contact

between whites and blacks was a major factor in keeping the races
segregated, and this was extended to the gridiron. If black players
were kept off the field, and off the team, the “sanctity” of one of
the last all-white areas of a university could be maintained.

Since

LeVias, “violated” that principle, he was the subject of verbal and
physical abuse, death threats, and hate mail.

There were other black

students at SMU during LeVias’ tenure with the Mustangs, but they do
not recall having been threatened in the same manner.

Anga Sanders, a

freshman at SMU during LeVias’ sophomore year in 1966 noted, “I’d have
to say that our tenure was characterized more by benign neglect than
anything else.

We were an invisible minority, and little if any

thought was given to our feelings about or response to things that
were simply accepted at SMU”.

The invisible minority she was

referring to were black students who were not involved with sports
teams.

She never received any of the ridicule that aimed at LeVias,

nor did she recall any other black student mentioning threats like
made against LeVias.

The main reason was because she, nor other black
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students, were never put on as visible a stage as the football team
while at SMU. 26
Jerry LeVias’ senior year at Southern Methodist University was
his most productive as a Mustang.

He led the nation with 80

receptions, was named All-Southwest Conference, and All-American for
his play on the field.
All-American.

Off the field, LeVias was named an Academic

At the end of Jerry’s senior year, Fry noted that it

had been very successful.

He stated, “the Jerry LeVias era was over

at SMU and integration of the SWC was a success.

We had certainly

chosen the right person to integrate the conference”.

As a player

LeVias had never missed a game, and he very rarely missed class.
LeVias graduated from SMU in the spring of 1969 with honors, near the
top of his class.

By the time he left the program, SMU had several

other black players on the team that would follow in LeVias’
footsteps.

Rufus Cormier and Walter Haynes arrived in Dallas during

Jerry’s sophomore year, and both went on to have illustrious careers
in their own rights as members of the Mustang football program.

The

visible racism was gone from the football field once Cormier and
Haynes started playing for the Mustangs.

Cormier does not recall

having any incidents of hatred directed toward him on the gridiron
like LeVias.

Cormier did not receive death threats, nor have players

try to physically hurt him more than was standard in regular game
play.

26

By the time LeVias graduated, and Cormier and Haynes were

Anga Sanders, Personal Email Correspondence, January 10, 2013.
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juniors, one of the most visible part of SMU had several black players
on the football team, and others soon followed. 27
When SMU signed Jerry LeVias in 1965, it was the first school in
the Southwest Conference to successfully recruit and sign a black
football player.

Whereas SMU had followed the University of Texas and

the University of Arkansas in regards undergraduate desegregation, it
was once again the leader on the subject when it came to football.
None of the coaches in the conference wanted to be the first to open
its program to black players until Fry came to SMU. Baylor Coach John
Bridgers echoed the sentiment of all the coaches in the SWC when he
stated, “There was no policy, not at all. It was just a reluctance
among the coaches to be the first to go out and recruit a black
athlete”.

Fry recalled that he heard numerous head and assistant

coaches at the SWC meetings every year say they would never have a
black player on their team.

It was not until November of 1963 that

the Board of Regents at Texas even allowed black athletes to be
recruited to Austin.

Arkansas complied with the Texas ruling of 1963

to bring in black athletes. However, neither program started with
football. In fact, football was the last sport desegregated at both of
the power schools of the SWC.

No coach at Texas had ever recruited a

black player as late as 1967 when Jerry LeVias was in his junior year
at SMU.

The Longhorns’ first varsity black football player was Julius

Whittier, and the Razorbacks first was Jon Richardson.

Both were

freshmen in 1969, and did not play their first varsity games until

27

Jerry LeVias: A Marked Man, Fox Sports Southwest. Fry, A High Porch
Picnic, 82. Rufus Cormier Phone Interview, August 17, 2012.
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1970. The pair became the “last first black players in the SWC”.

By

that time, Cormier and Haynes were seniors at SMU and LeVias had
graduated the previous year.

Football provided a forum for SMU to

take the lead on the desegregation front once again, at least in the
Southwest Conference. 28
Despite the fact that Jerry LeVias was the first black football
player at SMU, he never considered himself a pioneer.

According to

Richard Pennington, “LeVias insisted that he didn’t choose SMU to make
any racial statement, but to get and education and to play football”.
LeVias made the same point personally in phone conversation when he
stated, “We never talked about being a pioneer and I think if we had
talked about it I wouldn’t have gone to SMU”.

When Fry recruited

LeVias he talked to Jerry about academics at SMU and a little about
football.

He was adamant that LeVias would get a good education from

SMU, and that convinced him to sign as much as anything.

The fact is,

however, that despite his reluctance, LeVias was a pioneer and opened
the door for many black athletes to follow at SMU and the Southwest
Conference. 29
Football was not the last racial barrier to fall at SMU.

There

were no black fraternities and sororities on campus until the mid1970s, so black students did not have an important social outlet

28

Dwonna Goldstone, Integrating the 40 Acres: The Fifty Year Struggle
for Racial Equality at the University of Texas (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 2006), 126, 131. Gordon Morgan, The Edge of Campus: A
Journal of the Black Experience at the University of Arkansas
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1990), 155-156.
Pennington, Breaking the Ice, 15-16, 114.
29
Phone interview with Jerry LeVias, February 22, 2010. Pennington,
Breaking the Ice, 83.
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available to them at SMU.

Phi Beta Sigma was the first black sorority

at SMU and was chartered in 1974.

Not long after, the Alpha Xi Omega

chapter of Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority Inc. was established at the
university.

Sophomore Rickie Clinton was the first female inducted

into the sorority in the spring of 1975. By the fall, several other
female students expressed interest in being a part of the historically
black sorority.

They created an interest group called The Vine

Sisters, and were initiated in March of 1976 when the sorority became
an official part of SMU.

A few months later, in May of 1976, the Nu

Iota chapter of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority Inc. was started by nine
women on campus.

Dubbed the “Divine Nine”, they started a “legacy of

unparalleled community service” at SMU.

In 1977 the Nu Kappa Chapter

of Omega Psi Phi Fraternity Incorporated was started on campus by six
make black students.

A charter was granted in November of 1977, and

it was an immediate success despite the fact that there were only 175
black students at SMU in 1977. The chapter went dormant in the mid1980s but was brought back in the early 2000s. 30
Student government and politics was one of the last avenues
closed to blacks at SMU.

As late as 1978, there had never been a

black student government president.

That changed in the spring of

1978 when the top two offices in student government went to black men.
David Huntley, a write-in candidate endorsed by the Daily Campus
newspaper, defeated Beverly Bell 1,109 to 891 in a run-off for student
body president. Huntley originally ran as a candidate for the advisory

30
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board to the vice president of student affairs and won “hands down”.
However, once he won the president position he resigned his advisory
board post. Huntley said he did not campaign at all for president in
the general election, but once he made the runoff he made a more
concerted effort to obtain the office.

He was very pleased with his

write-in campaign and said it “proved SMU students were more concerned
with the best possible candidate for the job than with race”.

Brett

Ledbetter won the student body vice president position, also in a
runoff, by a vote of 1,051 to 883 against Ken Mifflin.

It was the

first time in the history of SMU that the two highest elected student
officials were both black. 31
By the time Willis Tate became president at Southern Methodist
University, the school had enrolled its first black graduate students.
During his tenure, the institution continued to open more doors to
blacks.

The Law School was desegregated by the mid-1950s.

undergraduates started coming to SMU in 1962.

Black

The first black

professor began his brief career in 1965, which was the same year the
Mustang football program signed its first black player.
other barriers began to fall as well.

After 1965,

However, it should be

emphasized that SMU was still in the desegregation phase.

All the

schools and academic programs were open to black students, but the
campus was not truly integrated. The start of making African American

31

1978 Rotunda, SMU Yearbook, 63, memories.smu.edu. Accessed August
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students feel fully welcome on campus did not come until the late
1960s with the formation of a group called Black League of African
American and African College Students.
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Chapter Six
A Calm Rebellion: Black Student Protest at SMU
This is SMU. It was then and is now. So any type of civil unrest was
kind of unheard of because this is a very contained campus, very calm.
It’s not Berkeley.
So we were very calm.
We stated the list of
demands that we had… And thus the civil rights movement began at SMU
because that’s when the negotiations started. 1
Anga Sanders was one of thirty three black students at Southern
Methodist University that presented a list of demands to President
Willis Tate in the spring of 1969.

Prior to the meeting with Tate,

the black students had formed a group called the Black League of AfroAmerican and African College Students (BLAACS) because they wanted
their voice to be heard.
desegregation

as

Despite the fact that the campus had started

early

as

1951,

Sanders

and

the

other

members

of

BLAACS, were still a decided minority on campus who felt they were not
being

treated

equally.

The

thirty-three

participants

of

the

organization represented the entire black student population of SMU in
1969, and they wanted SMU to do more to help them feel comfortable on
campus.

The BLAACS organization was something new for SMU.

As the

above quotation shows, Sanders was clear on that issue when she gave a
speech on campus in 2011 reminiscing about her time in Dallas.

SMU

had not experienced any violence with desegregation like was the case
at

the

University

of

Alabama,

the

countless other schools in the South.
Sanders were not satisfied at SMU.

University

of

Mississippi,

or

Even so, black students like

There were very few black students

on campus, even fewer black professors, and black workers that were
not getting paid enough.

1

These were not the only things on their list

Anga Sanders speaking at SMU, February 22, 2011.

Found on YouTube.
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of

demands,

just

the

most

glaring

problems.

In

order

to

help

alleviate the situation, Sanders and others followed the example of
numerous students across the country and created an organization that
would raise consciousness among black scholars at SMU.
violent and did not break any laws.

They were not

Despite staging a sit-in outside

Tate’s office BLAACS presented their demands to him in a scheduled
meeting, and were respectful of his authority.

The black students

involved in the sit-in did not take over the administration building
as

happened

country.

at

many

college

and

university

campuses

across

the

BLAACS simply wanted to be heard and their demands met at a

private, mostly white, Southern institution. In essence, they were
starting a calm rebellion at Southern Methodist University.
The Black League of Afro-American and African College Students
was organized at SMU in the fall of 1968.

While black students were a

very small minority on the campus in Dallas, it did not mean that they
were

not

aware

activism

of

occurring

the

growing

among

their

social
peers

consciousness
across

the

and

student

country.

The

formation of BLAACS was a sign of the times, and African American
students at SMU “simultaneously recognized the need for a formalized
group”.
Student

By the end of February 1969, the Faculty Senate Committee on
Organizations

university

at

organization.

SMU

had

The

approved

constitution

BLAACS
of

the

as

a

recognized

group

approved by the faculty senate contained four major points.

that

was

The first

was to create an outlet for social expression and exchange among black
students.

The

second

was

to

“act

promotion of black creative endeavors”.

as

a

unified

center

for

the

The third goal for BLAACS as
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stated by the constitution was to encourage a fraternal spirit among
black students.

Finally, the organization would provide a way for

black students to feel like they were a more significant part of the
university

(literally

and

figuratively).

All

four

broad

themes

outlined more specific problems that were addressed during the group’s
meeting later in the spring with President Tate. 2
While general social consciousness and student activism played a
role in the creation of BLAACS, neither idea fully explains why the
organization was created specifically in the fall of 1968.

In order

to get a better grasp on why black students at SMU felt the urge to
create their group in that particular instance, a look at the social
environment on campus is important.

Prior to the formation of BLAACS,

SMU participated in what was known as Old South Week.

The event was

put on every year by the Kappa Alpha fraternity and was a week-long
celebration of the regalia of the plantation South.

During the week,

the fraternity held a demonstration at the student center where the
confederate flag was flown and a mock slave auction was held.

Black

students were not fond of the symbolism portrayed by the display, so
they went to Dean Howell to ask him to stop the program. He told the
black

students

that

there

was

nothing

he

could

do

because

the

fraternity was part of the university and allowed to have programs on
campus.

Since

the

dean

would

not

help

them,

the

black

students

decided to stop the flying of the confederate flag and the slave
auction themselves.

2

During the next demonstration at the student

Anga Sanders, email correspondence, September 23, 2012. “BLAACS, UCM
get Recognition”, SMU Daily Campus, February 28, 1969, 1.
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center, Jerry LeVias, one of the black members of the football team,
climbed up to the balcony and cut down the confederate flag.

The

other black students in attendance pulled out pocket versions of the
same flag and proceeded to burn them as the crowd started to chant,
“the South will rise again”.

For all practical purposes, the black

students’

South

BLAACS

actions

and

a

more

during

Old

formal

Week

organization

prompted

from

which

the
to

creation
protest

of
the

inequities they faced on campus in Dallas. 3
When BLAACS became a recognized organization there were a number
of white students that came out in support of the group.

Gary Dragna,

a junior at SMU, felt the growing racial tensions on campus needed to
be addressed not just by the black students but by white students as
well.
student

Evidence of this manifested itself through a fight in the
center

February 1969.

between

a

few

white

and

black

students

in

early

Even so, nothing had been done about racism on campus

to that point according to Dragna, and if it was to change white
students had to be willing to help.

Dragna and several other white

students got together to create the Organization Against Racism (OAR)
to “feel out what the white students felt about Malcolm X Day and to
get an interested group of students to work on the issue of racism at
SMU”.

All in attendance were in agreement that they wanted to do

something about racism on campus and OAR president Bill White said,
“Racism is a white problem”.

While OAR did not represent the entirety

of the white population on campus, it showed that BLAACS had support
beyond
3

the

thirty

three

African

American

members

Anga Sanders Speaks at SMU, February 22, 2011.

of

the

group.
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Members of BLAACS said as much when they “emphasized the importance of
the white organization to support the BLAACS in their three major
concerns”. 4
With

the

support

of

the

Organization

Against

Racism,

BLAACS

proceeded to draw up a petition voicing their concerns to President
Tate.

The list of concerns were broken into six categories covering a

broad

range

of

subjects

including

student

recruitment,

admissions,

financial aid to students, curriculum concerns, and faculty to name a
few. Max Drazen, co-chairman of OAR, spoke to the nearly 125 member
organization and said OAR would be an “active organization to initiate
reforms against racial discrimination on campus and to support the
demands of BLAACS”.

Chairman Bill White said OAR would support most

of the demands made by BLAACs “not because they help the black group
but because their beneficial to the whole student body”. 5
By drawing up a petition to be sent to the president, black
students

at

SMU

were

following

activists across the country.

the

protocol

of

numerous

campus

According to Ibram Rogers, author of

the Black Campus Movement, “Black campus activists usually wrote out
their demands in essay format or as a simple numbered list.
(Historically
addressed

the

White

Colleges

demands

to

the

and

Universities),

president”.

At

they

regularly

Southern

Methodist

University definitely qualified as a Historically White University,
4

“Race Relations: Both Sides Trying for Harmony”, Dallas Morning News,
April 27, 1969, 27. Mary Lou Muns, “Students Organize Against
Racism”, Daily Campus, March 4, 1969, 1. Gary Dragna, Letter to the
Editor of the Daily Campus “White Students React to Malcolm X Tribute”
February 26, 1969, 5.
5
Ibid. Mary Lou Muns, “Group sets Goals to Fight Racism”, Daily
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143
and the black students on campus were doing all they could to present
their grievances to the administration through the proper channels.
The first step in that process was to draft the petition and present
it President Tate. 6
In order to fully understand the petition written by BLAACS that,
an in-depth look at each of the demands is imperative.

The first

issue that BLAACS wanted administrators to address was the idea of a
free student union.
center

was

not

The group felt that the governing board of the

representative

of

the

student

body.

In

addition,

BLAACS felt that the student union, “should provide an atmosphere of
harmony and be a focal point for every social and ethnic group it
represents”.

Blacks that attended SMU wanted to have more of a say in

how the student union was run, and Tate agreed.
discussed

in

the

petition

and

subsequent

Of the six problems

meeting

with

Tate,

the

governance of the student union was the least controversial so Tate
capitulated rather quickly. 7
The

second

part

of

the

petition

from

BLAACS

concerned

the

recruitment of more black students and scholarship money for those
recruited.

The organization saw the university’s admission policies

as “fair” in providing “equal opportunity for all who wish to come to
SMU”.
6

However, black students only made up 1% of the total student
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body.

Also, according to BLAACS, 93% of the total scholarship funds

went to white students, with the remaining 7% going to all other
students on campus. In order to rectify the situation, BLAACS proposed
the creation of a university-funded recruiting committee made up of
black

students.

They

also

enrolled by the fall of 1969.

requested

that

500

black

students

be

In order to help achieve this goal, the

petition called for a 50-50 split of financial aid to white and black
students until “the proper ratio of black students to white students
at SMU is achieved”. 8
When black students at SMU made a demand for more of their own on
campus, they were following the model of countless others across the
country.

Bringing in additional black students was very important to

groups like BLAACS, and all the other requests centered on this idea.
New Mexico State’s black students issued a list of demands in April of
1969,

and

demands

University

brought

of

forth

Mount

the

Union

following

in

Ohio’s

March.

administrators

Black

students

at

saw
the

University of Maryland-Eastern Shore presented the administration with
a fifty page report documenting changes that needed to take place on
campus.

More than fifty grievances were given to school officials at

Virginia Union.
at

Skidmore

Such demands were often very similar. Black students

College

in

New

York

felt

that

they

could

not

get

a

meaningful liberal arts education without more scholars of color on
campus.

In

addition

to

increased

numbers,

black

campus

activists

demanded the active recruitment of black students, and they wanted to

8

“Demands from Black League of Afro-American and African College
Students (BLAACS)”.
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be a part of the recruitment process.

Students at the University of

Arkansas created Blacks Americans for Democracy (BAD) to help with
“the

issues

that

mattered

Fayetteville campus”.
so

that

black

the

most

to

students

of

color

on

the

BAD created its own newspaper, the BAD Times,

students

on

university sponsored media.

campus

would

receive

fair

coverage

in

BAD plead with university officials to

bring more black football players and to black faculty campus.

The

BAD Times wrote articles stressing that the black studies program
needed to be increased beyond one course.

BAD created more social

opportunities in Fayetteville including a choir, drama club, beauty
pageants, and dances to name a few.

Members of BLAACS wanted to be

heard just like black students across the country. 9
The third topic addressed by the petition was the structure of
the Liberal Studies Department at SMU which BLAACS felt was too Anglo
oriented.

The

department

was

“too

white”

in

the

professors

it

employed as well as in the courses taught. In order to change the
dynamics of the department, BLAACS proposed that 20% of the professors
employed by Liberal Studies should be black.

Courses should also be

altered to include the role of blacks and other minority groups in the
development of Western Civilization. 10
All across the country, groups similar to BLAACS were calling for
the teaching of more courses relevant to the black experience.
9
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addition they wanted these courses to be taught by black professors.
Students at Saint Peter’s in New Jersey questioned the “validity” of
courses taught by white teachers.

Black students at San Francisco

State thought it was impossible for white professors to teach these
courses.

Some took it further by demanding that white instructors be

fired and replaced with blacks.

Students at the University of North

Dakota disrupted a black history course in February 1969 saying it
should

not

be

taught

by

a

“honkie”.

In

July

of

1969,

students

involved with Stanford’s Black Student Union demanded that the new
Black Studies Program be “black led and black taught”. 11
The fourth item on the list of demands did not directly involve
black students at SMU, but black workers on campus.

According to

BLAACS, the majority of low-paid workers at SMU were black in 1969.
Furthermore, the organization’s petition said there was only one black
person

in

a

supervisory

role

on

campus

as

well.

There

were

no

contracts or legal commitments regarding pay scales for workers, and
there were no guarantees for pay raises either.

BLAACS also said

workers were afraid to use the proper channels to issue complaints
because all the supervisors (except one) were white.

Black workers at

SMU feared reprisals by their white employers so they did not speak
out against the pay injustices.

Since the workers felt they could not

do anything to change their situation, BLAACS took it upon themselves
to include the workers in their list of problems to be addressed by
the administration.
black
11

workers

on

SMU was not the only school to demand rights for
campus.

By

the

fall

Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 115.

of

1969,

students

at

the
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University of North Carolina, Tufts University, and Harvard “fought
for the rights of black campus nonacademic workers”. 12
One of the most controversial of the issues presented by BLAACS
in the petition was fifth on the list-the creation of an Afro-American
Studies program.

The demand for the new program was the lengthiest

part of the entire appeal by BLAACS, and one they felt could not be
ignored.

Members of the organization felt that white colleges “white-

wash and condition black students” and prevent them from learning
about

their

black

heritage

or

culture.

They

wanted

their

black

identity to remain a separate part of America, not assimilated into
white America.

By the same token, the Afro-American studies program

should be an autonomous department at SMU, and the program should not
fall under the control of other academic divisions.

In essence, by

attempting

separate

to

get

the

administration

to

create

a

Afro-

American studies program, the students in BLAACS were following the
model of black pride that was sweeping the country in the late 1960s. 13
Black students at SMU were not the first to come up with the idea
to

create

heritage.

a

program

devoted

to

the

study

of

their

culture

and

Rather, it was started by students at San Francisco State

in the fall of 1966 to foster “black power, self-determination, black
pride, and criticism of white thought and institutions”.

What started

as a notion to raise awareness at San Francisco State quickly evolved
into

discussions

discipline.
12

for

the

formation

of

a

separate

Black

Studies

By the fall of 1967, several courses were taken out of

Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 100,115.
“Demands from Black League of African American and African College
Students (BLAACS)”.
13
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the Experimental College and offered for credit in Black Studies.
However, a few courses did not satisfy black students at San Francisco
State.

They wanted a separate department with a Black Studies degree,

and continued to push for that.

The following spring (1968), word of

the Black Studies Program began to reach other colleges, and black
students

on

campuses

across

the

country

decided

that

they

wanted

similar programs at their schools.

A year later SMU followed suit

when BLAACS drafted their petition.

By 1969, SMU joined the ranks of

schools such as Harvard and Cornell University in the creation of such
a program. 14
The sixth and final demand made by BLAACS in the petition was a
two-part item that fell under the general category of Human Relations.
BLAACS wanted to see the establishment of a Human Relations Board that
would supersede all functions of the present Student Senate at SMU.
The board would control all governing bodies on campus and would meet
the needs of all ethnic groups on campus, as well as promote better
understanding of all people on campus.

In a subcategory to the human

relations

it

demand,

BLAACS

also

“deem

necessary

for

the

black

students on campus to have a ‘house’ for themselves for the purpose of
conducting social affairs and some business affairs”. 15
Once the petition was drafted and sent to university officials,
BLAACS requested an audience with President Tate and others to discuss
the demands.

The meeting was granted and held on Monday April 28,

1969 in Tate’s office and included Tate, Vice President-Provost Neill
14

Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 93-94, 98.
“Demands from Black League of Afro-American and African College
Students (BLAACS)”.
15
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McFarland,
President

administrative
Thomas

E.

members of BLAACS.

Vice

Broce,

President

Dean

of

Richard

Students

Joe

Rubottom,
Howell,

Vice

and

the

Tate office issued a report of the meeting that

said it was conducted in “mutual faith and understanding”.

Since

BLAACS had gone through the proper channels to ask for the meeting,
Tate and the other officials were willing to sit down with them and
see where changes could be made.

While Tate only stayed at the

meeting for 50 minutes, McFarland and the other administrators met
with the students for five hours.
the

meeting,

and

while

Vice

All six demands were brought up in

President

Broce

said

“it

would

be

difficult to fulfill all the requests, the discussions will continue
between

the

students

and

the

responsible

administrators

who

were

present”. 16
When Tate left the meeting (after the scheduled time was up),
the

black

students

in

attendance

staged

an

impromptu

sit-in

and

refused to leave the president’s office until their demands were met.
Even when Tate threatened to expel them and told them to go back to
class, the members of BLAACS did not leave.

Anga Sanders, a member of

BLAACS, recalled that they told Tate they were not leaving, and that
they were there for the duration.

Once the president left the other

administrators present continued the meeting and started to negotiate
the points with the group.
left

16

“We

weren’t

wild,

we

Sanders also remembers that after Tate
weren’t

rowdy,

we

were

just

determined

“Negroes Confront Faculty at SMU”, Dallas Times Herald April 29,
1969. Judy Wiessler, “Blacks at SMU Present Demands”, Dallas Morning
News, April 29, 1969.
Marlyn Scwartz “5-Hour Talk Fails to Meet
Black Demands”, Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1969, 1A and 11A.
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because

we

observation.
kind

of

had

a

mission,

a

goal”.

Others

confirmed

Sanders’

Vice President Broce noted, “There was at no time any

confrontation.

responsible students”.

It

was

a

discussion.

These

were

very

Tate’s widow Marian, who at the time was his

secretary, said that the only “damage” done to the president’s office
was some paper napkins and mustard packets left by the students after
they were brought lunch by their friends.

The meeting did not turn

violent, as was the case at a number of other schools.

Even so,

rumors started flying that there were 30 black militants that had
occupied the president’s office at SMU.

Sanders said that one girl

had a nail file but that was about as serious as it got.

Marian Tate

remembers taking a phone call from the governor’s office asking if the
National Guard needed to be brought to campus.

She responded that the

campus police could handle the situation because it was very much
under

control.

Amidst

the

rumors,

the

representatives

of

BLAACS

continued to talk with the administrators present, and they began
negotiating the demands on the list.

The talks were helped by a local

African-American clergyman named Zan Holmes.

He had attended the

Perkins School of Theology and was in the state legislature at the
time of the meeting.

Holmes happened to be in Dallas the day of the

encounter and rode straight to campus to help.

According to Sanders,

“Five hours later, with the assistance of Reverend Holmes, we walked
out with having most of our demands been met.” 17

17

Anga Sanders Speaks at SMU, February 22, 2011. Marian Tate,
interviewed by Jim Early, October 13, 2000, SMU Video Archive Series,
found at digitalcollections.smu.edu. Marlyn Schwartz, “5-Hour SMU
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As far as the Black Campus Movement goes, SMU’s sit-in was mild
in comparison to others.

By February of 1969, schools all across the

country were experiencing much worse than the five hour meeting black
students had with administrators at SMU.

Students at the University

of Wisconsin-Madison caused a near riot.

Classes were boycotted for

two weeks at the University of California at Berkeley.

Roosevelt

University in Chicago saw a week of classes disrupted when students
attempted

to

get

the

school

to

teach

Black

Studies.

Nearly

200

protestors were expelled from Mississippi Valley State University on
February 13 because protests on campus had gotten out of hand.

Even

at Duke University, a private Methodist school much like SMU, protests
escalated beyond simply a meeting with the president.

Forty-eight

black students entered the administration early one February morning
and told the clerical workers they had to leave the building.

The

Duke students proceeded to nail the doors shut, threatened to burn
university records if the police were called, and renamed the building
“Malcolm X Liberation School”.

From here they issued thirteen demands

including the creation of a Black Studies program controlled by the
students, funds for a Black Student Union Building, the building of a
dorm for black students, and an end to “racist policies” at Duke.
Students at Cornell took the hostile takeover even further in April of
1969

when

they

were

buildings on campus.

seen

brandishing

weapons

as

they

occupied

A picture surfaced nationwide showing the armed

students, and for the first time the nation was visually exposed to

Talk Fails to Meet Black Demands”, Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1969,
1A and 11A.
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the violence on college campuses.

While these are just a few examples

of the more extreme black campus movement, they illustrate that it was
happening from coast to coast and all points in between. 18
Not all campuses exploded in violence as is shown in the example
of SMU.

Even though the takeover of administration buildings garnered

media attention, it was not the chosen path for schools like SMU.
SMU’s

black

change

students

policies

in

were

not

Dallas.

nonviolent sit-ins like SMU.
hostile.

alone
A

in

number

their
of

peaceful

attempt

institutions

to

advocated

When this tactic was used it was not

During peaceful protests in campus administration buildings,

the normal flow of business was not disrupted.

Buildings were not

shut down at SMU, nor at Radcliffe College in 1968, to give a similar
example. Female students at the college sat outside President Mary I.
Bunting’s office for seven hours in order to get her to listen to
their demands.

Bunting eventually came out and promised the students

that she would increase Negro enrollment.

After the president spoke,

the students thanked her, and “left in a festive mood”.
Radcliffe effected change without resorting to violence.

Students at
The same

could be said about black student at SMU who felt it was better to
negotiate with administrations in a calm demeanor rather than take
over the campus. 19
Despite the fact that SMU’s “major” incident in the black student
protest movement had not turned violent, Mike Morris did not think the
meeting had gone as well as others.
18

As chairman of BLAACS, he felt

Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 1-2, 127-129.
Ropbert Reinhold “Negroes Stage Radcliffe Sit-in; Colleges Act on
their Demands”, New York Times, December 11, 1968, 32.

19
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that the administration did not go far enough to meet the demands.
When discussing the meeting with the Daily Campus Morris said it was
“not what the organization wanted.

We were not pleased. We were there

for

was

an

answer

and

what

happened

more

or

less

a

rejection”.

Despite the fact that Morris was not pleased with the results of the
meeting he did mention that negotiations would continue.

He did not

give any indication that if all of the demands were not met in the
manner that BLAACS wanted that they would turn violent.

Rather, they

would meet with administrators again to “see what they can and can’t
do”. 20
While

BLAACS

felt

it

necessary

to

stage

a

sit-in

in

the

administration building to demand better treatment, some did not see
it this way. Civil rights leader Bayard Rustin criticized the tactics
and the motives used at schools across the country, including SMU, to
bring about change.

Rustin was quoted by the Associated Press telling

an audience in New York that, “In the real world no one gives a damn
if

you’ve

taken soul

courses.

They

want

to

know if

you

can

do

mathematics and write a correct sentence”. Rustin felt that demands
made like those by BLAACS at SMU were not practical.

The problems

emphasized separateness and did not prepare black students for the
“real world”. The only way for black students to progress was to work
with mainstream society not against it.

Rustin and others felt that

the petitions by groups like BLAACS were working against mainstream
society, and according to an editorial in the Dallas Times Herald, “If

20

Mary Lou Muns, “Negotiations still Underway on Demands from BLAACS”,
Daily Campus, April 29, 1969, 1.
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separation is the black students’ only goal, they are morally bound to
look elsewhere for an education”.

Administrators at SMU, notably

President Willis Tate felt the same way. 21
Several

days

after

the

meeting

with

statement with his initial reactions.

BLAACS

Tate

issued

a

He said that he promised the

students “clear answers to the requests made”. Tate wanted the black
students to realize that they would be treated just like any other
student on campus.

Their personal growth and development would be

furthered to the best of the administration’s abilities, just like
with all other students on campus.

If that growth was achieved by

saying yes to some of BLAACS demands then Tate acquiesced.

If the

goals of the black students could not be reasonably attained by the
demands

then

the

president

said

no.

Tate

made

it

clear

in

his

statement that while anyone could apply to SMU, they would only be
admitted

if

university.

they

met

the

body”.

standards

put

forth

by

the

If students did not meet the qualifications, then SMU had

a right to deny admittance.
society.

academic

Tate noted that, “SMU is no microcosm of

It is highly selective, both in faculty and in the student
In other words, SMU would not capitulate to the demand for

more black students simply because BLAACS wanted more students of
color on campus.
much,

and

Tate

The school was only so big and could only offer so
was

determined

BLAACS, to circumvent that ideal.

not

to

allow

any

group,

including

Ultimate authority on any decisions

regarding SMU were to be made by Tate, the administration, and the

21

“Blacks and the Real World”, Editorial to the Dallas Times Herald,
April 30, 1969, 24A.
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Board of Trustees and “no special interest group within or without the
university can make our decisions for us and certainly there can be no
autonomous structures within the university or it would cease to be a
university”.

With several of the demands Tate felt BLAACS was trying

to force his hand to make a decision that would only benefit a small
portion of the academic community at SMU, and he would not allow that
to happen. 22
Tate’s statement to BLAACS in regards to the demands was similar
to that of numerous university presidents across the country.

Black

students did not want to accept a slice of bread, according to Ibram
Rogers, because they wanted the whole loaf.

Even so, administrators

“habitually forced them to accept the slice, arguing the loaf was
impossible, too expensive, against the law, reverse discrimination, or
the opposition to academic freedom or the values of the colleges”.
University officials were willing to give in where they could, like
Tate, but they also wanted to keep the integrity of the school intact.
Oftentimes, representatives of historically white colleges gave in to
the call for more black students, faculty, black studies courses, and
the like.

However, when it came to university control, administrators

were not as willing to bend to the demands of organizations such as
BLAACS. 23
The demands made by BLAACS were not completely dismissed by Tate
and other university officials at SMU.

Rather, there were at least

some

issues

22
23

changes

promised

on

all

six

presented

“BLAACS get Reply” Daily Campus, May 2, 1969, 2, 5, 12.
Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 119-120.
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administrators.

First on the list was the Free Student Union with

more control going to the students.

The Student Center Governing

Board felt that “the demands of the BLAACS concerning the revision of
the Governing Board are pertinent and indeed constitute much needed
reform not only in the make-up of the Governing Board but also in its
function as a student controlled government body”.

One way to give

the students more power in the union was to allow them to elect
representatives to the Governing Board.

By 1970 students at SMU were

allowed to elect four executive officers and two student members.

In

addition a graduate student was appointed by the elected president of
the Governing Body.

Two faculty members were elected by the Governing

Body as well as two alumni members.

Other members were added ex

officio to complete the Governing Board.

In essence, the students

were given more of a say in how the board was put together.

Therefore

they gained more power in what the Board did with the Student Center.24
Several

changes

were

made

to

increase

recruitment

of

black

students as well as giving them financial assistance to attend SMU.
In

the

summer

of

1969

two

black

students

were

employed

by

the

university as admissions counselors to assist in bringing more black
students

to

closely

with

recruiting

campus.
black

The

two

students

activities”.

In

counselors
on

campus

addition,

a

were
and

“encouraged
enlist

black

their

faculty

to

work

aid

member

in
was

invited to serve on the admissions committee to help the two student
employees.

By the fall of 1969, 50 new black students had been

brought in to SMU with more to follow quickly.
24

“BLAACS get Reply”,

As for financial aid,

Daily Campus, May 2, 1969, 2, 5, 12.
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officials at SMU began exploring the possibilities of making funds
available to students who would not have been able to attend the
university without such help. 25
Altering the structure of the Liberal Studies Department was the
next issue that university officials made recommended changes based on
BLAACS petition.
in

a

way

that

Tate and others felt the program should be organized
reflected

the

“accomplishments,

problems,

and

aspirations of Black people both historically and in the contemporary
world. In order to achieve the desired effect, the University College
Council recommended revisions to the Nature of Man course as well as
the Twentieth Century course at SMU to provide more content relevant
to the black experience.

The Black and White class was also changed

to provide a “more in-depth study of the Black and White situation”.
In addition the council wanted to employ more black instructors in the
department “on a substantial basis beyond the point of tokenism”.
According to Dean of Students Joe Howell nine black faculty members
were added in the fall of 1969 that were “scattered throughout the
University College and the School of Humanities and Science”. 26
Black employees at SMU also garnered attention by Tate because of
the petition by BLAACs.

The first thing Tate promised was to make

sure as many employees on campus as possible received $1.60 per hour
which was minimum wage at the time.

He noted that the university

would take into account merit and length of service of workers in
25

Ibid. Ken Hunt, “Black Courses Readied for Fall”, Daily Campus,
August 28, 1969, 6.
26
“Blacks get Reply”, Daily Campus, May 2, 1969, 2, 5, 12. Susan
Maxwell, “Black Demands, Part II: Jobs and Classes”, Daily Campus,
September 11, 1969, 2.
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regards to pay increases.

The university established a review board

to also determine financial compensation for all employees and the
board would include black workers.

Black laborers were given a proper

grievance procedure so they would not be afraid to complain about
their

white

superiors.

Staff

members

were

made

aware

on

initial

employment of the opportunities for their children to take advantage
of grants in order to attend SMU.
continue
positions,

to

“recruit

such

as

qualified

those

recently

The University also promised to
black
hired

persons
as

for

Director

supervisory
of

Services and Building Coordinator of the Student Center”.
it

clear

that

there

were

several

blacks

employed

in

Volunteer
Tate made

supervisory

positions including the foreman at the Central Plant and a new officer
on the campus security force.

Even so, SMU would continue to offer

more opportunities for black employees on campus. 27
Forming an Afro-American Studies program was a big concern for
BLAACS, and Tate provided a nuanced response that helped start the
department at SMU.

The Planning Board of the School of Humanities and

Sciences gave approval to appoint a committee that would develop a
proposal for Afro-American Studies.

SMU committed to modifying and

further developing present courses in the curriculum dealing with the
subject.

Once the program was implemented, it would be under the

tutelage of a black director. The coordinator would have input from
faculty committees and students involved with BLAACS to help formulate
the course work for the program.

27

Ibid.

Finally, according to Tate, “The
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most suitable academic structure for this enlarged program will be
established”. 28
One

of

the

crucial

components

of

the

Afro-American

Studies

program at SMU was that it would be under the leadership of a black
director.

The person chosen to be in charge of the department was

Irving Baker.

Former executive vice president of Bishop College in

Dallas, he was appointed by Tate in the summer of 1969 to head AfroAmerican

Studies.

Baker

was

the

perfect

choice

because

he

was

familiar with SMU prior to his directorship. He had been a political
science professor and in addition to his director duties, Baker was
made special assistant to Tate.

In other words, he was familiar with

both academics and administration of the university,

and each would

be vital to his success as director of the new program.

Tate was not

the only one to think that Baker was the right fit to lead the new

program.

Vice President Neill McFarland also felt this way when

he said upon Baker’s hiring that, “he is very enthusiastic and
quite candid.

He’s a charming person and at ease and doesn’t really

have the hang-ups most of us have.

I don’t care what color he is…he

is a great asset to SMU”. 29
Once Baker was added to the staff, he began the
building the Afro-American Studies program at SMU.

process of

Baker quickly

developed a degree program proposal that was ready for submission to
the faculty in the fall of 1969.

28

He noted that he wanted to achieve

Ibid.
Irving Baker, Interviewed by Neill McFarland, October 12, 2001, SMU
Video Archive Series , #3003, found at digitalcollections.smu.edu.
“Staff Adds Baker”, Daily Campus, August 28, 1969, 2.
29
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two things with the new department.

One was the development of new

courses that highlighted the black experience and culture.
thing

Baker

wanted

was

to

give

“a

new,

The second

inclusive,

relevant

interpretation to factual material in the various disciplines—history,
literature, economics, religion”.
would

raise

black

awareness

Practically speaking, the program

which

Baker

felt

was

necessary

“if

students are to have the breadth and scope of the experiences they
need for today’s society”.

Not only was this important for black

students but for white students as well. 30
The last demand that Tate negotiated with BLAACS fell under the
general category of human relation.

The first thing Tate recommended

was the creation of a human relations board that would be made up of
students from various ethnicities.
faculty

and

administration

be

Tate also endorsed the idea that

allowed

on

the

board

as

well.

In

addition to the board Tate acknowledged “the request for a house for
social and business affairs for Black students as a legitimate one”.
Shortly thereafter, university officials began searching the campus
for a house that would fit Tate’s criterion to help black students
transition from an all-black world to the predominantly white one they
faced on campus at Southern Methodist University.

The house had to be

open to all students at all times and follow University regulations. 31
Tate’s concluding statements regarding the petition made it clear
that he intended to honor all the commitments he had set forth for
each demand.
30

He would constantly review the new polices put in place

Ken Hunt, “Black Courses Readied for Fall”, Daily Campus, August 28,
1969, 6.
31
“BLAACS get Reply”, Daily Campus, May 2, 1969, 2, 5, 12.
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by the administration and make changes as he deemed necessary.

One

reason Tate was willing to do so is because the students involved with
BLAACS

went

through

petition heard.

the

proper

university

channels

to

get

their

Tate made sure the university community knew this

when he stated, “Commendation must be made again of the seriousness
and rational conduct of the black students.

While free to dissent,

they have not once resorted to pressure tactics or disruption to win
their points”.

If violence and disruption had occurred, Tate would

have been less willing to negotiate with BLAACS which in turn may have
actually precipitated SMU’s black protests to become more like that of
other schools. 32
Despite

the

fact

that

BLAACS

had

gone

through

the

correct

procedures in presenting their demands, not everyone on campus agreed
with Tate’s decision to negotiate with the organization.

In the fall

of 1969 twenty-eight student leaders at SMU voiced their difference of
opinion with Tate and the administration saying they “surrendered to
imposed threats and deadlines”.

BLAACS committed “systematic piracy”

as university officials stood idly by and did nothing according to the
group.

Warren Russell, senior history major and president pro tempore

of the student senate, feared the administration’s negotiations with
BLAACS would “cheapen the value of a degree” at SMU.

He was perplexed

as to why Tate would capitulate to the demands of BLAACS because that
is

all

they

were-demands.

Russell,

and

other

elected

student

officials, felt that the petition created by BLAACS was not presented
to the people at “the level of its most immediate concern”.
32

Ibid.
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they took it straight to the president ignoring student government
protocol.

Because BLAACS went straight to Tate, he was coerced into

giving in to the demands according to Russell. 33
Tate responded to the charge of the university student leaders,
as well as civic organizations in Dallas, by denying that a breakdown
occurred

in

SMU’s

chain

of

command.

Tate

told

friends

in

the

community that the academic integrity of SMU had never and will never
be compromised because of a group like BLAACS.

His mantra to everyone

concerned was always, “We are not going to give this University away”.
In August of 1969 Tate sent out a letter to faculty, staff, and
students that said disruption of the University’s normal functioning
would not be tolerated.

Pledges to BLAACS were not made in duress and

never would be according to Tate.

All students admitted to SMU would

be expected to maintain the academic standards of the university.
Tate reiterated that the university would not give in to violence like
at other schools and he intended to keep it that way at SMU as long as
he was president.

The Dallas Times Herald agreed that “while the

educational process at many another American college has denigrated
into turmoil and violence, SMU has, for the most part remained serene
and at peace.

Tate has now come a long way toward ensuring it will

stay that way”. 34
Whether
BLAACS

33

is

there

were

irrelevant

critics

because

of

Tate

Tate’s
had

plan

already

to

negotiate

agreed

to

with

certain

Jean Kelly, “Students Attack SMU: Surrender to Negro Threats
Charged”, Dallas Morning News, August 16, 1969.
34
“SMU’s President Eases Public Concern”, SMU Update, Vol. 1, No. 4,
Fall 1969, 1 and 5.

163
changes on all six demands.

Being a man of principle, he was not

going to back down on that promise.

The petition was SMU’s version of

the Civil Rights Movement, and it had been offered without violence
and disruption.

According to Anga Sanders, “The Civil Rights Movement

at SMU did not take on the same violent tone as it did as many schools
across the country.

Yet it was still enough.

perfect, but we were perfect for SMU”.

We may not have been

Rufus Cormier was a black

football player at SMU during the late 1960s who was also a member of
BLAACS.

He echoed Sanders sentiment when he said, “There was not a

sense that this was a place that was unaccepting or hostile to us.

It

was a situation where we needed progress, but not a situation where we
needed revolution”. 35
The progress described by Rufus Cormier was achieved in part
because the Black League of Afro-American and African College Students
was willing to participate in a calm rebellion at Southern Methodist
University.

The organization pushed for change, but it did so within

the boundaries of the university structure.

Because of the lack of

violence, President Willis Tate was willing to bring change to benefit
black students at SMU.

35

Anga Sanders Speaks at SMU, February 22, 2011, Found on YouTube.
Rufus Cormier, Phone Interview, August 17, 2012.
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Conclusion
The University followed a strategy of quiet but positive progress
towards making SMU a university open to all who could meet its
admissions standards.
I believed that we would get more done if we
did not debate it or confront people with it. 1

Desegregation started at Southern Methodist University as early
as

1950

when

Trustees

to

then

President

change

the

Umphrey

school’s

Lee

bylaws

to

admittance of African American students.
process

would

begin

almost

convinced
allow

for

the

Board

the

of

eventual

Little did Lee know that

immediately.

SMU

admitted

two

black

students in the fall of 1951, and the university started down the path
towards change.

While the two students failed by the end of the fall,

and true desegregation did not pick up in earnest until the following
year, SMU had begun a process that the university would not back down
from in the coming years.

SMU started breaking down racial barriers

before the Methodist Church with which the school was affiliated.
one expected SMU to lead the way among the Methodist seminaries.

No
The

hope was that Duke University and/or Emory University would lead the
way in 1952.

Rather, it was SMU that became the first Methodist

seminary to open its doors to black students.
more

years

meantime,

before
SMU

it

moved

came
ahead

to

terms

of

the

with

Church,

The Church took sixteen
desegregation.
as

well

as

In
the

the

other

Methodist seminaries, in regards to race divisions. In addition to
this, SMU also began removing the obstacles to equality before the
city of Dallas.
1

While desegregation in Dallas occurred quietly and

Gerald McGee, “On the Ups and Downs”, Interview with Willis Tate, in
Johnnie Marie Grimes, Willis Tate: Views and Interviews (Dallas:
Southern Methodist University Press, 1978), 167.
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without many problems, it was years after SMU had already achieved
that same goal on campus.
about

desegregation

at

Although many individuals helped bring

SMU,

none

were

more

important

advancement than Merrimon Cuninggim and Willis Tate.

in

the

Both received

their respective posts at SMU in the early 1950s and worked tirelessly
to open the doors of the university to black students.

They operated

behind

occur

the

without

scenes

the

to

fanfare

across the country.

make

and

sure

desegregation

violence

associated

would

with

numerous

at

SMU

schools

Even when SMU experienced black student protests

by the late 1960s, that “disturbance” took on a calm demeanor.
One of the unsung heroes of desegregation at SMU was also one of
the

most

visible

figures

on

campus.

When

Hayden

Fry

became

the

football coach at SMU in the early 1960s, he accepted the job with the
promise that he would be allowed to recruit black players.
so

he

advanced

Southwest

desegregation

Conference.

Fry

not

was

only

willing

at

SMU,

to

be

but
the

conference when other more powerful coaches were not.

By doing

also

in

the

leader

in

the

He grew up in

segregated Odessa, Texas and did not think it was fair that his black
friends could not play football with him in high school.

From then

on, Fry swore that if he was ever in a position of power to change
that situation he would.

SMU afforded that position when they hired

him to coach the Mustangs.

Once Fry was given the green light he

recruited Jerry LeVias, and in doing so changed the course of football
in the Southwest Conference.
While

Southern

Methodist

had

dynamic

desegregation, the Methodist Church did not.

leaders

to

bring

about

At least none that were
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in positions of power until the mid-1960s.
church

had

Methodists’

was

Edgar

Love,

organizational

but

his

structure

The closest thing the

initiative

failed

in

to

the

reform
early

the

1950s.

Others tried after Love but were not successful, and it was not until
the late 1960s when the Central Jurisdiction was finally ended.
Unlike the Church, the city of Dallas did have at least a few
dynamic

leaders

that

were

peacefully and quietly.

willing

to

bring

about

desegregation

While the process was not started quite as

early as SMU, the Dallas Citizens Council ensured that it would be as
smooth as possible.

The group wanted to keep economic investment high

in Dallas, and in order to do that desegregation had to come slowly
and without incident. Because of the leadership of the DCC that is
exactly what happened.

The personalities in the business community of

Dallas were similar to those on campus at SMU.

In both instances,

desegregation came in an organized manner facilitated by leaders that
knew how best to control the pace.
During the early 1950s, Southern Methodist University was a small
private school.

Between 1950 and 1953, when the university started to

desegregate, the average student population was just under 8,000 The
school was in a city that was not a hub of the civil rights movement.
It was affiliated with a church that had just started to formally
segregate whites and blacks in 1939.

SMU does not seem to fit the

traditional model of desegregation that is usually told.

There was no

court order in 1950 to force SMU to desegregate like at the flagship
university in Texas.
required

to

achieve

At some of these schools, federal troops were
desegregation

despite

the

court

orders.

No
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similar institutions were even thinking about desegregation at the
time.

When

problems

other

with

private

the

universities

administration

did

often

start

to

occurred.

desegregate,
Violence

and

controversy, especially when accompanying an issue as sensitive as
desegregation,

provided

copy.

Media

coverage

was

exponentially

greater at the University of Mississippi, the University of Alabama,
the

University

of

Texas,

etc.

students provided a story.

where

bringing

in

the

first

black

SMU was the opposite in that it quietly

admitted black students behind the scenes; therefore it was not as
entertaining to the general public.
On the surface, since SMU’s desegregation did not provide much
news copy, it would seem the story does not need to be told.

On the

contrary, that is what makes SMU relevant to the desegregation grand
narrative.

SMU provides an alternative model to that of the large

state schools in regards to desegregation.

Since it was a private

school that did not have to desegregate when it did, the university
was able to control the pace and do so quietly.

University officials

purposely kept decisions on the matter in house so the media could not
create a firestorm like at other schools.

This is precisely why

desegregation went so smoothly at SMU, and why the account should be
told.
and

SMU’s desegregation is one of peaceful change, perseverance,

university

fashion.

officials

taking

care

of

business

in

an

orderly

Total integration did not happen overnight on campus, but by

not pushing for too much change too quickly SMU had virtually no
problems.
schools.

The
The

same
courts

cannot
did

be

not

said
get

of

many

involved,

of
the

the

larger

cameras

state

were

not
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flashing, and the students did not riot.
worthy,

it

did

allow

SMU

to

ease

While that may not be news

into

desegregation

without

any

outside pressure to do more or less than the school wanted at any
given time.
In 1952, Southern Methodist University admitted five black men to
the school.

The total enrollment of the university at the time was

7,741 so the black students accounted for less than 1% of the student
body. In the fall of 2012, there were 702 black students enrolled at
SMU a figure that equates to 6.4% of the student body.

While the

percentage may not be that high, it is a significant increase from the
time the university started to desegregate to the present.

As a

private school SMU continues to maintain high academic standards, but
the statistic shows that the school did not turn away from admitting
black students once the initial desegregation push had been made.
Like desegregation itself, the number of black students on campus has
steadily increased over the years to its current enrollment.

If you

compare SMU’s current enrollment of black students to the University
of Arkansas and the University of Texas the percentage is actually
higher.

During the spring of 2013, the University of Arkansas had

1,212 black students enrolled out of a student population of 23,286 or
5.2% of the total of the campus enrollment.

In the fall of 2012, the

University of Texas had 2,126 black students out of 52,186 which was
4.1% of the total population. The reason these two statistics are
important is these are the two schools in the Southwest Conference
that desegregated before SMU.
significantly

larger

than

Both are public institutions that are
SMU.

Both

had

more

problems

with

169
desegregation than SMU, not just in admitting the first black students
but in getting people on their respective campuses to even allow for
the possibility.

The small campus of SMU in the 1950s allowed for a

better environment to start desegregation. That trend continues to the
present as seen in the aforementioned statistics. 2
Today, there is no direct push for increasing diversity at SMU,
but

there

are

certain

already on campus.

things

in

place

fund

recognize

the

diversity

The Multicultural Resource Center is designed to

promote diversity awareness on campus.
Scholarship

to

was

developed

to

In 2012, a Black Alumni of SMU

give

financial

aid

to

a

rising

sophomore or above that has shown academic success at the school.

In

order to be eligible for the scholarship, the student has to be a
member of the Association of Black Students, which appears to be a
similar organization to BLAACS of the 1960s.

While SMU may not be

actively recruiting black students, there are still entities on campus
that tie SMU to its past—a past that saw SMU become one of the first
schools of its kind in the South to open its doors to black students. 3

2

Bulletin of Southern Methodist University: Administration and
Supplementary Information (Catalog Number: Part X) For the 1952-1953
Sessions”, Southern Methodist University Archives, DeGolyer Library,
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
smu.edu/ir/Publications/Fact_Sheet_2012/Fact_Sheet_Index_2012.asp.
uark.edu/students/pdfs/Spring2013EnrlRpt.pdf.
utexas.edu/sites/ut/rpt/Documents/IMA_S_EnrollAnalysis_2012_Fall.pdf.
3
Anga Sanders, personal email, March 24, 2013.
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